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The present research is devoted to a study of the ongoing legal reform
in contemporary China, with special reference to its rule of law [fazhi
V'iVn] project. The aim of the reform is to build China into a modern
state with a legal system suitable for a market economy and also to
improve the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). The official-preached version of the rule of law is a socialist
rule of law with Chinese characteristics. What is the real meaning of
this formulation? What motivations are behind the legal reform? What
tasks does this reform set for itself? And what model does it follow?
With these questions in mind, I would like to conduct an
exploration into the relationship between political legitimacy and the
rule of law, and then trace the process of CCP's seeking legitimacy
since the late 1970s. The Party-controlled discussion over issues
relating to the rule of law shows that the regime has repeatedly
rejected the Western model of rule of law as alien and unsuitable for
socialist China, and that it has tried all the time to replace it with the
concept of rule by law [fazhi, ?£ ffrj ] through regularisation and
institutionalisation of the state and society to strengthen its power.
What the regime needs from legal reform is to use the law to regulate
the economy, the bureaucracy, and the society while the ruling Party
is able to stay above law and control the situation at all times.
However, non-official scholars, albeit under the Party's political and
ideological restrictions and supervisions, argue that the model for
China's rule of law should be a top-down and government-enforced,
and gradual and slow, process, by taking advantage of Western legal
rules and Chinese legal tradition and by being guided by the Party.
The focus of China's legal reform is to realise a government of
exercising administrative power according to law [yi fa xingzheng, \k
?&]. Chinas' legal reform is thus carried out without political
democracy and freedom, and the political reform is confined within
the administrative system.
It is fundamental in a society that the political and
administrative power should be constrained by the law in order to
establish a real rule of law. In order to illustrate the characteristics of
China's socialist version of the rule of law, I would like to devote the
following part of this thesis from Chapter Two to Chapter Six to a
critical review of the role of the Party and government in the legal
reform to see whether there is an effective administrative legal system
to regulate and curb state power, whether the law is able to protect the
rights of individuals and enterprises, whether the judiciary is powerful
enough to check official arbitrariness, and whether there is a
favourable legal culture for promoting the rule of law.
From a close study of legal documents and cases conducted in
previous chapters, this thesis will conclude that, within the current
political framework, a socialist rule-of-law system with Chinese
characteristics, which is designed to strengthen the Party-state power
rather than weaken it, is nothing other than a legalist rule by law with
the Party-state remaining above the law. This is the fundamental cause
for the frustration and constraint for implementing the rule of law. In
contemporary China, there is in general not a real rule of law simply
because it is in conflict with the Party's efforts to strengthen its raw
political power.
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Chapter One: Introduction
—A Socialist Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics
1. The problem of legitimacy and China's response
Whenever radical social change happens, the model of authority usually has to transform
itself in order to regain legitimacy. According to Max Weber, there have been three ideal
types (or pure types) of authority during the transformation from a traditional society into a
modern one.1 These three types, the patrimonial, charismatic, and legal-rational modes, have
had a long-term impact on the study of social modernisation and political legitimacy.
Weber argues that human society has experienced a gradual evolution from relying
first on "an established belief in the sanctity" of the divine right of monarchs, then on
"devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person,
and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him," and then on a legal-
rational model based on a belief in legalising normative rules and the government decision¬
making being limited by these rules.2
The legal-rational model of legitimacy emphasises rationality and the supremacy of
law. The rules here must be objective and impersonal, and the ruler is subject to the same
laws as everyone else since these rules are widely accepted by society. Obedience on the part
of subjects is given to formal norms rather than to persons.3 A Weberian legal-rational model
or legal dominance, based on Western democratic societies, has long been regarded as a
model of political legitimacy in modern society. However, scholars of comparative
communism argue that legitimacy in the communist world does not necessarily have to be
based on a legal-rational type, and instead can focus on goal-rationality based on Communist
goals.4 In other words, a socialist country may justify its legitimacy by designing certain
goals in different periods by mainly relying on officials rather than the people, in the absence
of the rule of law and political democracy. This goal-rationality based on communist
ideology and command leadership has served as a form of legitimacy in many communist
societies such as the former Soviet Union and pre-reformed People's Republic of China
(PRC).
1 For his account of the three ideal types of leadership, see Max Weber, Economy and Society: An
Outline ofInterpretive Sociology (New York: Bedminster, 1968).
2
Weber, pp. 227 and 241-245.
3
Weber, pp. 217-219.
4 For his full account of goal rationality, see T H Rigby, "Introduction: Political Legitimacy, Weber
and Communist Mono-Organisational Systems", in T H Rigby & F Feher (eds.), Political
Legitimation in Communist States (London: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 1-26.
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However, Holmes argues that in many communist states this goal-rational legitimacy
has encountered serious crisis and started to change since the 1980s.5 These countries have
started to seek legitimacy both from the people and the officials primarily in terms of
economic performance and social welfare. Thus, improvement in economic performance and
social welfare, which according to Holmes, is often referred to as social eudaemonic
legitimation, could be effective as a model of legitimacy. This eudaemonic model is usually
used by the communist countries to improve their legitimacy by satisfying the growing
material aspirations of the people.6 With the improvement in living standards, people's
attitude towards the government will change, and the Communists will remain firmly in
control.
At the same time, however, Holmes claims that the eudaemonic model could also
become problematic to the leadership and the legitimate process.7 A good economic
performance requires reforming both the economic and political systems, leading inevitably
to a diminution of officials' power and interests. During reform times, in order to maintain its
legitimacy, the state has to appeal more to the people than to its officials by emphasising
restricting state power and protecting private rights. With the economic reform intensified,
officials will increasingly become obstructive since their decision-making power will be
further limited. China's widespread corruption and anti-corruption campaigns, as he
observes, is a symbol of crisis of legitimation.8 If economic reform fails to reach its goals,
the process could engender growing hostility among the officials towards the regime,
"leaving both an alienated staff [bureaucrat] and a frustrated citizenry."9
It follows from this that eudaemonism sooner or later proves inadequate because
demands in society for a deeper move into legal-rationality will increase as the reform
continues. Yet this demand for legal rationality, or for the rule of law, will ultimately
become incompatible with communist ideology and its political system. The ideology will be
adapted to changing circumstances and thus become blurred, giving rise to an identity crisis
to the existing leadership. Holmes believes that such a conflict will eventually endanger the
process of legitimation and further result in collapse of a communist system, as happened in
the Eastern European communist bloc.10 Unless the leadership really committed itself to the
rule of law, its legitimacy would be insecure. However, such commitment to the rule of law
5 Leslie Holmes, The End ofCommunist Power: Anti-Corruption Campaign and Legitimation Crisis











will eventually result in the dissolution of an authoritarian regime, requiring the leadership to
completely deny its ideology and ruling position.
The communist regime's attempt at political legitimacy is happening in China.
When Deng Xiaoping came to power in the late 1970s, he faced a profound crisis of
legitimacy for the leadership of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its ideology. In order
to rebuild the Party-state's legitimacy, Deng launched a policy of economic reform and an
opening-up project with the goal of improving people's living standards and realising the
"four modernisations" (of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national
defence). At the same time, Deng called for the strengthening of socialist democracy and the
legal system in order to regularise the government and prevent the recurrence of upheavals
like the Cultural Revolution, during which Deng and many other senior politicians suffered
persecution or torture.
The process of legitimation in China is primarily an ideological adjustment. In order
to justify universal reforms, Deng Xiaoping brought forth a theory of a socialist country with
Chinese characteristics. Over the last twenty years the CCP has carried out several
experimental stages in finding a balance and combination between a market economy and
socialism. In order to seek ideological justification for a socialist market economy, the Party
preached a theory of a socialist preliminary stage in which the primary task is to develop a
commodity economy and thus a market economy and legal rules are necessary. In 1992, the
CCP made a breakthrough in its ideology by introducing the goal of building up a socialist
market economy. In order to form a legal framework for a socialist market, the CCP further
endorsed the goal of building a socialist country based on the rule of law in 1997 and revised
the constitution in 1999 accordingly.
Since 1978, China's official discourse in legal development has correspondingly
evolved from a requirement "to strengthen socialist democracy and the legal system"
A
[jiaqiang shehuiziiyi minzhu he fazhi, to the need to "administer
the state according to law and build a socialist country based on the rule of law" \yi fa zhi
guo, jianli shehuizhuyi fazhi guo, ® H]. Lately Jiang Zemin
calls for "combining the rule of law with rule of virtue" [yi fa zhi guo yu yi de zhi guo xiang
jiehe, ffc&Vn n"].11 The new goal of building a market economy and its
subsequent remarkable achievements, for the time being, appease public discontent about the
11
Jiang Zemin raised this discourse on his tour of Guangdong in early 2000. Later next year, he gave
a speech in which he required that rule of virtue and rule of law to be implemented in building up the
Party and state. See Comment of Renmin ribao, "Ba yi fa zhi guo he yi de zhi guo jiehe qilai" [To
combine administering the state according to law with administering the state according to virtue],
Renmin ribao, 1 February 2001, p. 1.
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Party leadership in the past, especially, during the Cultural Revolution, its crackdown on the
1989 Democratic Movement, widespread political corruption, and social inequality.12 Thus,
from goal-rationality to economic performance, the Party leadership eventually, might
reluctantly, finds that a legal-rational type cannot be avoided for building its legitimacy. This
shows that the Party has realised that economic performance alone is not sufficient to
maintain its legitimacy; and that the rule of law is necessary for strengthening its ruling
position through legalising the economy and administrative power.
However, the rule of law is a double-edged sword to the regime. On the one hand,
the rule of law is used to fulfil the goals such as economic development and the removal of
official corruption, which are also crucial to the process of legitimation. On the other hand,
however, the establishment of a genuine rule of law will undeniably endanger the power of
the CCP. It is hard to suggest that the CCP could strike a balance: to grant a limited degree
of legal-rational rule to promote economic growth and curb corruption but not extend the
legal-rational principles so far that the Party control of political power is threarened. It is
unclear whether the communist leadership endeavours to elevate the rule of law to a superior
position among its many other goals, and whether the ruling elite itself voluntarily accepts
meaningful constraints by law. If the leadership has treated the rule of law with an
ambivalent attitude, contradictions and dilemmas will exist from the very beginning and
become increasingly prominent with further moves towards legal rationality. This conflict
will cause powerful resistance among the bureaucracy to deeper reforms of the political
system, and correspondingly legal reform will be restricted within certain boundaries.
There are many theoretical problems remaining to be defined and debated, such as
whether establishing the rule of law will eventually fortify the CCP's legitimacy, how China
will resolve the conflict between the rule of law and the Party supremacy over state and
society, what model of China's rule of law will adopt, how the pace of economic reform will
affect legal reform, and whether the current legal reform will eventually lead China to the
rule of law. In order to understand these questions, it is necessary to examine both official
and academic debates on legal reform and also the process of legal reform itself, since these
decide the future and direction of legal reform. It is also important to review legal scholars'
research on the rule of law with Chinese characteristics, the achievements and constraints of
legal reform, as well as Western assessment of China's rule of law.
12
Henry Rosemont, "Asia: China's New Economic Reforms: Replacing Iron Rice Bowls with Plastic
Cups", Z Magazine, 8 September 2002 (http://www.zmag.org/zmag/articles/rosemontjune98.htm).
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2. A socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics
(1) Official debate on the rule of law
China's legal culture is an "elite legal culture"13. It is only fragmentary ideas manifested by
top rulers, like Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen and Jiang Zemin, backed up by institute scholars
or scholar-officials. Deng Xiaoping's idea of law is a part of his theory of socialism with
Chinese characteristics. By referring to the phrase "strengthening the legal system" rather
than the rule of law, he used the two terms "institutionalisation" and "legalisation" [zhiduhua
he fazhihua, MS. if^P& rfrji-t], to instruct the direction of legal development. As a result,
legal construction in Deng's realm aims to regularise the work of the government and
maintain social order through massive work on legislation and institutional building.
Deng Xiaoping's legal thinking, although fragmentary, contains some preliminary
principles required by the rule of law. His legal ideas are highlighted in a widely-quoted
paragraph: "In order to safeguard people's democracy, it is imperative to strengthen the
socialist legal system so that democracy is systematised and written into law in such a way
as to ensure the stability, continuity and full authority of this democratic system and laws;
there must be laws for people to follow, these laws must be observed, their enforcement must
be strict and lawbreakers must be dealt with."14 [the italicised part refers to the sixteen
characters of Deng's legal thought: you fa ke yi, you fa bi yi, zhifa bi yan, weifa bi jiu, fjtf
hT'K. This paragraph is summed up by both official
and academic circles as bearing four features of a modern legal system: to perfect the law, to
observe the law and to act according to law, to ensure equality before the law, and to
strengthen the supreme authority of the law.15
In review of lessons from the Cultural Revolution, Deng realises the need to restrict
state power, separate the Party from government, and rely on law rather than man to resolve
problems. In doing this, he calls for legalising the ideology and Party policy through making
laws to justify them, and regularising state management. According to him,
institutionalisation of state and government power is a guarantee for preventing individual
13 Pitman B. Potter, "Foundations of Elite Legal Culture in the PRC: The Influence of Peng Zhen", in
Association for Asian Studies (USA): AAS Abstract: China Session 211, access on 4 July 2001
(http://www.aasianst.org/absts/1996abst/china/c21 l.htm). For Potter's other studies of China's legal
culture, see, "Riding the Tiger: Legitimacy and Legal Culture in Post-Mao China", The China
Quarterly, no. 138 (1994), pp. 325-358, and his book, The Chinese Legal System: Globalisation and
Local Legal Cidture (London: Routledge, 2001).
14 The Communique of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the Central Committee of the
CCP (held on 22 December 1978), Beijing Review, no. 52 (29 December 1978), p. 14.
15
Zhang Zhengde, "Women de mubiao shi shehuizhuyi fazhi guo" [Our goal is a socialist country
based on the rule of law], Xiandai faxue, no. 5 (1988), p. 13.
5
arbitrariness, and the correct handling of the relationship between the Party and the
government is crucial to reducing the instances of the rule of man.16 He attributes the
phenomena of rule ofman and the lawlessness during the Cultural Revolution to the Chinese
tradition of the excessive centralisation of political and economic powers.17 He said, "Very
often, what leaders say is taken to be the law and anyone who disagrees is called a law¬
breaker. Such laws change whenever a leader's views change."18 He claims that "democracy
has to be institutionalised and written into law, so as to make sure that institutions and laws
do not change whenever the leadership changes or whenever the leaders change their
views."19
Deng Xiaoping calls for building up a set of supervision systems in order to
effectively control the power and avoid the mistake of Mao and Stalin.20 At the same time,
he requires to design a set of supervision mechanisms with Chinese characteristics in order
to restrict state power in a limited extent without hampering efficient management. He says:
"Excessive power concentration hampers the enforcement of socialist democracy and the
Party's democratic centralism, the development of socialist construction, and the
development of collective wisdom and causes individual arbitrariness".21 He also says, "If
excessive emphasis is placed on a mutually limited system, it maybe still cannot solve the
problem".22
He disregards the idea that officials and Party members should enjoy privileges and
requires that state officials should be equal to ordinary before the law, and especially Party
members should be constrained by Party constitution and discipline. He says that "citizens
are equal before the law, and [Party] members are equal before the Party constitution and
discipline. Everyone enjoys equal rights and bears legal liabilities. Nobody can take
advantage or breach the law. Whoever breaches the law must be put under investigation by
the public security agencies and tried by the judicial agencies. Nobody is permitted to
10
Deng Xiaoping , "Guanyu zhengzhi tizhi gaige wenti" [On the problem of reform of political
system], in Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, vol. 3 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), p. 177.
17
Deng Xiaoping, "Gaige dang he guojia de lingdao zhidu" (Reforming the leadership system of Party
and state), Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984), p. 333. as for
translation ofDeng's word cited from vol. 2,1 have consulted its English version with very little
change (see Selected Works ofDeng Xiaoping, 1975-1982, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1984, pp.
157-158).
18
Deng Xiaoping , "Jiefang sixiang, shi shi qiu shi, tuanjie yiahi xiang qian kan" [Emancipate the
mind, seek the truth from facts and unite as one in looking to the future], Wenxuan, vol. 2, p. 136.
19 Ibid.
20
Deng Xiaoping , vol. 2, pp. 331 and 333.
21 Ibid, p. 321.
22
Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, p. 256.
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interfere in the implementation of the law, and anyone who infringes the law must not escape
from legal punishment."23
In addition, he stresses the importance of legal education among the public, calling
for improving people's legal consciousness [falii yishi, in all social sectors,
including schools, Party organisations, government agencies, enterprises and individuals.24
He considers that the criteria for evaluating laws and legal systems are their ability to
improve people's material life, to foster spiritual civilisation in the socio-cultural area and to
promote democracy in the political realm.25
At the same time, however, Deng Xiaoping regards political stability and economic
growth as two prime concerns in the process of promoting democracy and strengthening the
legal system.26 Legal construction has always been viewed in official texts as part of socialist
spiritual civilisation [shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming, z? i SL fit 'St UJ ], which
encompasses traditional values, socialist ideology and Party goals. It has been written into
the constitution as a spiritual fence against Western influences.27 Deng calls for the grasping
of economic reform and construction with one hand, and law and socialist spiritual
civilisation with the other, with equal priority and toughness [liang shou zhua, liang shou
dou yao ying, The aim for the "two grasps" is the attaining of
economic growth while resisting the influence ofWestern liberal thought.
The ideological boundary Deng designs for all-round reform is the "four cardinal
principles (FCP)": adhering to the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Party
leadership and Marxist-Leninist Theory and Maoist thought.28 This restriction has set a
bottomline for the reformers and also provided hope for pragmatic thinking. As Carlos
Wing-Hung Lo comments, "on the one hand, 'the four cardinal principles' were designed to
provide an ideological safeguard against the possibility that emancipating the mind from
dogmatism could lead to the negation of Marxism. On the other hand, the fact that they were




Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, p. 360.
25 Ibid, p. 315.
26 Ibid, p. 330.
27
"Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa" [The constitution of the PRC], article 126, promulgated in 4
December 1982 at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress. In Zhonghua renmin
gongheguofalii huibian, 1979-1984 [Collection of PRC laws] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1985), pp.
17-20.
28
Deng Xiaoping, "Jianchi si xiang jiben yuanze" [Upholding the four cardinal principles], Vol. 2, pp.
150-151.
29 Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, "Socialist Legal Theory in Deng Xiaoping's China", Columbia Journal of
Asian Law, no. 11 (1997), p. 477.
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Thus Deng's institutionalisation and legalisation is not the same as the rule of law.
Law is used to serve the Party's economic goals and strengthen its ruling position as well as
its ideology, rather than put the Party under the control of law. Eventually law is an
instrument at the Party's discretion. His legal reform is based on strict ideological and
political restriction without allowing for changes to socialist system and one Party rule. This
can be well demonstrated from the Party's call for a halt to the reform on the separation of
the Party and the government in the late 1980s. During that time there were growing calls for
human rights and political democracy, finally propelling the 1989 Democratic Movement.
The plan for limited political reform, which was formulated by Zhao Ziyang in the
Thirteenth CCP Congress held in 1987 and based on Deng's ideas at the time on reforming
the Party and state system, aimed to separate the Party and government, government and
business, and to absorb more intellectuals into the leadership.30
Since 1989, however, the CCP has become very cautious about political reform in
fear of a Soviet-like breakdown. The regime repeatedly stresses the utmost importance of
stability and development. Party control over all sectors is strengthened. The Party, on the
one hand, reaffirms that political reform will remain an important goal, while on the other
hand it adjusts the goal of political reform to improve government efficiency, strengthen the
vitality of Party and state, combat bureaucracy and corruption, and foster enthusiasm among
the people for political participation at rural levels.31 Deng later viewed the idea of
separation of Party and the government as a manifestation of "bourgeois liberalisation."32
Instead, he said that the Party must change its working style by focusing on more important
decision making processes and the separation of the day-to-day running of state affairs. One
basic strategy was to make Party policies into state laws through legal procedures, with the
Party then taking the lead to abide by these laws within the constitution. By doing so, the
Party leadership would be strengthened and the working efficiency of the government would
be improved since these laws were based on Party lines, policies, and goals.
30 Su Shaozhi (the former director of the Institute of Maxism-Leninsm Studies of the China's
Academy of Social Science and went to America after Zhao Ziyang's leaving from the power), "Deng
Xiaoping shidai Zhonggong zhengzhi tizhi gaige de lilun he shijian" [Theory and practice of the CCP
on reforming the political system in Deng Xiaoping era], Dangdai Zhongguo yanjiu, 66: 3 (1999),
accessed on 4 March 2002 (http://www.chinayj.net/StubArticle.asp?issue=990305&total=66).
31 For example, see Deng Xiaoping (18 Januaray-21 February 1992), "Zai Wuchang, Shenzhen,
Zhuhai, Shanghai deng di de tanhua yaodian" [Summary of the talk in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai,
and Shanghai], wenxuan, vol. 3, pp. 379 and 381.
32
Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, p. 302 and vol. 3, p. 324. For a detailed discussion of Deng's criticism of
Zhao Ziyang and its impact on China's political reform, see Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China after Deng
Xiaoping (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 1995), pp. 241-245; Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of
Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard
University Press, 1994), pp. 234-235.
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In addition to ideological and political restriction, legal reform is also restriced by
the pace of economic reform and Party policy relating economic development. Law is
mainly to serve and facilitate the pragmatic needs of the economic development. After 1992,
legal reform arrives at a new stage for serving the needs of a socialist market economy.
Scholars advocate that "a market economy is a rule-of-law economy"33, and begin to study
the relationship between the two concepts and to work out a legal framework for the market
economy. Official texts do not use the term "rule of law" until 1997 when this term is
formally brought forward at the Party's Fifteenth Congress as "Yi fa zhi guo, jianli
shehuizhuyi fazhi guo" [administering the state according to law and establishing a socialist
rule-of-law country].34
However, the use of term rule of law does not necessarily mean that the Party has
really committed itself to the rule of law. Yi fa zhi guo [RjjfelfiH] is not the same as rule of
law, nor does a rule-of-law with socialist prefix. One will clearly assume this conclusion
from following concerns. First, Party and governmental officials always use the discourse
"socialist legal system" or yi fa zhi guo without differentiation rule of law from rule by law.
Except some legal scholars, the vast majority of Chinese people are not aware the difference
between the two concepts. To the public, the legal system or rule by law and rule of law are
all the same in their pronounceation in Chinese as fazhi. Moreover, imperial legal system has
had thousands of years of tradition by using law as an instrument to rule the people rather
than ruling class and as a supplement to Confucian morality, which are still deeply
influencing the mind of ordinary people, and besides the rule of law is not from Chinese
legal culture. In this particular circumstance, the distinguishment of rule by law and rule of
law is essential for the general public to understand without misleading them.
Second, in many occasions, the Party always rejects Western concept of multi-party
politics, tripartite division of powers, judicial independence and human rights, as a bourgeois
ideology, which is contrary to socialism and a socialist legal system. Jiang Zemin makes it
clear that "we uphold and improve this fundamental political system, instead of copying any
Western models. This is of decisive importance for upholding leadership by the Party and the
33 There are many books and articles on this topic. For example, Qiu Chunlan, "Shichang jingji yu
fazhi jianshe zongshu" [A summary of the study on market economy and legal construction], Shoudu
shifan daxue xuebao, no. 4 (1995), pp. 76-79; Xie Pengcheng, "Lun shichang jingji falii tixi de jiben
jiegou" [On the basic structure of the legal system in a market economy], Faxue yanjiu, no. 4 (1994),
pp. 50-57.
34
Jiang Zemin, "Gao ju Deng Xiaoping lilun de weida qizhi, ba jianshe you zhongguo tese de
shehuizhuyi quanmian tui xiang ershiyi shiji" [Upholding the great banner of Deng Xiaoping theory to
fully push the establishment of socialism with Chinese characteristics into the twenty-first century],
Qiu shi, no. 18 (1997), p. 3.
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socialist system, and realising the people's democracy."35 At the same time, the Party
reiterate "Chinese characteristics" in building a socialist legal system.
Third, according to Jiang Zemin's definition, yi fa zhi guo, jianli shehuizhuyi fazhi
guo is that the vast majority people, according to the constitution and the law, under the
leadership of the Party, and through a variety of ways, administer state affairs, economic and
cultural matters, social affairs, in order to ensure all state affairs will be carried out in
compliance with the law and gradually make socialist democracy systematic and legal, by
which this system and law will not change with the change of leaders, or with their opinion
and focus."36 He further points out, "according to law to administer our country unifies the
Party's leadership, developing socialist democracy and strictly acting in accordance with the
law, thus ensures the enforcement and implementation of the Party's basic policy and line
from systematic and legal areas. This ensures that the Party can all the time play the crucial
leading role in controlling the full situation and co-ordinating all parties."37 This definition
manifests the supremacy of Party leadership in making and enforcing the law in order to let
the Party master and dominate all round situations in state affairs without binding by the law.
Thus, Jiang's understanding of the rule of law is still within Deng's frame of
institutionalisation and legalisation rather than emphasising restriction of Party and
government power. He claimed that "Strengthening socialist legal construction and yi fa zhi
guo are an important part of Comrade Deng Xiaoping's theory of establishing socialism with
Chinese characteristics. It is also an important policy for our Party and government to
administer the state and social affairs."38
Last, one more example about Party intention of the rule of law may be illustrated by
its consistent suppressing of any opposition opinions. In 2001, Jiang ordered to crack down







38 Renmin ribao, 9 February 1996, p. 1.
39 China's Democratic Party (CDP) was founded in June 1998, and in 2001 over thirty members of the
CDP were sentenced to imprisonment without public trial and due process. The same case is the "New
youth Institute", which is a young scholars' group aiming to discussing political issues. The four
members were detained illegally in 2001 and were refused to see their family within three years of
illegal detention until November 2003 when the Supreme Court tried this case. In this trial, the four
were sentenced to serve a range from 8 to 10 years in prison. In recent years, there are more
crackdowns and censorship on internet speech and many net writers who published their political
opinion have been arrested or sentenced for the crime of "spread to overthrow the regime" under
article 105 (2) of the criminal law. This suppression has breached article 35 of the PRC constitution
about the freedom of speech, which have been consistently criticised by international community and
overseas Chinese scholars. For detail, there are many overseas sources available through internet. For
recent reports, see Qi Yong (VOA reportorj's interview with Xu Guang on 16 September 2004 who
was a key founder of the CDP and was just set free from the prison, in Boxun.public opinion, 20
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of Western style of separation of power, judicial independence, the supremacy of law,
human rights and multiparty politics.40 Such crackdown is continuing in contemporary China.
By deliberately defining the rule of law, democracy and human rights as socialist
and Western while stressing socialist and Chinese characteristics, the CCP clearly shows that
it will not adopt a real rule of law as many people understood in the international community,
and that legal reform will be restricted within the limits of FCP and the current political
structure. Like Deng, Jiang also does not allow any challenge to the CCP's legitimacy as a
ruling party. Thus from the beginning, two conflicting legal principles, a law by which to
rule China and a law by which to serve the Party, have coexisted throughout the reform
process and resulted in dilemmas to China's legal reform.
While some legal scholars inside China debating the difference between a rule of
law and rule by law through their academic activity, those outside China, especially
dissidents such as Cheng Weinong, who is the chief editor of Dangdai Zhongguo yanjiu
[Modern China studies, based in America], have criticised that the leadership deliberately
used this discourse to blur the distinction of the rule by law and the rule of law, in order to
continue to justify its authoritarian rule while at the same time transferring public attention
from political reform to the legal field.41 One thing is clear that the Party's intention is not, or
is not ready for, a real rule of law; instead, law is used as a means to develop the economy
and curb rampant corruption.
However, the ineffectiveness of the law in curbing ever-increasing economic crime
and corruption has seriously undermined Party legitimacy and social stability. Instead of
addressing the underlying reason for the cause of the weakness of law, Jiang Zemin warned
about the deterioration of moral standards, the practice of worshipping money, seeking
pleasure and selfish individualism, and the revival of feudal superstitions, etc. are sail
eriously damaging the work of both Party and government; furthermore, there is a vacuum in
people's faith in socialism. He claimed that all these problems must be resolved through the
promotion of ethical and cultural moralism.42
The two methods Jiang Zemin designed for the moral improvement is manifested by
his idea of "three represents" [san ge daibiao, and rule of virtue [de zhi, $8vn],
which seemed to build his political legacy by filling in the basket of "Chinese
September 2004 (www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2004/09/200409160349.shtml), and 24 June
2004 (www.peacehall.com/news/gb/pubvp/2004/06/200406241241.shtml).
40
Jiang's speech in 2001, Renmin ribao, 1 February 2001, p. 1.
41 For an updated report, see VOA report by Jiang He, 13 March 2004, in Boxun, 20 March 2004
(www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2004/03/200403130715.shtml).
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characteristics" preached by Deng Xiaoping. The so-called three represents is that the CCP
should always keep forward by representing the requirements of the developing trend of
China's most advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's most advanced culture
and the interests of the most majority of the Chinese people.43 Since the CCP always
represents the most advanced economic and cultural interests, its legitimacy as a single ruler
is surely unchallengeable in the twenty-first century.
In order to meet the requirements of three represents, Jiang Zemin further advocated
the rule of virtue as a supplement to the rule of law.44 He considered that the law alone was
inadequate to resolve various problems emerging from the rapid development, especially
widespread official corruption and discreditable practices in the new market. He required
Party members and government officials to govern the country through a combination of the
rule of law and the rule of virtue. He pointed out that the CCP must strengthen socialist legal
construction and administer the state according to the law during the process of establishing
socialism with Chinese characteristics and developing a socialist market economy, while at
the same time strengthening socialist moral education and the rule of virtue. The rule of law
would not work well without the supplementation of the rule of virtue, and the rule of virtue
would greatly enhance the rule of law.45
According to Jiang, both the rule of law and the rule of virtue are means for
regulating people's thought and behaviour, and are equally important in building socialism
with Chinese characteristics. The rule of virtue, as a means of establishing a socialist thought
and moral system in compliance with the socialist market economy and legal system,46 is
part of the CCP's efforts to fill in an ideological vacuum due to plural interests arising from
economic reform.
This officially advocated rule of virtue, focusing on cultivating rulers' moral
qualities, has its roots in Confucian tradition resting the hope for "benevolent government"
[renzheng, \ZL and "sage rulers" [mingjun or mingzhu, tyj ja 0J] i]. A problem here
42 "Resolutions in the CCP Central Committee Regarding Important Questions on Promoting Socialist
Ethical and Cultural Program," adopted at the Sixth Session of the Fourteenth CCP Central
Committee Congress, 10 October 1996, Beijing Review, no. 4 (October 1996), p. 22.
43
Jiang Zemin defined "three represents" on 1 July at the 80th anniversary celebrations of the founding
of the CCP in 2001, and on 31 May 2002, he further stressed this idea at the graduate ceremony of the
Central Party School for training provincial officials. See Qiu Shi, "Zhongguo gongchandang
zhizheng de jiben jinyan" [The basic experience of the CCP rule], Xinhua wenzhai, no. 7 (2002), p. 2.
44 Renmim ribao, 1 February 2001, p. 1.
45
Special commentator of New China News Agency, "Jianchi yi fa zhi guo he yi de zhi guo de jiben
fanglue" [Upholding the basic strategy of administering the state according to law and administering
the state according to virtue], Xinhua yuebao, no. 3 (2001), pp. 27-28.
46 The special commentator for Xinhua News Agency, "Jianchi yi fa zhi guo he yi de zhi guo de jiben
fanglue," [Insisting in basic strategy of ruling the state according to law and virtue], Xinhua yuebao,
no. 3 (2001), pp. 27-28.
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is by what and whom a virtuous official is to be defined or judged. With China under one
Party rule, the judge can be none other than Party and officials themselves. This combination
of law and virtue is therefore a reminder of the traditional combination of Confucian theory
(the rule of virtuous men) with Legalist thinking (rule by law). This combination would
undermine the efforts in legal reform, since China's legal tradition has very few links with
the notion of the rule of law. The rule of virtue relies on officials' voluntary restrictions
through cultivating their moral quality rather than on legal and political reform. The rule of
law emphasses the authority of law while rule of virtue stresses respect for morality, and thus
there is a fundamental contradictory between the two concepts. Such stress on virtuious
cultivation might provide a chance of reviving China's legal tradition which itself represents
a culture of rule of man. What important for China's legal modernisation is that China
should concentrate on inventive introduction ofWestern legal concepts and practices.
The emphasis on the rule of virtue also highlights the leadership's main concern: the
crisis of legitimacy facing the Party due in part to widespread corruption and local
protectionism. However, the Party is reluctant, afraid or even unable, to resolve this problem.
In China, it was mainly the unrestricted official power that caused the failure to implement
the rule of law. As long as single Party rule remains, efforts to promote moral levels on the
part of the state officials will not be effective. It is true that the use of law and morality to
improve fair competition and credibility will help the operation of the market, and that
officials may behave themselves better. But the most important goal is to elevate the
authority of the law rather than rely on good officials. An enormous effort is now under way
to make Party officials peruse Confucian classics in Party schools, and all round social
sectors are required to elevate their moral standard which is decided by the Party-state based
on socialist cultural programme.
The law itself will not be able to play an independent role in state administration
without supportive political and cultural environment. Minzhu [democracy, Psife] is different
from mingzhu [a wise ruler, although they are very siminar in Chinese. Whether a
socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics can play the same role without relying on
political democracy and human rights is doubtful, however much stress is given to the
importance of a local context, because the current Leninist-style state make it difficult for
law to rule effectively. Without a coherent theory with respect to the control of power, the
elite legal ideas would be easily adjusted in the direction of the Party's actual needs, in terms
of the Party's ruling position in the country. In practice, officials may find it difficult that
abiding by the law while not at the same time in conflict with the supremacy of Party
leadership. As Carlos Wing-Hung Lo points out, if the law were genuinely supreme, the
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Party would be subordinate to law and under the supervision of the judiciary rather than the
two existing in a harmonious relationship.47 However, since the Party rejects the Western
version of rule of law and the bourgeois notion of the supremacy of law, the conflict between
the Party leadership and supremacy of law will inevitably arise.
The change of the official discourse about legal reform shows that the Party likes to
strengthen its legitimacy by relying on yi fa zhi guo through smooth development of the
market economy without reform to the political system. This shows that China's reform is a
paradoxical process in the use of capitalist economic rules to enhance socialism. Ideas and
ideology play an important role in China's economic reform, in order to sustain Party
legitimacy.48 Being constrained by FCPs, requirement of maintaining stability and the pace
of economic reform, legal reform has to be carried out within the current political system,
bearing "socialist" characteristics including socialist public ownership, CCP leadership party
rule and its ideology. Thus a "socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics" can only be
an ideological mixture of socialism, legal tradition based on Confucian values and Legalist
rule by law, and capitalism.
(2) The concept of the rule of law: in Western and Chinese perspective
Unlike rule by law, rule of law is quite alien to China's legal culture. Rule of law is a product
ofWestern liberal democratic philosophy. Being parallel to the German idea of Rechtsstaat,
this concept
"Most simply expresses the idea that everyone is subject to the law, and should
therefore obey it. Governments in particular are to obey law—to govern under, or in
accordance with law. The rule of law thus requires constitutional government, and
constitutes a shield against tyranny or arbitrary rule: political rulers and their agents
(police and so on) must exercise power under legal constraints, respecting accepted
constitutional limits."49
Such a concept plays an essential part in the political philosophy of liberalism,
although its nature and meaning are contested and controversial. However, there are basic
principles and elements featuring in the rule of law that have been widely accepted by those
societies based on the rule of law. The rise of the rule of law is a major response to the rise
of modern capitalism, free markets, and clearly defined and legally enforceable property
rights. Max Weber's sociological analysis of law emphasised that rational rules not only
47 Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, "Socialist Legal Theory in Deng Xiaoping's China", Columbia Journal of
Asian Law, 11:2 (1997), p. 481.
48 Chen Feng, Economic Transition and Political Legitimacy in Post-Mao China: Ideology and
Reform (New York: State University ofNew York Press, 1995), p. 2.
49 Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, vol. 8: Rule of Law (New York:
Routledge, 1998), p. 388.
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promote predictability and thus enhance economic efficiency and contribute to economic
development; they also enhance the legitimacy and authority of law in that they are more
likely to be normatively acceptable to the people.50
The idea that rule of law imposes limits on the arbitrary acts of the state is also
necessary for protecting the individual actors in the market, and for ensuring economic
predictability and enhancing efficiency. As Andrew Altman points out, the rule of law
requires both well-regulated public and private power, and political corruption may be
constrainted only by law and everyone should be equal before law. From a modern liberal
view, he identifies two major purposes for the law to play, including an autonomous private
sector with well-defined areas of freedom to prevent state intervention, and the generating
and exercising of any power by the state must have legal authority.51
Peerenboom has given a detail and profound discussion of two versions of the rule
of law: a "thick" theory and a "thin" theory, according to whether its specific emphasis is on
formal or substantial aspects.52 By studying the virtues the rule of law should have from Raz
and Fuller,53 he refers a thin theory of rule of law to formal or procedural justice without the
influence of ideology and philosophy, focusing on features that any legal systems must
possess to function effectively as a system of laws, such as a complete set of legal rules and
institutions with certain restraints on official arbitrariness. The basic elements in a thin
theory are that the government acts in accordance with law, as opposed to the rule ofmen, by
limiting at least some forms of arbitrariness on the part of the government; assuring law to be
predictable in order to allow people to plan their affairs and hence promote both individual
freedom and economic development; and a fair mechanism for the resolution of disputes.54
However, as Raz notes,55 a thin rule of law may be utilised by an authoritarian
regime as an effective instrument to fulfil its own ends and suppress people. A non-
democratic legal system (such as Nazi Germany) based on the denial of fundamental human
rights, poverty, racial segregation, sexual discrimination, and religious persecution, may bear
50 Max Rheinstein (ed.), Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1954), Introduction, Iviii.
51 Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990), pp. 22-23.
52 Randall Peerenboom, "Ruling the Country in accordance with Law: Reflections on the Rule of Law
in Contemporary China," Cultural Dynamics, 11:2 (1999), pp. 315-351. He expands this theory in his
recently published book: China's Long March towards Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002).
53
Joseph Raz, "The Rule of Law and its Virtues", in his book The Authority ofLaw (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 210-229; Lon L Fuller, The Morality ofLaw (revised ed.) (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1969), p. 39.
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better formal features required by the rule of law than the legal systems ofmore enlightened
Western democracies.
In contrast, a thick theory of rule of law refers to substantive justice underlying a
formal rule of law and also incorporating a wide range of elements such as political
democracy, a free capitalist economy, and protection of human rights. It belongs to a part of
the larger social and political philosophy, with broader scope than even a fully developed
thin theory of the rule of law.56 The International Congress of Jurists held in New Delhi in
1959 declared a thick meaning of a thick rule of law: "the function of the legislature in a free
society under the rule of law is to create and maintain the conditions which will uphold the
dignity ofman as an individual. This dignity requires not only the recognition of his civil and
political rights but also the establishment of the social, economic, education and cultural
conditions which are essential to the full development of his personality."57 This shows a
universal trend for advocating the rule of law combining both procedural and substantial
justice, in order to better safeguard individual rights and curb state power.
Generally speaking, the idea that the rule of law can hold state officials and even
most senior officials accountable has become the key to distinguish whether the rule of law
exists or not in a society. According to Peerenboom, the primary purposes of law and rule of
law, varied in terms of different parties, are to constrain the arbitrary acts of the government;
to facilitate and ensure economic development; to protect the individual against the state; and
to provide a fair mechanism for resolving disputes. Thus he divides rule of law into four
ideal types: liberal democratic rule of law, communitarian rule of law, neo-authoritarian rule
of law and statist socialist rule of law.58 He claims that liberals interpret protection of the
individual against the state in terms of a conception of human rights that emphasises the
freedom and autonomy of the individual, while others may assign less importance to
individual freedom and autonomy and more to communal values or social stability, and
hence draw a different balance between the rights of individuals and the needs of the state.59
In China, legal scholars have also participated in active debate about a socialist rule of law.
Deng Xiaoping's pragmatism tolerated the competitive coexistence of different value
systems. The theory of a socialist preliminary stage in line with market forces and the rule of
56
Peerenboom, 2002, p. 3.
57 The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), The Rule ofLaw in a Free Society: A Report on the
International Conference ofJurists" [held in New Delhi, India], which is also known as Declaration
ofNew Delhi (Geneva: The Commission, 1959), cited from Peerenboom, 1999, p. 316.
58 Peerenboom, China's Long March towards Rule ofLaw, pp. 103-109.
59 Peerenboom, "A Government of Laws: Democracy, Rule of Law and Administrative Law Reform
in the PRC", Journal ofContemporary China, 34:12 (2003), p. 64.
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law changed formal legal thinking. Although contemporary jurisprudence is still basically
rooted in the speeches of his Southern Tour in 1992, there has been a remarkable
breakthrough in Marxist ideology by advocating a socialist version of the rule of law with
Chinese characteristics.
Since the late 1970s, China's leading scholars debated a wide range of legal topics,
including (1) the nature of law: they rejected the class nature of law and acknowledged law's
nature as a social regulator instead of as an instrument of class struggle; law is not only the
tool of class struggle but also a social regulator; (2) the validity of current Marxist theory: it
must develop according to changes in different historic periods and specific conditions; (3)
the difference between the rule of man and rule of law: the latter should be the goal of
China's legal modernisation;60 (4) a market economy is a rule-of-law economy with an
emphasis on legal rationality and rights protection; and (5) the mode, content, principles and
key elements for establishing a socialist rule of law.
Before 1989, the liberal discussions of law called for limits to governmental
arbitrariness and for the creation of a constitutional government. Liu Hainian noted that
during the debate on the rule of men and rule of law a major point was to decide which
should be supreme: the political power or the law.61 Some scholars already proposed to
"administer the state according to law",62 while other scholars doubted this on the ground
that communist literature did not provide any such discourse and ideas. In the late 1980s,
some scholars had already brought forward the term "rule of law" to be the goal of the legal
reform63 and also stressed the difference between rule by law, rule of law and rule of man.64
Shen Yuanyuan invokes the trend for favouring a combination of rule of law and rule ofman
during this debate and claims that this influence still exists currently among scholars and
officials. Such influence comes from the long-standing political and legal tradition, the
contemporary political structure, and four decades of Soviet-interpreted Marxist notions of
60 For detail, see Zhang Jin (ed.), Renzhiyu fazhi wenti taolun ji [Collected papers on the rule of men
and the rule of law] (Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 1981).
61 Liu Hainian, "Yi fa zhi guo: Zhongguo shehuizhuyi fazhi jianshe xin de lichengbei" [Administering
the state according to law: new milestone of construction of China's socialist legal system], Faxue
yanjiu, no. 3 (1996), p. 26.
62 Li Buyun, Wang Dexiang and Chen Chunlong, "Lun yi fa zhi guo" [On administering the state
according to law], in Zhang Jin (ed.), Renzhiyu fazhi wenti taolun ji, p. 180.
63 Shen Zhonglin, "Fazhi, fazhi, renzhi de ciyi fenxi" [A analysis of the meaning of fazhi (rule of law),
fazhi (rule by law) and renzhi (rule of man)], Faxue yanjiu, no. 4 (1989), p. 8
64
Wang Jiafu, Liu Hannian and Li Buyun, "Lun fazhi gaige" [A discussion of reform on the legal
system], Faxue yanjiu, no. 2 (1989), p. 9.
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law, which emphasises good leadership and instrumental function of law aiming to maintain
substantial justice rather than a procedural one.65
After 1992, the topic for legal research became much broader with the expansion of
legal areas in contemporary development. Pure instrumentalism and the rule of man have
been criticised on the grounds that a market economy is a rule-of-law economy based on
Max Weber's legal-rational ideal type; the importance of protecting individual rights and
curbing official powers has been stressed. Since 1996, debates among legal scholars have
intensified, with more concentration on figuring out the mode and content of the rule of law
in China by taking reference from Western legal concepts and institutions. The flourishing of
legal research is well manifested in "ten major hot topics in jurisprudence in 2001", which
was brought forward by the Legal Daily and eleven other press agencies.66
After the CCP Fifteenth Congress, scholars made great efforts to control
administrative discretion and maximise individual rights; in emphasising procedural justice
and an independent judiciary; and in affirming the superiority of law over the Party-state.
However, this discussion was more restrained than that before 1989. As Lubman notes, the
proposals advanced in 1996 placed "less emphasis on the need to clarify the relationship
between the Party and law, and more focus on the need to create a legal framework for the
developing socialist market economy."67
The choice of China's rule-of-law model must be restricted within the above
boundaries and also by traditional legal culture and values as well as the changing conditions
arising from the economic reforms. Scholars have specified three aspects to "Chinese
characteristics": Chinese realistic conditions (socialist preliminary stage); current features
(reform and opening up); and fine cultural tradition (national features and good elements
from the traditional legal system).68
In contemporary China, legal scholars are playing a limited but increasingly
important role in legal development by holding lectures on legal theory for senior officials,
65 Shen Yuanyuan, "Conceptions and Receptions of Legality: Understanding the Complexity of Law
Reform", in Karen G. Turner, et al (eds.) The Limits of the rule ofLaw in China (Seattle: University
ofWashington Press, 2000), p. 27.
66 These include the enforcement of the constitution, the enactment of a comprehensive civil code, the
safeguarding of human rights based on the discussion of two UN human rights conventions joined by
China, the reform of the administrative litigation and state compensation systems, court reform,
introducing a systematic law of evidence, Internet rules, the relationship between the WTO and
China's rule of law, consumers' rights protection, and regulating the market. See Xinhua wenzhai, no.
4 (2002), pp. 5-8.
67
Stanley Lubman, Bird in A Cage: China's Post-Mao Legal Reform (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1999), p. 129.
68 For example, see Zhang Wenxian, "Zai lun jiangou you Zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi faxue" [RE-
discussing the establishment of socialist jurisprudence with Chinese characteristics], Zhongguo faxue,
no. 3 (1997), p. 23.
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by advocating plural ideas about the rule of law, and by participating in the drafting process
of new laws. China's institutional scholars, such as those from the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences (CASS) and law schools of top universities mainly focus on official
concerns of anti-corruption and market order in carrying out their studies. As Keith and Lin
observed, "They act as a professional interest group or lobby which attempts to move Party
and NPC leadership in a certain legislative direction," having achieved a "qualitative
conceptual breakthrough in what is admittedly a composite and uneven but surprisingly
positive trend towards modern rational legal culture in China."69 Yet the CCP will not
permit any challenges to Marxist ideology and Party position for temporary economic
growth. Besides, the imbalance in state power structure often turns the legislative process
into a power-pursuing struggle while ignoring legal scholars' proposals. Thus the academic
role in promoting the rule of law remains limited.
Academic debate of rule of law mainly focuses on the concept of a socialist rule of
law by distinguishing rule of man and rule by law, what model of China should adopt for
establishing a socialist rule of law, and the content of and key to the establishment of the rule
of law.
A. Rule by law and rule of law
The rule by law or the rule of law [fazhi or fazhi, V'iife'JhKv'iTn] is often addressed as opposed
to the rule of man [renzhi, Avri], which refers to a leadership based on ruler's personality
and will without following laws and law is used to rule ordinary people rather than the ruling
elite. While rule by law, a particular Chinese discourse, literally has two meanings: the legal
system and rule by laws. The two strategies of governance have belonged to the main part of
China's legal tradition and political philosophy in thousands of years of China's imperial
practice and the early PRC history. Chinese scholars have already rejected the rule of man,
but they also disagree with the supremacy of law or the worship of law, because the law
cannot decrease Party leadership.70 Although these scholars already know the difference
between rule by law and the rule of law,71 they regard the rule of law as a series of steps
69 Ronald C. Keith and Lin Zhiqiu, Law and Justice in China's New Marketplace (New York:
Palgrave, 2001), pp. 245-246.
70
Zheng Yongnian, "The Rule by Law versus the Rule of Law", in Wang Gungwu & Zheng
Yongnian (eds.), Reform, Legitimacy and Dilemmas: China's Politics and Society (Singapore:
Singapore University Press, 2000), p. 140.
71 In June 1990, the Shanghai Academy of Social Science co-held a symposium with the Princeton
University, USA, on the following topic: "Theory and practice of the rule of law in the USA". The
participants concluded from this discussion that rule by law was not equal to the rule of law even if it
included the 16 characters of Deng Xiaoping, but a socialist rule by law was equal to a socialist rule of
law. See Zhou Yongkuan, "Yi fa zhi guo, jianshe shehuizhuyi fazhi guojia lilun yantaohui shuping"
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from indicating the way to the rule of law through legalisation, rule by law or administering
the country according to law and then to rule of law. They then claimed that rule by law,
ruling the country according to a set of legal system by institutional authority rather than by
individual leader, were moving China inevitably towards the rule of law.72 They realised that
rule by law was institutional and organisational, which might be manipulated by rulers in
different ways, while the rule of law was to govern rulers. Under a system based on rule by
law, the law is an instrument in the hands of rulers to suit them and they are not constrained
by their own legal system. Limited by a prefix "socialist" ahead of the rule of law as opposed
to a Western liberal democratic version of the rule of law, the Party-preached rule of law
seems to have more features of rule by law rather than rule of law. However, many liberal or
radical scholars have gone beyond this limit to express high expectations and enthusiasm for
Jiang's formulation (ofyi fa zhi guo, jianli shehuizhuyi fazhi guo). According to them, the
ruled here in this term should be the state and its officials—not the people—and the ruler here
should be the people. Who should be ruled is the fundamental difference between a rule by
law and the rule of law. Thus they concluded that this formulation was the same as the rule
of law in that it emphasises governing state agencies rather than the people.73 Laws in these
terms should be good laws that reflect social justice and common values.74 This firstly
requires Party members and government officials to follow the law, or the rule of law will
not be successful and the legal system will go back to a traditional Legalist idea of rule by
law. To restrict state power is the precondition for realising the rule of law because the rule
of law is firstly a concept and consciousness regarding the authority of law, and includes
individual dignity against the state.
For example, Guo Daohui, the editor-in-chief of Chinese Jurisprudence
states that two points are significant for distinguishing the two concepts: whether law is
supreme or whether it is used as an instrument.75 This is because the law instrumentalists
accept the need to strengthen the legal system but often utilise it as a tool to control society
or serve class struggle. The rule of law, on the other hand, must emphasise the democratic
[Review of the symposium on administering the state according to law and building up a socialist
country based on the rule of law], Fazhi yu shehuifazhan, no. 2 (1997), pp. 12-14.
72
Zheng Yongnian, p. 143.
73 Yu Xuede, "Fazhi haishi fazhi, zhi min haishi zhi quan: guanyu yifazhiguo wenti taolun guandian
zongshu" [Rule of law or rule by law, governing the people or governing the power? a summary of
debates on the issue of governing the state according to law], Qianxian, no. 12 (1997), p. 27.
74 Yu Xuede, ibid; Huang Pei, "Lun 'bentu ziyuan1 yu fazhi de maodun chongtu: qian tan fazhi de
yuanyuan yu linian" [On conflicts between 'local resources' and rule of law: a preliminary discussion
of the origin and concept of the rule of law], Falii tushuguan on line: Falii lunwen ziliao ku [Law
library: collection of legal articles], accessed date, 11 March 2003
(http://www.law-lib.com/lw/lw_view.asp?no=1430).
75 Yu Xuede, p. 26.
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nature of the law, requiring both the legalisation of democracy and the democratisation of the
legal system. According to him, the term rule by law is not enough to draw a line between
the rule of man and dictatorship, while stressing both democracy and legality in the legal
system is actually different from totalitarian rule by law but close to a modern concept of the
rule of law.
Li Buyun, former director of the Law Institute of the CASS, points out that the two
concepts are related to each other in that both require a well-established legal system. Rule
by law refers to a legal system which exists in many societies, but the existence of a well-
established legal system does not necessarily mean the existence of the rule of law. He gives
the Nazi German regime and the Chinese Nationalist government as examples, claiming that
they both have complete legal systems but neither of them has the rule of law.76
Some liberal scholars call for the establishment of a democratic rule of law, which
requires three conditions: a coherent legal system, an independent judiciary, and legal
awareness among the whole people. Although the goal of the rule of law has been brought
forward, the three necessary conditions is either insufficient or does not exist. Without
political democracy and judicial independence, the rule of law would be nothing but empty
talk.77
B. The model of China's rule of law
Legal reform in China is a top-down process rather than a naturally evolved one based on
particular political, economic, social, and cultural contexts in favour of the rule of law. A
Party-state character has also restricted the model of China's rule of law. Chinese scholars
and the Party leadership all emphasise the importance of good traditional values and socialist
ideology in legal development.78 For example, Li Buyun stated that law should regulate at
least five pairs of relationships: the law and the people, individuals and society, interest and
justice, efficiency and fairness, rights and liabilities.79 Legal scholars regard the process of
establishing the rule of law as an unfinished goal of China's modernisation of the legal
system. This internal requirement for modernisation decrees that China's legal development
76 Yu Xuede, ibid.
77 Guo Luoji, "Fazhi: Xianfa zhishang" [Rule of law is the supremacy of law], Zhengming, no. 292
(2002), pp. 71-74.
78 For example, see Cheng Weili, "Jianshe shehuizhuyi fazhi guojia de jiazhi jichu", Shehui kexue
(Shanghai), no. 6 (1996), pp. 17-21.
77 Li Buyun, "Xiandai fa de jingshen lungang," [The outline of spirit of modern law], Xinhua wenzhai,
no. 10 (1997), p. 19; also see Li Buyun, "Shishi yi fa zhi guo zhanlue lungang" [Strategic outline of
implementing the administration of the state according to law], Xuexiyu tansuo (Harbin), no. 3 (1999),
pp. 66-72.
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must be based on its national characteristics. The rule of law must be a gradual process from
the top down under the CCP leadership.80
The establishment of the rule of law involves a process of absorbing positive points
from China's past and borrowing market-oriented rules from the West, on the condition of
maintaining socialist ideology and Party rule. Therefore, the model of a socialist rule of law
is actually a question of the extent to which the legal tradition of China and the Western rule
of law can be utilised. It is a question of finding a balance between localisation and
globalisation. In other words, the Party must ensure that further reform will assist economic
and legal progress while at the same time the outcomes from the reform will not pose a threat
to its rule. Since the legal reform is a gradual and top-down process, the success of the rule
of law will mainly rely on the regime's initiatives and motivations according to its own goals,
ends and proposals.
Legal scholars have claimed that although the rule of law is a bourgeois concept, it is
better than the rule of men and thus can be borrowed by a socialist country.81 After
comparing legal systems in "feudal" and "bourgeois" societies, Liu Hainian claims that none
was a true rule of law, because the former was connected with dictatorship and the latter in
essence serves a minority of rich people, although the latter played a progressive role in
fighting against dictatorial systems and remains effective in the contemporary Western world,
and he concludes that China's socialist rule of law was superior to other legal systems
because a fundamental difference in a socialist rule of law is that a broad group of people,
rather than a minority of rich ones, enjoys the ruling power.s2 He further proposed ten
principles for a socialist rule of law, including socialist democracy, human rights, freedom,
equality, the supremacy of law, administrative rule of law, judicial independence and
fairness, restriction and supervision of power, social order, and maintaining the Party
leadership.83
Li Lin insists that according to the Delhi Declaration, China's socialist rule of law
should integrate values, institutions and practices, and be guided by universally accepted
principles including people's sovereignty, the supremacy of law, human rights, the priority of
legislation over administrative regulations, constitutionalism, exercising administrative
811 Review of the development of legal research, in Zhongguo falu nianjian [The law yearbookof China]
(Beijing: Zhongguo nianjian chubanshe, 2001), p. 1082.
81
Guo Yunsheng and Yang Jianhua, "Lun shehuizhuyi fazhi guojia de biaozhun" [On the standards of
socialist rule-of-law state], Shanxi daxue xuebao, no. 2 (1996), p. 6.
82 Liu Hainian, "...lichengbei",p. 31.
83 Liu Hainian, "Liielun shehuizhuyi fazhi yuanze" [A brief discussion of principles of socialist rule of
law], Zhongguo faxue, no. I (1998), pp. 6-9.
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power according to law, and judicial independence.84 In order to fulfil this, he advocates that
individuals should have full development and freedom; productive forces should be set free
so as to reach a highly advanced material civilisation; the market system, which is based on
public ownership, should provide, to a great extent, the possibility of reducing conflict
between the individuals and the society, between individuals and the state and between
society and the state; the democratic political system led by the Party is the guarantee for
implementing the rule of law since it reflects the majority interests of the whole people rather
than a relationship between master and servant; the rule of law should develop on the
condition of promoting a socialist spiritual civilisation, absorbing both traditional legal
culture and worldwide common values. By doing so, there would be a harmony between
democracy and centralism, individual rights and community rights, citizens' political rights
and economic and cultural rights, and rights and responsibility, all of which were guarantees
for a democratic political system.85
As can be seen from above, these influential Chinese scholars regarded a socialist
rule of law as more democratic and advanced than any other versions. The rule of law is not
a panacea for resolving any problems, since the urgent task for China is social management
rather than autonomy, and the rule of law will not be built up by merely relying on political
and ideological reform, while the change in local context [or indigenous resources, bentu
zliiyuan, is important in building resources for the rule of law.86 Some scholars
considered that Western elements, such as political democracy, were not necessarily decisive
in establishing the rule of law. For example, Wei Pan advocated that a consultative rule of
law regime was feasible in China, in which the rule of law was supplemented by democracy
instead of a democracy supplemented by a rule of law, and this is deduced from China's
history, culture and existing social system.87
He stated that Western democracy was insufficient for resolving the most pressing
problem facing the country: rampant corruption in all sectors, especially official corruption,
which exploded in the mid-1990s and quickly conquered all levels and branches of
government. The widespread corruption stems from the contradiction between China's newly
84 Li Lin, "Fazhi de linian, zhidu he yunzuo" [The concept of rule of law and its institutional
operations], Falii kexue, no. 4 (1996), p. 5.
85 Li Lin, p. 4.
86 Zhu Suli and Qiang Shigong, "Zhongguo xiandaihua jingcheng zhong de fazhi wenti" [Problems of
the legal system during the process of China's modernisation], Jiancha ribao, 20 July 2001 (the first
part) and 23 July 2001 (the second part), both parts can be accessed in Jiancha ribao website: Zhengyi
wang, 24 August 2002, acc. 16 September 2002 ( http://211.100.18.62/fzdt/xwar.asp?id=2071 and
id=2091, respectively).
87 Wei Pan, "Towards a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China", Journal ofContemporary China,
34:12 (2003), pp. 3-43.
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installed market system and the Party-state's unfettered power, and from economic
decentralisation and local protectionism. Political corruption, if not controlled, could lead
directly to the collapse of the CCP.88 He claims that people are more concerned with curing
corruption and guaranteeing fair market competition rather than instituting political
democracy. This well suited the Party because at the fifteenth Congress it adopted direct
elections at the village level, advocating developing socialist democracy, but in the year after
1997 it changed to advocating the goal of administration according to law rather than
specifying a clear goal for political reform.89
Wei suggested that the rule of law rather than political democracy has become the
most important means of curbing widespread moral decadence and corruption, as decided by
China's actual needs. However, he exaggerated the role of the rule of law in curing all social
problems. In a modem society, law is not powerful enough to deal with the ever-increasing
pluralisation of social interests and problems, and moreover, if there is no democracy or only
limited political freedom, the rule of law may easily be restrained by the political power.
Even worse, without political democracy, a more developed rule of law would, in practice,
provide a more powerful instrument for strengthening the current authoritarian regime,
which would lead to rule by law rather than the rule of law.
Many scholars advocated a substantial concept for the rule of law, incorporating
human rights and other thick elements of political justice. They built their arguments on the
notion that a socialist market economy is a rule of law economy to advocate the protection of
individual rights by maintaining a balance between efficiency and justice, and legal value in
a socialist market economy should stress the efficiency of rule of law while at the same time
maintaining social justice. These scholars suggest90 that legal value in a planned economy
manifests itself in seeking social justice by focusing on equal allocation of social resources
and on realising universal harmony; while legal value in a market economy is mainly
focused on individual liberation, personal independence and efficiency.
They claim91 that since social interests are diversified in contemporary China,
economic development would be hampered if law only emphasised justice while ignoring
efficiency, and that on the other hand, there would be a big gap in income resulting from
88 Wei Pan, pp. 3-4.
89 Wei Pan, p. 4.
90 For example, see Li Bing, "Falti jiazhi xiaoyi youxian lun zhiyi" [Question the theory that priority
of efficiency is the value of law], Faxue yanjiu, no. 5 (1995), pp. 44-47.
91 For a detail account of this matter, see Cai Dingjian, "Fazhi de jinghua yu Zhongguo fazhi de gaige-
-Zouxiang fazhi zhi lu" [Evolution of the legal system and the reform on China's legal system:
towards the road of rule of law], Zhongguo faxue, no. 5 (1996), pp. 7-8; also see his article,
"Development of the Chinese Legal system since 1979 and its Current Crisis and Transformation",
Cultural Dynamics, 11:2 (July 1999), pp. 135-166.
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unfair allocation of wealth among social members if law only emphasised efficiency while
ignoring justice. For serving all these purposes, a series of institutional arrangements are
needed to build the supremacy of law and elevate the authority of the courts. At the same
time, it is necessary to legalise and protect individual rights and freedom in market operation
against state infringement. In order to realise social justice in contemporary China, it is
necessary first to define and protect rights, and to design a set of rational procedures so as to
resolve or mitigate unfair allocation of social wealth. This includes establishing a legal
system of rights and responsibilities in order to ask people to be aware of both concepts at
the same time, and not to infringe state and social interests, and maintaining fair economic
transactions in order to guarantee a fair and orderly market and smooth social transition.
Although stress has been placed on protecting individual rights in the late 1990s, it is
hard to guarantee social and judicial justice in a new marketplace, and a plural legal theory is
also difficult to form when the law is associated with political and economic priorities, as
Keith and Lin observe.92 In contemporary China, the continuing expansion of the market
economy and the complexity of social life require a new political and legal philosophy and
theory as well as corresponding institutional guarantees. The growth of a market economy
has led to strong autonomous and plural ownership relationship, the requirement for promise
of contract, credibility and respect for personality and dignity and the desire to safeguard
lawful private property rights. A market economy requires that law rather than the state play
a major role, and the law not be an instrument for rulers but a rational means without being
subject to individual officials or social connections. However, a socialist market economy
emphasises equal and social justice, preventing the occurrence of a big gap between the poor
and the rich. Market efficiency must combine with social justice. Thus, it is very important
to give market actors, especially the most vulnerable and unfavoured groups, equal treatment
with respect to their rights and liabilities.
When scholars appeal for elevating the authority of law and separating the state from
law, they also advocate an active state to reinforce the rule of law and protect rights and
freedom. They call for the establishment of a strong and stable political system and central
government to carry out legal modernisation, in order to maintain social stability and order.
In their view, the role of the state cannot be weakened; instead, it should be strengthened.93
92 Keith and Lin, Law andjustice in China's New Marketplace, p. 2.
9 See Jiang Lishan, "Zhongguo fazhi gaige he fazhihua guocheng yanjiu" [A study of China's legal
reform and the process of legalisation], Zhong wai faxue, no. 6 (1997), p.41.
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Chinese scholars realise the importance of making procedural laws and rules for
establishing a market economy and the rule of law.94 However, few of them advocate a thin
concept of the rule of law. Of the very few Chinese scholars in favour of such a concept is
Liang Zhiping, who suggested that a thin concept would prevent any disagreements from
arising from different political systems, ideology or morality, and was thus more likely to
lead to a Weberian formal and rational legal system, in order to meet the goals of
establishing a market economy and a rational government.95 He said that the traditional legal
system, from a formal point of view, was in compliance with the requirements of a thin rule
of law if it was summarised as a set of rules and principles. According to him, a thick theory
with its particular emphasis on the virtue and morality of laws is too broad, and thus would
distract attention from the basic elements required for implementing the rule of law. In
China, this thick theory would lead people to go back to a traditional emphasis on substantial
justice while sacrificing procedural fairness, and also lead to exaggerating the ability of law
to resolve all social problems.
Liang claims that a prior task for legal reform is not to revise the constitution or
make more laws, as some people have suggested, but to create a favourable environment
through procedural design and institutional guarantees for enforcing basic principles and
rules that have already been stipulated in the constitution and laws. Although it is crucial that
the state should commit itself to safeguarding human rights, this would also turn out to be a
threat to the rule of law project when the latter have an increasingly powerful impact on
restricting state and government actions, since the state controls all social resources and
administrative power. Thus it will be more important first to build a legalised government
and at the same time to foster citizens' independence from the state rather than just appeal for
human rights protection. A normative concept of the rule of law is unlikely to apply to all
laws and institutions in different periods and cultures. Moreover, social justice is not the only
94 For example, Chen Weidong, "Zhichi chengxu gongzheng zuowei sifa gaige mubiao" [ My view in
support of procedural justice as the goal ofjudicial reform], in Zhengyi wang, 5 December 2002, acc.
2 Janurary 2003 ( http://211.100.18.62/fzdt/xwar.asp?id=8484 ); Han Yuanheng and Feng Wensheng,
"Fazhi de shendu youlii: quanli ruhe deyi zhiyue" [A deep concern of the rule of law: how the power
can be restrained], in Zhengyi wang, 28 October 2002, acc. 4 December 2002
(http://211.100.18.62/fzdt/xwar.asp?id=8297); Liu Jingyou, "Jian lun chengxu bi shiti geng
zhongyao" [A brief discussion that procedure is more important than substance], Fazhi ribao, 17
February 2002, p. 3.
95 For Liang's detailed account of a thin concept of rule of law, see his article , "Fazhi: shehui
zhuanxing shiqi de zhidu jiangou: dui Zhongguo falii xiandaihua yundong de yige neizai guancha"
[Rule of law: institutional construction during the social transition: an internal observation of China's
legal modernisation movement], Dangdai Zhongguo yanjiu, no. 2 (2000), 6 May 2002
(http://www.chinayj.net/stubarticle.asp?issue=000202&total=69#), pp. 1-40 (print pages).
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goal of the law because in modern society law has many functions to play and it is
imperative that the Chinese people should be aware of these wide functions of law.
Liang Zhiping asks to focus on law's formal and procedural features and the rule of
law itself in the course of designing the model for China's rule of law project, although he
admitted that such a theory could be easily used by any political system, including a
totalitarian system, to serve their own goals. He highlighted the most popular features
contained in a formal rule of law as a set of principles, a series of systems, a special social
order, and a process of awareness. Based on these comprehensive procedures and
institutional arrangements, Liang believed that people can deal rationally with all kinds of
social relationships and conflicts arising from their daily lives. Such a rule of law is
particularly meaningful to China, in terms of its legal tradition in the neglect of procedural
justice and the current expectations for the law to resolve broad tasks.
The model of the rule of law involves absorption of both local and foreign legal
culture. As for the first one, the local legal culture, scholars generally agree that, as an inner
requirement for modernisation, legal reformers should take account of China's specific
history, culture, tradition and environment when designing its model and setting its values.96
The problem is what or how many local resources legal reformers can utilise to establish a
socialist rule of law. As for the second, the question is to what extent can the legal reform
borrow or transplant Western legal rules and concepts?
Some scholars suggest that the traditional legal system should be used as an
important reference in building a socialist rule of law, since it contains some positive values
and principles, such as the equal treatment in the like cases while different treatment for
different cases; the punishment must comply with the crime; the party cannot be the judge in
his own case; judges must enforce the law impartially and fairly; law must be published to
the public, be clear, specific, predictable and stable, and not be retrospective.97
However, most scholars have serious doubts whether the traditional legal system
would have a positive impact on contemporary legal reform, since this reform aims to
transform a rule of man society into a rule of law one. These proponents acknowledged the
lack of modernity in China's legal tradition for its limit in mainly emphasising maintaining
social order,98 and admitted the importance of transforming a traditional legal culture in
order to create new behaviour and mentality, to reform social structure and to build a new
96 See Gong Pixiang, Dangdai zhongguo de falii geming [Legal revolution in contemporary China]
(Beijing: Falti chubanshe, 1999), p. 466.
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Liang Zhiping, 2000, p. 15; Li Jiaofa, "Fazhi jianshe lungang" [A discussion outline on the rule of
law], Xiangtan daxue xuebao, no. 6 (1997), pp. 108-109.
98 Wu Shucheng, Zhongguo chuantong falii wenhua [China's traditional legal culture] (Beijing!
Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1994), p. 697.
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social order. Liang Zhiping called for the formation of a modern legal culture through
institutional arrangements and legal education by completely abandoning China's legal
tradition."
Cai Dingjian states that the modernity of a legal system, different as opposed to
traditional dominance of criminal law, lies in its adoption of constitutionalism and the rule of
law, with state power being strictly limited and civil and administrative laws being well-
developed. The roles for the law are not only to maintain social security and facilitate
economic development, but also, particularly, to ensure effective and legitimate
administration, and to restrict political and government actions.100 Traditional law is a series
of rules for maintaining order, without regard for such concepts of modern law as human
rights, private interests, freedom, equality and individual development.101
These scholars regard the legal tradition and culture as incompatible with the rule of
law.102 The inner conflict between China's legal culture and the rule of law is illustrated by,
for example, emphasising collective rights while ignoring individual rights; worshipping
authority and fearing reform; favouring harmony against disagreements; unifying regulations
of all social sectors into one single code; reducing law's role while elevating morality; the
individuals' weak position vis-a-vis powerful state machines. All these traditional concepts
are still governing people's lives and will last for a long time. Thus they claim that merely
changing law and inventing institutions can not assure the success of reform, as long as a
modern concept of rule of law based on protecting individual freedom and property rights
remained at its preliminary stage.103
Huang Pei studied Dicey's theory of the rule of law and concluded that the rule of
law was based on Western commercial civilisation and on Christian philosophy. The local
context in China, however, was of an agricultural civilisation based on Confucian philosophy
and thus lacking two fundamental elements of a modern society: equality in public areas and
freedom in private areas. He believes that China's local resources are totally against the
concept of the rule of law, and thus a profound enlightenment for the whole society is
essential to the modernisation of the Chinese legal system, as happened in Western Europe in
the eighteenth century.104
99 Liang Zhiping, 2000, p. 29.
100 Cai Dingjian, 1996, pp. 7-8.
101 Cai Dingjian, 1996, pp. 8-9.
102 For example, see Li Youxing, "Zhongguo fazhi xiandaihua de nandian jiqi duice yanjiu" [The
difficulties of and suggestions on the modernisation of Chinese legal system], Zhejiang shehui kexue,
no. 2 (1997), pp. 73-78.
103 Huang Pei, "Lun 'bentu zhiyuan' yu fazhi de maodun congtu."
104 Huang Pei, ibid.
28
Su Li claimed that China's legal tradition could only lead to the rule of man because
there were more negative elements towards the rule of law than positive ones. The choice is
to either respect Chinese legal tradition and restore the rule of man or to rebuild Chinese
legal culture to embrace the rule of law. He said that efforts at transplanting foreign laws are
mainly confined to institutional and technical areas without making proper changes to legal
concepts and principles. As a result, the transplanted rules failed to fit in with China's local
conditions and take root in its legal system. This failure is one of the reasons why legal
constructions were rather disappointing for many scholars. This instrumental method made
legal constructions stop at only institutional and technical layers without systematic change
to the legal system and people's attitudes.105
Chinese scholars are worried about an instrumental method of using law. As Jiang
Lishan claims, the state-dominant legal reform, on the one hand, may be effective in
mobilising social resources to propel reform and correct mistakes; on the other hand, the
mode of reform is also problematic because reform tends to be affected by the state's own
goals and values. Over twenty years of the legal construction has witnessed how the state's
ideology and values have decided this process. Party leaders see the rule of law as a way of
gaining legitimacy, ensuring stability and reining in wayward local governments. There is
always a possibility that the state's motivation for promoting the rule of law is suspended or
distorted in certain circumstances, 106 for example, during "strike-hard" campaigns against
crimes. In this situation, no matter how much emphasis is placed on the supremacy of law in
theory and in official policy, the law in effect has never been elevated to a governing
strategy.107
Jiang Lishan further notes that the motivation of the regime in promoting the rule of
law comes from external pressure and challenges arising from a systematic crisis due to a
backward economy and political system, once the rule of law deepens, these pressures will
be released and the state will face less of a crisis, which may slow down the reformers'
intentions to push reform farther. Besides, the Party-state itself is subject to reform, which
comes to the most sensitive topic: political reform. Since a fundamental requirement of the
rule of law is to impose meaningful constraints on the ruling elite, especially the senior
105 Su Li, "Renzhen duidai renzhi: Weibo (Jinji yu shehui) de yige dushu biji" [Taking the rule ofmen
seriously: a reading note on Weber's Economy and Society], Falti sixiang wang: Su Li wenji [Legal
thought network: a collection of articles of Su Li], 1998, acc. 6 August 2001
(http://mylaw.myrice.com/fali/fali-suli.htm); for a deep account of obstacles from China's legal
culture, see his book, Fazhi jiqi bentu ziyuan [The rule of law and local resources] (Beijing: Zhongguo
zhengfa daxue chubanshe, 1996).
106 Jiang Lishan, "Zhongguo fazhi daolu wenti taolun (Xia)" [A discussion of the issue of the road of
China's rule of law: part 2], Zhong waifaxue, no. 4 (1998), p. 29.
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officials, the more intensified the legal reform becomes, the more hostile the whole
bureaucracy will become. Further reforms will strengthen the rule of law while at the same
time diminishing Party powers. As a result, Jiang states, for maintaining power and interests,
the senior leaders will be likely to adopt an ambivalent attitude about some reforms and their
implication for the Party. 108
Many factors contribute to China's failure to develop into a rule of law society. As
Jiang Ming'an observes, some such factors come from cultural and organisational areas, and
some from law-enforcing areas. He says that it is not uncommon in China that public
servants ignore the law, local and departmental protectionism hampers the enforcement of
state policies and laws, replacing them with local and departmental rules, and law-
enforcement agencies and the courts fail to act according to law and legal procedures, or
even distort law by abuse of their discretionary power. What is more, the general level of
legal consciousness in the society is low, and both officials and ordinary people regard laws,
courts, and the legal system as less important than the political power.109 Many people
generally view going to the court as just seeking personal connections [da guansi jiushi da
guanxi, which accounts for more disputes being settled by informal
means often involving illegal practices outside the courts than by formal means inside the
courts.110 Moreover, judicial corruption and miscarriage of justice occur frequently, which
also prevent China from establishing a rule of law system.
C. The content of and the key to establishing the rule of law in China
Chinese legal scholars have proposed the basic elements needed for establishing the rule of
law from a wide range of perspectives. Some writers, through studying ancient and modern
Western jurisprudence and reviewing China's legal tradition, state that the creation of a
constitution is an utmost prerequisite for building a rule of law. They appeal for the elevation
ofChina's constitution to a supreme position in order to establish the rule of law, viewing the
essence ofyi fa zhi guo as administering the state according to the constitution. They further
advocated setting up a constitutional court to check whether governmental regulations and
actions are in conflict with the constitution, and to enforce the civil and political rights
107 Li Shuguang, "Lun yifazhiguo" [On administering the state according to law], Gongren ribao, 10
December 1997, p. 1.
108 Jiang Lishan, p. 29-31.
109 Jiang Ming'an, "Dui yi qi malasong guansi de fansi" [Reflection of a Marathon case], Zhengyi
wang, 2 December 2002, acc. 12 December 2002 (http://211.100.18.62/fzdt/xwar.asp?id=8473).
110 Cheng Weili, "Jianshe shehuizhuyi fazhi guojia de jiazhi jichu" [The value basis for establishing a
socialist country based on the rule of law], Shehui kexue (Shanghai), no. 6 (1996), pp. 19.
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stipulated in the constitution."1 The continuing debate on the enforcement of the constitution
through judicial process has been encouraged by a precedential case in 2001, which involved
a citizen's successfully using the constitution to claim her education rights."2
Li Shuguang considers it particularly important to build a rights-based concept,
including the full safeguarding and implementation of citizens' rights, to appeal for a
consciousness of citizenship and rights, to foster the mentality that everyone is equal before
the law, and to emphasise independent personality, freedom, dignity and interests. For
arousing a wide awareness of rights, according to Li, it is important to regularise government
actions. Traditionally, in China there was no distinction between the government and the
judiciary. In this institutional arrangement, no matter how well the legal system was
developed, it was in essence a rule of men, using law as a tool to control society while not
acting as a means to protect individuals against the ruler. In modern times, administrative
power has become even more expanded, resulting in a more difficult situation for the law to
curb. This requires the restructuring of state power and the transformation of government
functions according to the rule of law."3
Wang Liming emphasises the importance of making civil and commercial laws to
the establishment of a legal system for the market economy. He considers that the concepts
of rights-based [quanli benwei freedom of contract, and property rights, which
are principles required for market operations, are very important in promoting the rule of law.
He states that a complete legal system or Weberian legal-rational system cannot exist
without a civil law code (which is still in the process of being drafted). In this matter, the key
to building a civil and economic legal system lies in limiting administrative powers, in order
111 See Qing Qianhong, "Yi fa zhi guo he xianfa zhishang lun" [On administering the state according
to the law and the supremacy of the constitution], Xinhua wenzhai, no. 1 (1997), pp. 10-5; Zhou
Yezhong, "Xianfa zhishang: zhongguo fazhi zhi lu de linghun" [The supremacy of the constitution:
the soul ofChina's road to the rule of law], Zhongguo faxue wang, 17 June 2003, quoted in Zhengyi
wang, 25 July 2003 (http://211.100.18.62/fzdt/xwar.asp?id=9436); Guo Luoji, "Fazhi: xianfa
zhishang," [The rule of law is the supremacy of the constitution], Zhengming, p. 72.
112 In 1989, Qi Yuling was admitted into a commercial college, but when the enrolment notification
arrived at her high school, her teacher let Qi's friend give the notification to Qi. The latter concealed
the enrolment from Qi and instead went to attend the commercial college herself. In August 2001, Qi
discovered this fact, sued the former high school, the college and her friend, and sought compensation.
Qi won the case according to a Reply from the SPC (Supreme People's Court) on citizens' education
rights. This was the first case in which citizens' constitutional rights were enforced through judicial
process in China, which aroused scholars' hopes for enforcement of the constitution. See Zhongguo
falii nianjian [Law yearbook of China] (Beijing: Zhongguo falii nianjian chubanshe, 2002), pp. 1027-
1030.
113 Li Shuguang, "Lun yi fa zhi guo".
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to rein in the frequent practice of official power trampling over the law in the newly emerged
market."4
Some suggest that the basic preconditions for the development of a socialist rule of
law, such as a market system, socialist democracy, legislative achievements and socialist
spiritual civilisation, are already present."5 The rule of law must reveal rights protection,
procedural justice and morality, and its focus should be on the administrative rule of law."6
Guo Daohui calls attention to two terms: legalisation of democracy and the democratisation
of legality. He also calls for strengthening social autonomy to create a balance between state
and society so that state administration and social life will become legal and democratic."7
Wang Qifu stresses that judicial fairness is the crucial element for realising the rule
of law because the current severe degree of judicial corruption has hampered the
enforcement of state laws and undermined the authority of law and courts. This will
eventually threaten the future of the rule of law. Since China's judiciary is a part of the whole
administrative system, the essential problem with judicial corruption still concerns the
control of power. Judges and procurators in essence come from the same circle of state
bureaucrats. Thus, the central issue for implementing the rule of law is that the Party and its
government must set an example in legalising their actions, reducing interference in the
judicial process, and separating the relationship between politics and law, and between
government and law."8
To sum up, Chinese legal scholars view that it is very important to establish an
independent and efficient judiciary, so that no state organs, social organisations or
individuals may interfere in the judicial process. In order to curb state arbitrariness, it is
particularly important to establish and perfect a system of judicial review and state
compensation. Moreover, further reform of the judicial system is needed to improve the
quality of judicial personnel and court efficiency. It is particularly crucial to build up a fair
and complete procedural system in civil, criminal and administrative judicial process in order
to guarantee social justice from being frequently undermined by administrative power,
money and personal connections. Since judicial corruption is rampant now, building a fair
and clean judiciary is crucial, because such a judiciary is a yardstick for measuring the level
of democracy and rule of law in a country.
114 Wang Liming, "Ye tan yi fa zhi guo" [Yet more remarks on administering the state according to
]awL Faxue pinglun, no. 2 (1999), p. 44.
n5 Liu Hainian and Liu Han, in Yu Xuede, p. 26.
116 Cai Dingjian, in Yu Xuede, p. 27.
n7 Yu Xuede, p. 27.
us In Yu Xuede, p. 27.
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Chinese scholars propose that the content of the rule of law should include a full and
good system of laws, government administering according to law, an independent and fair
judiciary, the ruling Party acting within the law and enforcing socialist democracy, and a
great elevation of legal awareness broadly among the people."9 In doing so, first, they call
for a perfection of the National People's Congress (NPC) parliament system at all levels
through elevating it to a supreme legislature over all other administrative lawmakers. This
requires the redefinition of legislative power, procedures, legal interpretation and supervision
over lawmaking. The overall aim is to make all social sectors have laws to rely on and to
elevate law to supremacy in the state. The government, political parties, social organisations
and individuals must all be subject to the law. Any changes to the law must be made on the
basis of legal procedures.120
Among all the elements required for realising the rule of law, the key element is how
to legalise the Party leadership and how to exercise the administrative power in accordance
with the law \yi fa xingzheng, The Party and its scholars have always claimed
that Party leadership is harmonious with the rule of law. Cao Jianming, who has given a
series of legal lectures for senior Party leaders including Jiang Zemin, claims that the CCP
leadership is not in conflict with the market economy and rule of law. Moreover, the rule of
law, through which Party policies are turned into laws and regulations, will improve Party
legitimacy rather than weaken its leadership. He further claims that the rule of law and a
long-term stability cannot be achieved without the Party leadership.121 As a result, Party
leadership should be strengthened rather than weakened during the reform process.
Far from all agreeing with Cao, scholars express their concern that Party leadership
will undermine the supremacy of law and thus hamper the establishment of the rule of law
by subjugating the law to political needs while ignoring fundamental requirements of the rule
of law.122 In order to realise administrative rule of law, a prerequisite task is to legalise the
Party's ruling style. Party policies must be transformed into laws through legal procedures,
and these policies must bear social justice, such as safeguarding human rights, prohibiting
transactions between power and money, constraining official power.
119 Guo Yunsheng and Yang Jianhua, p. 6.
120 Wang Jiafu, "Yi fa zhi guo ji dai jiejue de xianshi wenti" [Realistic problems need to be resolved
relating to administering the state according to law], Liaowang, no. 10 (1998), pp. 9-10.For a
summary of recent studies by Chinese scholars on the rule of law, see Liu Baosan, "Yi fa zhi guo jinqi
yanjiu shuping" [Review of recent studies on administering the state according to law], Shehui kexue
dongtai (Wuhan), no. 12 (1996), pp. 6-10.
121 Cao Jianming, "Cong fazhi dao fazhi" [From rule by law to rule of law], Tansuoyu zhengming, no.
12 (1997), pp. 4-6.
122 Gu Yuan, "Ershi shiji Zhongguo fazhi huigu yu qianzhan yantaohui zongshu" [A summary of
symposium on Looking back and ahead of China's rule of law in the twentith century], Zhengfa luntan,
no.3 (2000), p. 158.
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The fundamental requirements and practices for the rule of law lie in legally
exercising administrative power. Administrative rule of law is essential to implementing the
rule of law.123 In China, according to Li Baosan, this particularly requires the leadership to
cultivate and strengthen a consciousness of democracy and legality, so that they can follow
the law and legal procedures while not infringing individuals' rights. In addition to
perfecting institutional safeguards, there must be effective legal means to punish state
agencies and officials where they have abused power and breached the law by pursuing
personal gains. Thus the reform of the administrative legal system should focus on laws
concerning administrative penalties, administrative redress, administrative litigation and
state compensation.124 Legal reform must therefore be supported by substantial political
reforms if it is to succeed.125
The principles ofy/ fa xingzheng, according to Ying Songnian who is the President
of the State Administrative College, is to perform administrative power according to law and
not to exercise any power that is not entrusted by law. This principle also allows any subjects
under the jurisdiction of the administrative agencies the right to apply for reconsideration of
their cases where they consider them to be illegal. Moreover, they may even sue
administrative agencies for specific actions or inactions. For any damages or harms caused
by administrative agencies, the victims are entitled to state compensation according to the
law by holding the relevant agencies accountable for their abuses.126 Li Lin, following
Wade's idea, points out that the rule of law in administrative affairs requires that
administrative power should be reasonable on the basis of law, which means that all
administrative actions without legal basis are prohibited, and that administrative agencies
should exercise their discretion properly.127
Ying Songnian, states that exercising administrative power strictly according to law
is crucial for guaranteeing the rule of law, because administrative actions greatly affect the
life and interest of citizens. Moreover, if administrative agencies and their officials fail to
abide by the law strictly, how can they ask people to follow laws? In China, it is not difficult
to require citizens to abide by law; the real difficulty is for officials to do so. Even if the state
acts for good ends, it also must be restricted within the law and bear legal responsibility for
any misconduct. Since people in power often control public power, social resources, and all
123 Ying Songnian, "Yi fa xingzheng lun gang" [A discussion of exercising administrative power
according to law], Zhongguo faxue, no. 1 (1997), p. 32.
124 Song Caifa, "Yifaxingzheng shi yifazhiguo de nandian he guanjian" [To exercise administrative
p0wer according to law is the difficult and key for administering the state according to law],
Shehuizhuyiyanjiu, no. 1 (2000), pp. 53-55.
125 Liu Baosan, "Yi fa zhi guo jinqi yanjiu...", p. 8.
126 Ying Songnian, p. 29.
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kinds of coercive means, it is easy for them to misuse these means to seek personal and
group interests. This means that the main threat to establishing the rule of law is the abuse of
public power, especially administrative power.128
According to Yu Huaining, in a market economy, the administrative rule of law
emphasises that the government must pay attention to its method and scope in administering
the economy, and maintaining a balance between effective interference and proper limitation.
Where this balance is broken, there must be damages to both the administration and the
economy. Without restriction of governmental interference, this would result in an
authoritarian economy in which the government acts as both regulator and player, using its
power to seek personal gains. At the same time, there would be strong resistance from the
local administrations towards the central power, leading to a failure in state macro control,
low efficiency and excessive budget, and widespread bureaucracy.129
As yi fa zhi guo does not necessarily lead to the rule of law, yi fa xingzheng, which
only means that the government rule the country according to law, does not necessarily lead
to the rule of law, either. 130 Thus some participants of 1996 annual conference of
administrative jurisprudence131 called for emphasising the principles of the rule of law in
administrative legal system. This is because that in contemporary China, administrative
regulations and rules, which are made by state agencies at all levels rather than by NPC
legislature, occupy a substantial apportion in Chinese laws, and over 80% of laws made by
the legislature also rely on administrative agencies for their implementation. The
administrative power has a long-standing tradition of allowing the state to dominate over the
law for fulfilling state goals. This increases the difficulty of curbing governmental discretion.
There has been concern about the broad definition of China's law in which not only
legislative laws but also administrative regulations are all defined as state laws. In reality the
constitution and NPC laws are sometimes overshadowed by administrative regulations
because of the powerful position of administrative agencies. Rules made by local Party and
governmental agencies play a great role in conducting local administration, although they are
frequently in conflict with the law and central policies. Many officials only pay attention to
administrative regulations while ignoring the constitution and laws. In this situation, some
127 Li Lin, "Fazhi de linian, zhidu de yunzuo", P. 6.
128 Yu Xuede, "fazhi haishi fazhi....", pp. 26-28.
129 Yu Huaining, "Lun shichangjingji tiaojian xia de xingzheng quanli kongzhi" [On administrative
power control under the condition of market economy], Shehuizhuyiyanjiu, no. 2 (1999), p. 73.
130 Fan Qingfang and Song Chao, "Shidai de qiangying: quanguo xingzhengfa yanjiuhui 1996 nine
nianhui zongshu" [The strong voice of the times: A summary of the 1996 annual conference of the




scholars suggest that it would be better to replace the term yi fa xingzheng with fazhi
xingzheng ox xingzhengfazhi (administrative rule of law, ff Yu ft tJ' YiYn) by stressing
the rule of law during exercising administrative power, and at the same time to correctly
handle the relationship between rule of law and rule of the Party.112
3. Achievements, failures and the dilemmas in establishing the rule of law
Since the reform began in the late 1970s, great achievements in legal development have been
made. The 1982 constitution incorporates basic principles of the rule of law such as the
supremacy of the law, the equality of all before the law, the need for officials to act within
the constitution and law and the rights of citizens to enjoy a wide range of freedom.111 The
regime has made great efforts in lawmaking and institution building as well as in
popularising public legal consciousness, which have improved remarkably in the minds of
both officials and ordinary people. A framework of legal system serving a market economy
has emerged.134
The legal theory has also experienced a profound revolution, leading to the
formation of Deng's theory on socialist democracy and legality and a socialist rule of law
with Chinese characteristics. The legal mentality of the general public has changed from
favouring a rule of man into a rule of law; from favouring supremacy of power into
supremacy of law; from emphasising responsibility above rights into emphasising both at the
same time in order to arouse a wide consciousness of rights; from only stressing law's class
nature into one of increasingly emphasising its function as a social coordinator; from
denying the difference between public law and private law into admitting the existence of the
two concepts in order to build a concept of private law; from favouring substantial justice
into emphasising the importance of both procedural and substantial justice in order to rebuild
the concept of procedural values; and from relying on administrative fiats into the concept
that the government acts according to law.135
In correspondence with changes in mentality and thought, practical efforts have gone
into developing and improving the professionalism of the legislature, judiciary, procuracy,
and the public security and legal professions. Since the fifteenth Party Congress, the regime
has set a target for itself to build up a legal system with Chinese characteristics by the year
132 Fan Qingfang and Song Chao, pp. 96-97.
133 Arts. 5 and 33 of the PRC constitution.
134 A working report delivered by Tian Jiyun, Vice President of the NPC, at the Fourth Session of the
Eighth Congress of the NPC, Renmin ribao, 11 March 1997, p. 2.
135 Liu Han and Li Lin, "Wo guo fazhi jianshe ershinian chengjiu yu zhanwang" [Achievements of
twenty years' legal construction and prospects], Qiushi, no. 23 (1998), p. 12.
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2010.136 A series of legal lectures have been held regularly for senior politicians to equip
them with basic legal knowledge, and the opinions of legal scholars have been referred to in
the decision- making process. Such lectures are also held for state agencies and officials at
all levels and a series of five-year plans aiming to elevate public legal awareness have also
been launched since 1986.
Remarkable progress has been made in lawmaking and institution building.
Contemporary China is no longer a lawless country in terms of codification of laws and
regulations, and the people are enjoying a better life and freedom than any period in China's
history. However, some scholars and members of the public have expressed deep discontent
about the actual performance of the law. As part of the package of socialist spiritual
civilisation, the law is expected to play a role in providing a legal framework for the market
economy, enhancing legislative and judicial efficiency, popularising legal education among
the cadres and citizenry, and attacking increasing economic crime and corruption. In China,
the general debate on the rule of law is carried out with a strong political flavour and
basically serves the current economic goals. In doing so, it reveals many profound theoretical
problems relating to the rule of law. Both official and intellectual circles have excessive
expectations for the rule of law to resolve political, economic, and social problems currently
being ignored.137 Thus the law has been regarded as a comprehensive panacea for curing
China of all the social problems facing China; such expectations of the rule of law are too
nai've to be of any help to the legal construction in China.138
From 1979 to early 2000, the NPC and its Standing Committee made 360 laws, an
average of 16 per year; the State Council made 700 administrative regulations; Local
Peoples' Congresses made 6,000 local laws, and Central Ministerial and Provincial
governments made over 30,000 administrative regulations concerning their specific
jurisdictions.139 Efforts have also been made to promote the administrative rule of law and an
administrative legal system designed to regulate state administrators and their conduct
through legal and administrative constraints is emerging. The establishment of an
administrative law system that gives individuals the right to challenge the decisions of
administrative officials has been one of the most remarkable features of the post-1978 legal
136 On 17 March 1998, the Fourth Session of the Eighth NPC Congress passed "Guomin jingji he
shehui fazhan 'jiu wu' jihua he erlingyiling nian yuanjing mubiao gangyao" [The 'ninth five-year' plan
for national economy and social development, and the outline for future goals to the year 2010],
Renmin ribao, 9 February 1996, p. 1.
137 Liang Zhiping, "Fazhi: shehui zhuanxing shiqi de zhidu jiangou...," 2000, p. 1.
138 Liang Zhiping notes that the term "the era of rule of law" has distracted the efforts from
concentrating on legal construction itself to a wide range of expectations for law to resolve. He calls
for focusing legal reform on the nature of law per se. ibid, p. 2.
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reforms. The Administrative Litigation Law, the Administrative Supervision Law, the State
Compensation Law and the Adminstrative Redress Law and the Administrative Penalties
Law have gone a long way toward creating a system that holds government officials
accountable for their acts, although problems remain both in the laws themselves and even
more so in their execution.
The general awareness of rights is apparent from the ever-increasing litigation and
participation in public affairs. People are more likely to use legal means to protect their
rights and interests. From 1978 to 1988, the cases the courts accepted at a first instance
increased to around 2,300,000 from 44,755. This further increased to 5,400,000 in 1998 and
to 6,000,000 in 2001. Among them, administrative cases increased more than ten fold from
8,573 in 1988 to over 120,000 in 2001.140 But the increase in administrative litigation is
relatively low as compared to that in other kinds of cases.
The achievement in legal development is very obvious in many fields, but China is
still far from being a rule of law society, as observed by both Chinese and Western
scholars.141 At the same time, these scholars have also shown their disappointment at
outcomes ofChina's legal reform. In their view, China's fazhi (rule of law) is just rule by law
rather than the genuine rule of law, although both have the same pronunciation in Chinese.142
As Tony Saich says, socialist legality and Jiang's rule of law is still covering the present
process of legalisation and regularisation. The fact that it was socialist legality set certain
constraints and retained for the Party the major role of deciding what was, and what was not,
a crime. Moreover, when Jiang and his advisors use the phrase rule of law, they do not mean
a system that gives primacy to law above political consideration and Party policy. Instead, it
is a way to manage power, regulate the economy and discipline society in light of rapidly
changing circumstances. In this sense, while it might provide greater predictability, it is just
another weapon in the arsenal of Party control.143
There is a great distance between efforts and outcomes, between expectation and
reality. The rule of law is more a slogan than a practice, and law is still a tool as
implementing and strengthening institutional changes, mainly economic changes, according
139 Liu Han and Li Lin, "Wuo guo fazhi jianshe ershi nian chengjiu yu zhanwang", p. 12; also see
Zhongguo renquan fazhan wushi nian, in Law yearbook, 2001, pp. 43-51.
140 See Zhongguo renquan fazhan wushi nian, pp. 43-51; Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tongji nainjian
[China statistical yearbook], 2002, p. 762.
141 For example, see Wang Yan, Chinese Legal Reform: The Case ofForeign Investment Law
(London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 14-24; Peerenboom, China's Long March Towards the Rule ofLaw,
pp. 7-8; Lubman, Bird in A Cage, chapter six, pp. 138-172.
142 Ronald C. Keith, China's Strugglefor the Rule ofLaw (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 1.
142 Tony Saich, Governance and Politics ofChina (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 126 and 125.
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to predetermined policies.144 Opinions as to whether the rule of law can be established or not,
and whether China can become a country based on the rule of law, are varied among these
scholars, so are their research methodologies. Many scholars in the West express their deep
suspicions of the direction of China's legal reform, and they even conclude that China does
not need rule of law while still gaining remarkable economic achievements. They believe
that the slogan of rule of law is, in fact, used by the CCP as a tool to attract foreign
investments, rebuild its legitimacy, and to control state power and suppress the people more
effectively.145
Some optimistic scholars claim that, in spite of great difficulties, China will
eventually become a rule of law state as time moves on. As Ronald Brown puts it, "perhaps
just as a rose by any other name is still a rose, the question can be asked whether 'rule by
law' is just another name for 'rule of law' or is it 'rule of man'?"146 It should be understood,
he argues, that many efforts have been made in China to build a new legal system leading to
better economic co-operation, and that some basic principles of the rule of law are in place.
He concludes that law with Chinese characteristics is diversity between different systems
rather than an adversity, and that there is no reason to deny that law and the courts will stop
to develop towards their perfection.147
Zheng Yongnian claims that rule by law is a Chinese concept also known as statist
instrumentalism, which is a mixture of China's legal tradition and Soviet legal system;
although law in today's China is still a tool in the hands of the CCP, it has become a more
important tool in promoting economic development, maintaining social stability, reducing
official arbitrariness and increasing political legitimacy. He regards the biggest difficulty for
establishing the rule of law, as well as the key difference between the rule of law and rule by
law, as that which officials must abide by the law in the same way as ordinary people. The
difficulties mainly come from cultural, organisational and structural flaws, and moreover, the
state promotes legal developments while at the same time hampering the process towards the
rule of law. This can be shown in Party-state structure in the political hierarchy, the
dominance of the state in the relationship between the state and the society, and the priority
144 Edward J. Epstein, "Law and Legitimation in Post-Mao China", in Pitman Potter (ed.), Domestic
Law Reform in Post-Mao China (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 19.
145 For detail, see William Alford, "A Second Great Wall? China's Post-Cultural Revolution Project of
Legal Construction", Cultural Dynamics 11:2 (July 1999), pp. 193-213; Michael W. Dowdle,
"Heretical Laments: China and the Fallacies of'Rule of Law' ", Cultural Dynamics 11:3 (1999), pp.
287-314; Yu Xingzhong, "Legal Pragmatism in the People's Republic of China", Journal of Chinese
Law, no. 3 (1989), pp. 29-51; William Alford, "Law, Law, What Law? Why Western Scholars of
China Have Not Have More to Say about its Law", in The Limits ofChina's Rule ofLaw, pp. 45-64.
146 Ronald C. Brown, Understanding Chinese Courts and Legal Process: Law with Chinese
Characteristics (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p. 133.
147 Brown, ibid, p. 147.
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of developing the economy. As a result, according to Zheng, the rule of law in China will not
be decided by legal development per se but more importantly by China's political, economic
and social structures, and the rule of law will be a long process but not impossible.'48
Shen Yuanyuan believes that both China's imperial and PRC practice emphasise
substantial justice more than procedural rationality. The former, which relies on good
leadership, has had a strong influence on current legal reform and political structure. In the
current political structure, the popularity of substantial justice over a formal one will last for
a long time, which may strengthen the practice of using the law as an instrument for Party
control.149 Neither China's traditional history nor recent practice over twenty years has
provided strong evidence that a system following principles of the rule of law will emerge in
China in the near future.150
Shen Yuanyuan doubts that the legal reform is successful in "fulfilling its state goals
of fostering economic reforms and building a legal system that would be granted the 'utmost
high degree of authority'."151 She points out the problems facing China in its legal
construction: the government has not yet managed to create a legal structure that can sustain
a mixed economy and many newly enacted economic laws do not serve their function well
because these laws are vague and incomplete. She questions China's success in
implementing the laws and more fundamentally in granting law the highest degree of
authority because Party interests are in conflict with the law.152 Unlike scholars inside China,
Shen does not think the rule of law is the same as socialist rule of law with the Party
leadership superior to law when conflicts occur between them. In this sense, any requirement
for promoting democracy while asking to restrict Party leadership is regarded as attempt at
promoting Western liberalism while overthrowing the regime.
The rule of law is fundamentally incompatible with socialist China because the rule
of law must be established on a liberal democratic system. As William Alford points out,
China's rule of law originated from its internal political dynamics with some borrowings
from the West, while the concept of rule of law originated in Western economic and political
systems. The Party has attempted to pursue economic reform goals without sacrificing its
leadership. Thus communist ideology and Leninist state rule foreclose any hope of genuine
148 Zheng Yongnian, "The Rule by Law versus the Rule of Law", pp. 135-136.
149 Shen Yuanyuan, "Conceptions and Receptions of Legality: Understanding the Complexity of Law
Reform", pp. 35-36.
150 Karen G. Turner, "Introduction: the problem of paradigms", in Karen G. Turner, et al (eds.) The
Lifliits ofthe Rule ofLaw in China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), p. 17.
151 Shen Yuanyuan, p. 21.
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development towards the rule of law because of the rejection of the separation of powers and
the supremacy of law.153
Stanley Lubman refers to China's legal reform as being the "bird in a cage" with
ideological and political constrains. He prefers the term "legal institutions" to "legal system",
and "legal construction" to "legal reform" in studying China's legal development, because he
does not think that there is a legal system in place in China.154 He claims that China's
political system will become a major obstacle for the realisation of the rule of law, and thus
the future of the rule of law is beyond imagination.155 He also points out that the Party's wide
and consistent emphasis on social stability and economic performance has resulted in annual
strike-hard campaigns and ideological suppression through imposing most severe
punishments on criminals and political-religious dissidents, and at the same time, arbitrary
interference from the state with the development of private businesses and foreign
investments without effective constraint. As the Party does not allow any challenges to its
vanguard role in the country and to the dogma of the Four Cardinal Principles although they
are contradictory with the rule of law, he concludes that the law will be tied up in the cage all
the time until the current political system is completely abandoned.156
Western Chinese scholars particularly criticise the instrumental use of the law by the
CCP to promote its own policies and to maintain stability and unity.157 Chen Jianfu states
that clearly it is socialist characteristics rather than Chineseness that China needs to
abandon.158 He points out that law in contemporary China is fundamentally used as a tool for
social engineering as desired and perceived by the Party. Such pragmatic use of law under
Deng's leadership fell well within the notion of rule by law but not the rule of law. Moreover,
Jiang's 1997 report hardly discussed democraticisation, political reform and human rights
protection, although Chinese scholars' discussion seems to suggest that China under Deng
was a country under the rule by law and the present China under the third generation of CCP
leaders with Jiang as its core [CCP jargon] is moving towards a rule of law.159 His report is
153 William P. Alford, "A Second Great Wall?....," pp. 198-199.
154 Lubman, 1999, introduction; also see William Alford, "Law, Law, What Law? Why Western
Scholars of China Have Not Had More to Say about its Law", pp. 45-64.
155 Stanley Lubman, China's Legal Reforms (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), introduction,
p. 1.
156 Lubman, 1999, introduction, p. 2.
157 Yu Xingzhong, "Legal Pragmatism in the PRC ", Journal of Chinese Law, no. 3 (1989), pp. 29-51;
Pitman Potter, The Chinese Legal system: Globalisation and Local Legal Culture (London: Routledge,
2001), introduction; Jianfu Chen, "Market Economy and the Internationalisation of Civil and
Commercial Law in the PRC", in Kanishka Jayasuriya (ed.) Law, Capitalism and Power in Asia: the
Rule ofLaw and Legal Institutions (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 69-86.
158 Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: towards an understanding ofChinese law, Its Nature and Development
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 361.
159 Chen Jianfu, ibid, pp. 361-363.
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continuing to talk about rule by law, not rule of law, and thus China remains a country based
on rule by law, not rule of law.160
Ronald Keith examines China's struggle to find a balance between efficiency and
justice in a new marketplace while developing a new legal theory in China, finding that the
emphasis on efficiency in a market economy has led to sacrifice of individual rights and
interests, and has also caused imbalance between efficiency and justice. This stress on
efficiency often fails to bring about social and judicial justice, since during economic reform
social and judicial justice has been deliberately associated with politically emphasised
efficiency in a marketplace, while the virtue of the rule of law per se is ignored.161
Randall Peerenboom suggests that it will be better to assess China's legal
development based on a thin theory of the rule of law, which focused on formal and
procedural progress based on China's conditions, rather than target human rights and
political democracy based on a Western liberal democratic version of the rule of law.162
However, although the Party seems to be able to accept certain constraints for more
effectively enforcing its policy and state unity, as long as the law is not becoming a threat to
Party interests, China continues to endorse an instrumental rule by law, since the Party has
an ambivalent attitude toward law and in particular the desire to retain ultimate authority
over the system. Thus he states that the future of the rule of law is dependent on the intention
and commitment of the Party in that whether the rule of law can obtain sufficient authority to
impose meaningful constraints on the state and its officials, especially senior officials.'63 He
reminds one of the difficulties in a single Party state in controlling and allocating political
and administrative powers, since in such a system, power's control must either depend on the
Party's voluntary or forced relinquishment of some of its power.164 In today's China, he
concludes, the Party continues to impose its influence on or interfere with the legislature and
courts, denies citizens many of their civil and political rights, and adopts harsh suppression
of ideological dissidents, any autonomous organisations, and especially opposition political
opinions on the internet. All these practices have resulted in the failure of China's legal
reform to attain even a thin rule of law.165
160 Chen Jianfu, ibid, p. 363.
161 Keith & Lin, Law and Justice in China's New Marketplace, p. 1.
162 Peeranboom, China's Long March towards the Rule ofLaw, introduction, p. 5.
163 Peerenboom, ibid, pp. 10-11.
164 Peerenboom, "A Government of Laws: democracy, rule of law and administrative law reform in
the PRC", p. 60.
163 peerenboom, "Ruling the Country in accordance with law...", p. 324.
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As can be seen from the above-mentioned discussion of the legal reform in China, the
favourable conditions for realising the rule of law, such as a free democratic polity, a free
market economy and a robust civil society, do not come into being in contemporary China.166
The emerging socialist market economy remains dominated by public ownership and relies
on the state to play an active role. Moreover, an authoritarian government, which builds its
legitimacy mainly on economic performance without political democracy, will not allow any
challenges to this status quo. The law is still a major tool for fulfilling Party goals and the
rule of law is dependent on the pace of market development. Whenever the Party-state feels
necessary, it will interfere in the economy. In practice, local governmental agencies have
formed a strong affiliation with businesses within their jurisdiction. Governmental direct or
indirect interest in the market has made local governments meddle frequently in enterprises'
operation and control of important industries. Such a market is not supportive of the rule of
law.
In addition to the lack of political democracy and a free market, the third condition
for establishing the rule of law, namely a robust civil society, has not come into being. To
date, the leadership consistently represses any independent social organisations. In order to
maintain its rule, the CCP continues to emphasise social stability, collective rights above the
individual rights, and a socialist spiritual civilisation. It controls the huge bureaucracy by a
cadre appointment system while the judiciary and judges are also subject to Party leadership.
The media, the legislature and governmental watchdogs are all subject to the Party. In this
situation, the whole society is under the close surveillance of the Party and its security
organs. In this sense, China remains a police state. An independent civil society will be
regarded as a threat to Party dictatorship and must be suppressed. The harsh crackdown on
the Falungong cult and the continued attacks on unregistered Christian groups and political
dissidents have revealed the powerful control of the state over society. In recent years with
the internet widely accessible to the public, the regime has expanded its censorship and
suppression to opinions and debates that are published on the internet.
It is true that China's society is becoming more plural and autonomous than before,
but this pluralisation of social interests has not brought about an independent society in
166 As what basic elements or indicators needed for building the rule of law, someone may raise
different opinion. However, these conditions listed above in the text are classic and essential, and at
least they have close interaction to each other in facilitating the establishment of the rule of law. The
rule of law may not reach its ideal or get perfection in even most developed democratic countries in
nowdays, neigher the democracy and market economy. But such less perfection does not mean that
the rule of law is not necessarily a prerequisite for building a socialist market economy, or that the
establishment of the rule of law does not necessarily require wide political democracy in China. Some
may also claim that these mutual conditions are decided by men rather than a truth, and thus they are
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China capable of balancing state power. What has formed in the new market economy is not
a middle business class as in the West, but a corporatism in which enterprises and businesses
have formed a close affiliation to local governments, in order to obtain scarce resources,
loans, and administrative protection. Local administrations also benefit considerably from
this link to local revenues and officials' incomes. The market reform is fostering an economy
linked to political power. In this situation, the emerging business group is unwilling and
unable to challenge the state to introduce a freer and more democratic political system. They
may be concerned with property rights and certain civil and political rights, but will not
challenge one-Party rule. In the near future, therefore, a form of socialist state corporatism
that serves the interests of the state and the elite is a more likely result of economic reform in
China than democracy.
The Party-state interests put the legal reform in a dilemma as the CCP and its
ideology will be brought into an ever-intensifying conflict with legal development. Since
1990, the regime has been facing more and more conflicts between pragmatic economic
policy and orthodox ideology, planned economy and market mechanism; central control and
local autonomy, maintaining stability and appealing for political democracy, and an open-
door policy and fear of Western influence.167 Besides, the CCP is also confronted with a
number of internal problems or challenges: the growing gap between quality of life in urban
and rural areas, increasing crime, rampant corruption, and spiritual emptiness from a loss of
faith in communist ideals combined with state policies against organised religion. The re-
emergence of superstition in rural areas, rural rebellion, and the heavy reliance on personal
social networks are all fighting against various incentive systems introduced by the reform.
All these in turn reinforce the ideological vacuum and the individual pursuit of material
gains.168
If reform is to succeed, communism and the Party and whatever is left of the FCP
must go, and the PRC leaders cannot have things both ways at once.169 "The communist
leadership stands at a crossroads. To rectify the structural imbalance and improve efficiency,
more reform measures must be undertaken and the operation of the economy must rely on
the market. Moreover, to attract foreign capital and technology, the open-door policy must
be strengthened and the investment environment improved. Laws must be passed to curb the
unreliable. However, these conditions and their interactions have been proved by social development
in the world to be existed better workable model than their flaws.
167 Zheng Shiping, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China: the Institutional Dilemma (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 278-279.
168 Joseph Y. S. Cheng (ed.), China: Modernisation in the 1980s (Hong Kong: the Chinese University
Press, 1989), introduction, p. xiii.
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spread of corruption and speculation, and the political structure must be revamped. All of
these moves threaten to undermine the foundations of the one-Party dictatorship and make
the 'FCP' meaningless."170
4. Introduction to the thesis
The concept of the rule of law is a controversial issue in present China, and there are many
contradictions and confusions. It is too early to predict the future ofChina's legal reform, but
a clear idea of China's legal environment status quo will deepen our understanding of the
nature and content of the legal reform taking place in China. The control of Party and state
power under the law is crucial to establishing the rule of law system, and it is therefore a key
criterion by which to differentiate the rule of law from rule by law. Within the current
political framework, however, it is hard to categorise China, a socialist country based on the
rule of law with Chinese characteristics, as a rule-of-law state as understood in the Western
context. In practice, the present legal system is used more as a powerful instrument by the
Party-state to reach its goals than to bring the Party-state power under control.
With all these in mind, 1 will explore in this thesis Chinese political, economic and
cultural contexts in which the legal reform is carried out, and trace legal development from
1978 to date ainly in the areas of restriction of governmental arbitrariness and protection of
rights. Case studies will go hand in hand with discussion and analysis of laws and
regulations concerned, with a focus on: (1) whether the constitution and law can effectively
check and balance the state power, and protect human rights and property rights; (2) whether
there is a legal culture in current Chinese society to favour the implementation of the rule of
law.
Thus there are seven chapters in this thesis. The first one serves as an introduction to
the background of China's legal construction, Chinese and Western theories and comments
on legal reform and legal development, and conflicts between the rule of law and Party
leadership. The second chapter concentrates on China's administrative legal regime, the most
chaotic and contradictory area in China's legal system. The following two chapters will be
devoted to case studies of the Party-state frequently infringing fundamental human rights,
including personal freedom and property rights of citizens and enterprises in the name of the
state or public interests.
Chapter Five will examine the status of the Chinese judiciary under the PRC
political structure to show its weakness and inability in reigning Party-state arbitrariness, in
169 Bill-Jaw Lin and James T. Myers (eds.), Forces for Change in Contemporary China (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 1993), p. 119.
170 Ibid, p. 281.
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safeguarding the rights and interests of the individual and company, and in resolving social
disputes. The sixth chapter will explore non-political elements in China's legal reform by
looking at Chinese legal tradition and culture, and the influence of these elements upon
ordinary Chinese people in their attitude towards official power, laws, courts, and lawyers,
which have proven to be a serious obstacle to the rule of law.
The last chapter acts as a conclusion. As previously stated, it is too early to foretell
whether China will be able to establish the rule of law system as this system is universally
understood. I will not close with any predictions about the fate of legal reform in China.
Rather, I will make an evaluation of the nature and content of China's legal reform based on
case studies within the present legal framework.
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Chapter Two: China's Administrative Law and Limits
The Chinese term "Yi fa xing zheng" ['KfetllSC] means "exercising administrative power
according to law." Yi fa xingzheng requires the government to act according to law, and
without it, the rule of law cannot but be empty talk. According to A. V. Dicey and F. A.
Hayek, an autonomous legal order requires two conditions: law as a restraint to government,
and law as formal and procedural justice. 1 In order to satisfy these conditions, the
government must be restricted by rules so that people can predict the consequences of state
management and then make their own choices and decisions; in this way, people are only
subject to the law rather than to the government while officials are restrained by the rules
known to the public. Thus it is crucial to build up an effective administrative legal system
according to the principles of the rule of law.
In China, administrative power has penetrated into all aspects of people's life, and
administrative fiats have long been used as main management methods. The administrative
power is superior to the law and the judiciary. Thus, whether state agencies and their
officials can perform their duties legally determines the fulfilment of judicial fairness, right
protection, market success and the rule of law. The CCP has called for efforts to speed up the
transfer of government functions and encourage all-round administration according to law, in
order to build a clean, diligent, pragmatic and efficient government.2 Correspondingly, a
series of laws and regulations have been made to control administrative arbitrariness, and at
the same time to empower individuals and social organisations to challenge the legality of
governmental actions. An administrative legal framework in China is emerging and the
governments at all levels have made remarkable progress in lawmaking and enforcement in
recent years.
However, much more work still need to be done for meeting requirements of the rule
of law. Problems in China's administrative law such as conflict and vagueness in
administrative legislation and regulation are serious, leading to confusion in the
implementation and interpretation of these laws and regulations. Meanwhile, the legal means
for controlling state agencies and officials, especially judicial review, is far too insufficient
1 A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study ofLaw ofConstitution (London: Macmillan, 1959 and
reprinted in 1975), the tenth edi., pp. 202-203; F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago:
University ofChicago Press, 1944), p. 154.
2
People's Daily (online in English version), 16 September 2002, 1 January 2003 (http://
english.peopledaily.com.cn/200209/16).
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to hold them accountable for rampant abuses. Legal procedures for restricting governmental
actions remain underdeveloped and fragmentary.
1. Unfettered administrative power in lawmaking process
The term "administrative law" is used to describe the legal regime governing public
authorities, including legislative, executive and judicial powers.3 Among the three powers,
the administrative power is the most powerful and ever-expanding one. Today,
administrative agencies not only enforce laws and regulations but also make regulations and
exercise adjudicating power in a wide range of areas.
In China, administrative regulations and rules play a major role in state governance.
The highest authority of the NPC in lawmaking is overshadowed by powerful and expanding
administrative power. According to the PRC constitution, the NPC and its Standing
Committee (SC) are the highest legislative authorities and have the power to make and revise
the constitution and state "basic laws" [/'/' ben fa, to interpret the constitution and
laws, and to make or revise "ordinary laws" [qi ta fa, ^tSfe].4 The provincial, municipal
and county People's Congresses can make regional legislation [difang fagui, ±t!l ff if jiW]
within their jurisdictions.
Compared with the NPC and its SC, the State Council (China's supreme
administrative agency) enjoys a wider legislative power. According to the constitution, it
may enact "administrative measures" [xingzheng cuoshi, jfiSJaJS], "administrative laws
and regulations" [xingzheng fagui, tf as well as "temporary stipulations" [zhan
xing guiding]." It may also recommend a motion to the NPC and its SC or issue particulars
for enforcing national laws.5 In addition, the State Council also has the authority, granted by
the NPC, to promulgate "empowered legislation" [shouquan lifa, SjXALfe] and "quasi-
laws" [zhun lifa, during the period of economic reforms.6 Under the State Council,
its numerous central ministries and commissions have the power to make departmental
3
C.T.Emery and B. Smythe, Judicial Review: Legal Limits of Official Power (London: Sweet and
Maxwell, 1986), Introduction, p. 3.
4 Arts. 58; 62 (1) (2) (3); 67 (1) (2) (3) (4) of the PRC constitution.
5 Art. 89 (1) (2) of the constitution.
6 See "Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu jiaqiang falti jieshi gongzuo de
jueyi" [Resolution concerning strengthening the work of law interpretation], issued on 10 June 1981,
in Falii huibian, p. 274-275.
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regulations [bumen guizhang, nPnS!$],7 and regional governments at all levels have the
power to make local regulations and rules [difang zhengfu guizhang,
Under this lawmaking mechanism, the administrative law in China has a wide range
of sources and multi-layer of authority. It is natural that, with the rapid pace of the economic
reform, confusion and conflicts among state agencies in relation to making and
implementing regulations frequently happen.9
In China, the making of administrative regulations and rules is mainly carried out to
enforce Party current policies. As China is ruled by one political party, all state agencies
including legislature and judiciary are subject to the Party leadership and must carry out its
policies which are manifested in various forms, such as laws, regulations, directives and
normative documents (guifanxing wenjian, The Constitution requires all
organisations, including all political parties, to obey the law,10 but at the same time, it affirms
the Party supreme leadership in all round state affairs to be the cardinal principle of the
FCP. " Thus, Party leadership in lawmaking, especially lawmaking regarding state
administration, is beyond challenge.12 Only when Party policies have been proven effective
and reasonable in practice may they be legalised. Thus the lawmaking process is not an
independent arising one out of the need of legal development itself but one that arising from
political needs.
As Perry Keller notes, "The Party leadership is consequently the ultimate source of
all legislation, regardless of its content, form or the institution through which it is issued."13
In practice, Party instructions and normative documents are issued at various levels of
authorities and cover all round areas, in order to implement the Party's economic, political
and cultural policies. Provincial and county Party Committees, based on the polices of the
7 Art. 90 of the constitution.
8
"Difang geji renmin daibiao dahui he geji renmin zhengfu zuzhi fa" [The Organic Laws of the Local
People's Congresses and Local People's Governments at all Levels] (promulgated on 1 July 1979 at
the Second Session of the Fifth Congress of the NPC), arts. 27, 35 (1); in huibian, pp. 64, 66.
9 For discussions of conflict and disorder in China's law system, see Ge Wenxiu, "Wo guo
xingzhengfa muqian cunzai de wu da wenti ji duice" [Five major problems of administrative law in
current China and the solutions], Dong Jiang xuekan, no. 3 (2000), pp. 104-108. Other comments, for
example, see Perry Keller, "Sources of Order in Chinese Law", The American Journal ofComparative
Law, vol. 42 (1994), pp. 711-759.
10 Art. 5 of the constitution.
1' Preamble of the Constitution.
12 In the 1980s, some members in the NPC attempted to point out the conflict between the Party
leadership and the NPC supreme legislative authority. Peng Zhen, the then Chairman of the NPC,
clarified that upholding the Party leadership in legislative work was absolutely beyond challenge
because legal reform was to strengthen and improve Party leadership rather than to weaken it. Since
then, this topic has been left untouched at least in official circle.
13
Perry Keller, "Sources of Order in Chinese Law," The American Journal ofComparative Law, vol.
42(1994), p. 738.
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Central Party Committee, play a substantial role in guiding policy within their own
jurisdictions. Administrative normative documents come in various forms, such as decisions,
orders, and instructions. Sometimes these powerful instructions are only a note or a
telephone from some officials. In practice, the order among all laws and regulations in terms
of their authority is as follows: the law is often subject to political and administrative power;
administrative laws [approved by the NPC] and regulations are superior to NPC-made laws;
administrative regulations are more powerful than administrative laws; normative documents
are treated with more respect than administrative regulations; and notes and orders from
superiors are more effective than normative documents.
The dominance of administrative regulations in state administration may be shown
from statistics relating lawmaking between the legislative agencies and administrative
agencies during the period from 1979 to April 2000. The State Council made 891
administrative regulations and rules during this period, while at the same time the NPC only
made 185 laws. Over this period, the State Council made 142 regulations while the NPC
made 41 laws throughout its whole fifth session; during sixth session of the NPC, the former
made 258 while the latter made 47; during the seventh session, the former made 201 while
the latter made 60; during the eighth session the former made 241 and the latter made 85. 14
The administrative control has been also expanded to regulate many civil areas, such as
housing management, road accidents, and medical negligence.15
The most chaotic situation occurs when local or departmental agencies enjoy the
power to make local rules or administrative normative documents. For example, in a process
of rectifying administrative regulations and rules, Zhejiang provincial government alone
issued 261 decisions and orders between December in 1993 and November in 1994, and
between December in 1998 and November in 2000.16 Illegal practices were full of the
making process of these regulations and rules or of their contents, such as infringing private
rights and interests, monopolising the decision-making process, and low transparency of the
procedures.
The decentralisation during the economic reform has given rise to local
protectionism or localism [difang baohuzhuyi, it!i ® i ] and departmental
protectionism [bumen baohuzhuyi, Localism refers to local government and
its functional agencies or national departments utilising their administrative power to restrict
14
Wang Baoming, "Zhongguo xingzheng lifa pingshu" [Review of China's administrative legislation],
Guojia xingzheng xueyuan xuebao, no. 4 (2000), p. 69.
15
Huang Long, "Xingzheng lifa de minshi zhiyue wenti" [The problem of civil restriction of
administrative legislation], Fazhi ribao, 4 February 2002.
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or discriminate fair competition from outside regions, by restricting outside businesses
entering into their regional market or preventing local enterprises and their capital from
flowing out.17 In essence, this practice is an abuse of administrative power. As a result,
market competition is sacrificed to the pursuit of local or departmental interests.
In some circumstances, China's regional governments employ local regulations as a
means of resisting central policies and laws. These administrative agencies wield their
lawmaking powers to protect or increase their jurisdictions and to advance their own policies.
Their lawmaking power becomes a means of allocating interests or even protecting huge
profits at the expense of social justice and public interests. Such abuse of legislative power in
pursuing local or departmental interests will result in legislative corruption in that these
lawmakers may smuggle inactive or bad laws and even evil laws into legislation. This is a
waste of legislative resources and an invisible corruption of power which is latent and
therefore more dangerous than judicial corruption.18
Li Buyun, who participated in drafting the PRC Legislative Law, notes that the
attitude of lawmaking participants towards legislation reveals the intention to promote
departmental interests, these departments only considering their own benefit and expansion,
often ignoring "the reasonable distribution of benefits and the reasonable allocation of
authority."19 As local governments increase their control over their own economic resources,
they not only resist central policy and national law, but also make more regulations within
their jurisdiction. As a result, there are inevitably bargains and negotiations between
different departments and regions, which have caused chaos in a newly established
administrative law system. In this lawmaking mechanism, the process of lawmaking will be
slow and time-consuming, and policy differences are resolved through near endless lobbying,
16
Xingzhengfa luntan [Forum of administrative law], acc. 4 June 2002
(http://www. 1488.com.cn/bbs/showannounce.asp?id=358875&boarddid=27&page-l).
17 For the definition, see He Yourong, "Difangzhuyi de chengying, weihai jiqi duice" [The reason,
harm and solution of local protectionism], Xinhua wenzhai, no. 2 (2002), p. 193.
18 For example, during drafting the Criminal Procedural Law, the amount of time for the defence
lawyer to be involved in the investigation was compromised to a time after the first interrogation
began, because of the Public Security Bureau's powerful resistance. Again, the Administrative
Litigation Law (ALL) limited the jurisdiction of a case involving a county-level government agency
to be ruled by the courts at above county level, which showed the intention of administrative drafters
to maintain the authority's self-interest and reputation. See article 14 (3) of the ALL and article 8 of
the Supreme People's Court's interpretation to the enforcement of the ALL. On the other hand,
however, the civil code has not yet been published because it does not concern the interests of any
agencies.
19 Li Buyun, "Guanyu qicao 'Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lifa fa (zhuanjia jianyi gao)' de ruogan
wenti" [On several issues concerning the drafting of'PRC Legislative Law (Draft of expert'
recommendations)], ZhongGuo faxue, no. 1 (1997), p. 14.
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compromise, consultation, and negotiation for alternatives acceptable to many
20
organisations.
It frequently happens that two agencies fight for jurisdiction over granting the same
licence, such as setting up new petroleum stations or issuing taxi licences. The chaotic
situation in lawmaking causes confusion among the enforcing agencies and personnel,
especially when a national law is in conflict with a local regulation, or when a particular
regulation comes into conflict with a particular policy, as shown in the case of Wang
Kaifeng, which aroused the attention of jurists concerned with the legislative conflict
between a national law and a local normative document.
Wang Kaifeng, head of the fiscal bureau of a county under Changle city, Fujian
province, between 1995 and 1999, provided financial guarantees for enterprises in support of
their application for loans, known as financial turnover capital, from Changle municipal
financial bureau. The Party committee of Changle issued a normative document, in which
the lower financial branches were required to provide a guarantee for enterprises within their
own jurisdiction when they applied for such a loan from the Changle municipal financial
bureau. But the Security Law of the PRC prohibits any state agencies from providing
guarantees for any businesses. Nearly seven and half million yuan of loans could not be
collected because these enterprises went out of business. Thus, Wang was arrested for
negligence and was sentenced to five years and six months of imprisonment.21
It is clear that Wang Kaifeng became a scapegoat for China's self-conflicting
legislative system. Wang, a governmental official, was required to perform two duties: to
obey instructions from local Party Committee and to obey the state law. Whichever duty he
performed, he eventually has to take responsibility for either disobeying his superior order or
the state law.
In practice, it is the higher Party Committee that checks the lower Party committee's
documents. Local governments usually do not take national laws as a guide. Instead, they
follow local Party and governmental regulations. Besides, laws and regulations are so
general and ambiguous that officials find it difficult to follow when dealing with practical
issues. In some areas, there are no laws at all for them to follow, which leaves them nothing
to rely on except Party policies and instructions. Bureaucrats enjoy enormous discretion in
implementing laws and administrative rules due to the overlapping authority of lawmaking
and the excessive administrative power. There is no single institution strong enough to
20
Murry Scot Tanner, "How a Bill Becomes a Law in China: Stages and Processes in Lawmaking," in
Stanley Lubman (ed.), China's Legal Reforms, 1996, pp. 40-41.
21 See "Zhengce he falti dajia, zhixing zhengce de cheng tizuiyang" [Policy conflicts with the law
while the policy-enforcer becomes a scapegoat], Beijing Qingnian bao, 25 January 2002, p. 2.
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preserve the coherence of laws and regulations at different levels. Whereas, due to CCP's
experimental approach toward reform, more subordinate regulations to implement
experimental reforms will be enacted, resulting in further disruption to the order of laws.
Moreover, China has no constitutional court to review government regulations and
policies even if they are in conflict with the constitution. Again, PRC courts have no power
to repeal an illegal administrative regulation. Although the Administrative Litigation Law
(ALL) allows compensation for certain illegal governmental action, it does not empower the
courts to reject administrative regulations or rules that are illegal or in conflict with another
law. Since instructions from superiors are treated with more respect than laws in China and
also there is no effective means to constrain administrative power, the abuse of such power
will be widespread and the law will be an infant.
Due to the unclear allocation of lawmaking powers and the disorder in the origins of
law, confusion often arises as to who makes the law and who has the authority to interpret it.
Administrative agencies from the central to regional levels may interpret their own
regulations. Although the constitution grants the Standing Committee of the NPC the power
to interpret the Constitution and statutes, it has not formally exercised the power of
constitutional interpretation because the constitution is not made for enforcement. It has no
power to interpret administrative regulations but only legislative laws. Moreover, its
legislative interpretation is not more than a reference for administrative agencies'
consideration during adapting these general rules into their regulation-making process rather
than direct enforcement.
At the same time, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) has no constitutional power to
interpret laws. With more and more lawsuits arising from economic reforms, the SPC has
been playing a more important role in interpreting legislation and regulations during the
judicial process, but its interpretation is restricted to only "questions involving the specific
application of laws and regulations in adjudication works,"22 and is only valid within the
judicial system and its cases may not be cited as a precedence by lower level courts in their
formal judgements.23 All other Chinese courts are prohibited from expressing any formal
opinion on the meaning of legislative language.24
22 Art. 33 of the Organic Law of the PRC Courts, in huibian, p. 88.
23
"Guanyu renmin fayuan zhizuo falii wenshu ruhe yinyong falti guifanxing wenjian de pifu" [Reply
to the treatment of legal normative documents in the formulation of legal documents by the people's
courts], Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zui gao renmin fayuan gongbao, no. 3 (1986), p. 25.
24
"Guanyu difang geji fayuan buyi zhiding sifa jieshi xingzhi wenjian de pifu" [Reply to the
inadvisability of regional people's courts formulating documents which resemble judicial
interpretations], Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zui gao renmin fayuan gongbao no. 2 (1987), p. 19.
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In contrast, the State Council enjoys great power with the interpretation of almost all
laws and administrative rules.25 Its numerous ministries and commissions also have the
power to interpret their own regulations and rules. As legislation continues to expand during
an increasingly complex economy, the institutional disorder in legislature and interpretation
will continue to give rise to confusion in legal development, which could seriously
undermine the pace of economic reform.26 At the same time, the intention of legislature in
this complicated system will be easily distorted in the course of factional and institutional
struggle. As Keller notes, the immediate response of China's lawmaking system to political
and institutional pressures has inevitably generated ambiguous and inconsistent situation in
contemporary legislative mechanism, but this situation has also carried China's legal
tradition in which the statute laws are tended to be made formalistic and symbolic while
leaving administrative regulations and rules flexible and pragmatic.27 The Chinese legislative
drafting basically emphasises that primary legislation should be both "general" and
"flexible".28 At the same time, the low professionalism in PRC institutions also requires law
drafting not to use very technical terms but to use the everyday language of ordinary
people.29
As a result, the rationality and authority of primary laws are impaired by such
general and vague legal drafting; they are adapted to local conditions with the unrestricted
discretion of regional authorities. This practice may meet the needs of regional diversity but
it is short-sighted and will undermine the requirements of the stability and predictability of
law. Without effective constraint resulting from NPC laws, administrative regulations and
rules will frequently be in conflict with national laws operated at the discretion of various
agencies at their own advantages. Sometimes, the Party documents are needed to clarify the
confusion in implementing ambiguous superior laws.
Before the reforms, governmental officials relied on Party policies and internal
decrees to carry out their daily work. This continues to exist, although considerable progress
has been made in legalising the Party rule by legal procedures. Party policy is manifested
through all kinds of policy statements, administrative regulations, reports of meetings,
25
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notices, instructions and speeches of Party officials. The reliance on Party policies instead of
formal laws in state administration is a remarkable practice in China, and it will hamper the
establishment of a reliable and rational legal system. Since Party policy takes precedence
over the law, the latter loses its rationality and internal coherence.
In terms of China's vast territory with various conditions and a long history of
factionalism against central authority, to maintain consistency between policy and the law is
particularly difficult, especially with the increasingly complicated situation resulting from
the reforms. Moreover, the decentralisation of the central power that purports to encourage
local economic development and foreign investment has given rise to inconsistency between
central and local policies, and even instances of local resistance to and violation of central
policies and laws.30 This disorder in lawmaking and implementation has posed a serious
threat to the formation of a coherent and effective administrative legal system.
It is hard to be optimistic about a significant Western impact on China's legal system,
because the borrowing ofWestern legal concepts into the Chinese legislation, especially for
laws needed in a market economy, "reflects a formalistic approach, one in which law is
regarded as a body of rules that can be 'transplanted' and exist independent of time and
place."31 The transplantation of foreign legal concepts and mechanisms will face obvious
difficulties because China's history, culture, traditions, and language differ so greatly from
foreign models. Moreover, the potential ideological implications from legal transplanting are
also a concern for the CCP regime.
Corne states that China's legal system suffers from normative dislocation in that
although traditional Confucian norms were weakened, the new socialist norms were not
established. Therefore, when Western legal concepts were borrowed, they were placed side
by side with weakened traditional norms, resulting in a normative vacuum in China. In the
administrative area, government officials are empowered to draft and implement new laws,
and left with broad discretion for them to apply regional norms. As a result, central laws are
adapted to local rules and regulations. In this atmosphere of legal dislocation, extra-legal
norms such as corruption, favouritism and guanxi are poorly sanctioned and able to flourish.
Such administrative problems are "at root structural, and stem from a variety of internal
weaknesses, ideological constraints, and inadequate legal reforms."32
In order to address vagueness and conflicts in the lawmaking system, a
comprehensive law concerning legislative work is necessary. Chinese scholars had
30 Lubman, 1999, p. 140.
31 Lubman, 1999, p. 148.
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developed great expectations of a legislative law to solve the problems in the lawmaking
process, but they were deeply disappointed when the first PRC Legislative Law was
promulgated in 2000.33
This law, which seems to have been designed to clarify problems in lawmaking
system, failed to achieve the goal of restricting administrative arbitrariness and clarifying the
confusing lawmaking system. It widens the scope of laws by categorising administrative
regulations and rules as a part of law, thus legalising the lawmaking power of administrative
agencies. This law provides rules concerning law interpretation and application which should
be exercised by the judicial authority in a society based on the rule of law, and thus goes
beyond its jurisdiction. Moreover, it stipulates rules concerning the allocation of legislative
powers, which should be regulated by the constitution and has already been specified in the
constitution. Such stipulation is actually a revision of, or supplement to, the Constitution,
which is not in compliance with the rule of law.
This law further expands the lawmaking powers of the State Council and regional
governments in making administrative regulations. In legal interpretation, this law legalises a
widespread practice of "whoever makes the law interprets it", a typical feature of the
traditional rule ofman. In a rule of law society, legal interpretation should be given to courts,
aiming to curb lawmakers and to strengthen the stability of law.
The failure of the legislative law in meeting scholars' expectation is partly due to the
insistence on the instrumental use of law. In practice, the priority of the Party is to maintain
the existing social order, namely, to maintain the legitimacy of the CCP, which make it
necessary for the NPC legislature to ensure Party's role in lawmaking process. Whatever
Chinese scholars suggest, the CCP does not favour a clear distinction between law and
politics. The scholar-drafted version of legislative law is only partly adopted by the legislator.
In the end, the law has to be subject to the Party and its policies. A legislative law which
satisfies scholars would restrict Party and its government. Besides, administrative agencies
32 Peter Howard Come, Foreign Investment in China: the Administrative Legal System (New York:
Trans-national Publishers, 1997). Book review by Robb M. Lakritz
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are established actually to carry out Party policy, and governmental officials often
experience difficulty in distinguishing laws from policies. Even if officials enforce state laws,
they may only apply legal principles rather than articles in order to be flexible in their work.
The rule-making power of administrative agencies is not a legislative power but an
administrative power granted by the state. The legislation law categorises administrative
regulations as law and thus legalises the practice of partitioning the legislative power. In this
matter, this law breaches the principle of constitutionalism. Without political democracy and
the rule of law, the current NPC parliament system is still a political show. The use of a term
"rule of law" cannot cover up the reality of the rule of man in the lawmaking process, and
this legalisation might become a legal veil for the rule of man rather than a constraint. Thus
this law does not separate the legislative power but acknowledges the disorder in allocating
lawmaking power, turning the process of making Legislative Law into a struggle for
pursuing regional and departmental interests without exception from making any other laws.
2. Principles and purposes of China's administrative law
Modern judicial principles require that in order to constrain administrative discretion it is
important to regularise administrative processes and apply judicial review to control
administrative arbitrariness.34 Regulating and restraining governmental power is the essence
of establishing a state based on the rule of law. An administrative agency may affect
individual rights through its action such as rulemaking, investigation and adjudication, etc.
The primary focus of the administrative law is on procedures: how the officials make their
decisions rather than what they decide. A procedural justice based on well defined and
transparent rules and procedures will give individual and organisations guarantees for a fair
treatment. Thus administrative procedures act to constrain administrative discretion within
legal scope in order to prevent officials from abuse their power. Thus, it is particularly
necessary that exercising of public power must have legal authority. The principle that
government must be conducted according to law means that for every act performed by the
government there must be legal authority, which is usually derived expressly or by
implication from the law. 35 Where the law does not provide all regulations for
administrative decision-making processes, there should be legal principles to govern the
exercise of discretion.36
34 Christopher F. Edley, Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control ofBureaucracy (Michigan:
Yale University Press, 1990), p. 4.
35 A W Bradley and K D Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (London: Longman, 1997), p.
705.
36 Ibid, P. 707.
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In the West, the courts have two major ways to check administrative power,
including judicial review and state compensation. According to modern administrative legal
theory, a constitution has supreme authority in restraining legislation and governmental
actions. In doing so, judicial review is used to check any governmental actions that breach
the constitution or are in conflict with the constitution. Judicial review is acting both as a
remedy to the affected parties and as a constraint to administrative power.
A prestigious judge in England, Lord Diplock, stated the grounds of judicial review
using three broad classes: legality, rationality and procedural regularity.37 The first principle
injudicial review of administrative power is legality, which refers to the legal authority of an
administrative action. If this action has no legal grant, then it is illegal and should be held
accountable; the second principle, rationality or reasonableness, sets general requirements
for the exercise of discretion. It demands that whenever discretion is being exercised, the
motivation, the purpose, the reasoning and the decision of the discretion should be
"reasonable" without abuse of the power. As for how to decide whether an administrative
action is reasonable or not, Lord Greene articulated a principle, which is known as
"Wednesbury unreasonableness", referring to "a decision so outrageous in its defiance of
logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the
question to be decided could have arrived at it."38
The third principle, procedural propriety, asks that administrative agencies must
abide by certain procedures when some actions must be followed according to law. If the
administrative agencies fail to comply with such a requirement, it may be decided that they
have acted outside their powers and thus should be dealt with by the courts. This principle
requires that administrative procedures should be fair and open, and that a person should not
be denied the chance to represent himself or to a fair hearing.39
Chinese scholars in administrative law have not reached an agreement relating to
what principles China's administrative law should adopt.40 As for judicial review, they
37
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generally agree that both legality and reasonability must be applied to judicial review and the
legality should include both substantial and procedural legality. But their opinion about the
nature and purpose of the administrative law is controversial. Generally there are three
different views of the function of administrative law: state administration, power-control,
and balance (of power and rights).41
The first theory is about the traditional role of administrative law in the planned
economy, where the state acted as an omnipotent governor and manipulated all social areas.
This management style regards administrative law as a law of state administration based on
the relationship between rights and responsibility, and between order and obedience.42 This
view stresses responsibility the administered subjects should bear where they fail to abide by
the state law, but does not stipulate the state's legal responsibility in the process of
administration.43 Where an administrative misconduct happens, it is handled within the
administrative hierarchy rather than the courts. In contemporary China, it remains popular
that the nature of administrative law is normative stipulations on state administration, or a
law regulating administrative activities and relations. This theory, since it excessively
emphasises state administration while ignoring subjects' interests, cannot create a
supervision mechanism over the state and its officials.
Since 1990, the theory of power-control arose.44 As a popular theory in common law
systems, power-control stresses protection of rights through requiring the administrative
power being exercised according to strict legal procedures. It considers the increasing
expansion of the administrative power in modem times to be a major concern, and thus it is
necessary to curb such power through administrative law in order to prevent political
corruption and safeguard citizens' rights. The main effective means for this purpose is clear
legal procedures to regulate governmental decision-makings and judicial review to check the
legality of their actions. Scholars in favour of this theory advocate that China's
administrative law must contain the principle that it is administrators rather than subjects
who undertake responsibilities. This requires that administrative agencies act in accordance
with law and focus on power control and rights protection. At the same time, the judicial
41 Chen Sixi and Liu Nanping, "Zhongguo xiandai xingzhengfa fazhan dui xianfa de yingxiang"
[Impacts of the development of administrative law in modern China on the constitution], Xingzheng
faxue yanjiu, no. 1 (1998), p. 32.
42 Luo Haocai, "Xingzhengfa zi yuyi yu yiyi fenxi" [An analysis of discourse and meaning of the
administrative law], Fazhiyu shehui fazhan, no. 4 (1995), p. 11.
43 This theory is stressed during 1979-86, see Gao deng xuexiao faxue shiyong jiaocai, Xingzhengfa
gaiyao [An outline of administrative law] (Beijing: Falii chubanshe, 1983), p. 1.
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review should play an important role in holding state agencies and their officials accountable
for their abuses of power.45
These scholars emphasise three features of Western administrative law: clear
distinction of public and private laws, the government's exercising administrative power
according to law and the control over public power. They claim that administrative law aims
to govern and restrict administrative power rather than give the power to administrative
agencies to make rules themselves.46 However, this theory is rejected in China as politically
incorrect in that its theoretical foundation is the separation of powers. This hostility towards
power-control is related to the long-standing centralisation of the economic and political
system. To control government power is considered to weaken its administration. The
understanding of yi fa xingzheng by administrative agencies is to rule according to law
without binding their hands by the law. Thus problems occur where the modern market
economy appeals for protecting individual rights and restricting governmental power, while
China's tradition and current political structure resist the appeal.
The theory of balance is advocated by Luo Haocai and his postgraduate students,
who claim that the above theories are incomplete and limited. They believe that the power-
control theory puts too much on restriction of power and the role of judicial review, while
ignoring the requirements for the state's proactive administration in modern societies aiming
to improve administrative efficiency and protect public interests. Luo argues that a balance
theory fits well in with the purpose of the administrative law. By keeping a balance between
the administrators and their subjects, it is devoid of shortcomings existing in two other
theories. He claims that the purpose of the administrative law is to seek an inner balance in
state administration through harmoniously treating right and responsibility.47 He claims, in
modern societies, conflicts between public and private interests widely exist, which requires
45 Gao Bing, "Kong quan lun: xiandai xingzheng faxue de lilun jichu" [Theory of power control:
theoretical foundations ofmodern administrative jurisprudence], Nanjing shifan daxue xuebao, no. 4
(1998), pp. 20-23; Cheng Ganyuan and Li Zaihua, "Shichang jingji he xingzheng faxue 'kong quan
lilun' de sikao" [Thinking of the market economy and the theory of power control in administrative
jurisprudence], Xue hai (Nanjing), no. 5 (1994), pp. 62-66.
46 Ibid.
47 Luo Haocai & Yuan Hongshu, "Xiandai xingzhengfa de lilun jichu: lun xingzheng jiguan yu
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correctly handling through building a balanced administrative law system. It is important for
administrators to protect citizens' rights and interests by open and transparent administration,
effective surveillance and legal remedy, and at the same time, state agencies must be
entrusted effective power and supportive means to carry out comprehensive administrations
in order to protect the public interests.
However, the theory of balance has also come under criticism. Critics argue that
constraining administrative power and protecting private interests should not treated as
issues of equal importance, and more emphasis should be put on the former in order to
achieve the latter.48 When the term yi fa xingzheng was set for the goal of administrative
reform, there was a general agreement among scholars about basic requirements for yi fa
xingzheng: (1) the government should act according to law; (2) all administrative powers
must have legal foundation and must not perform powers without clear stipulation; (3)
administrative powers performed without or beyond legal authority are illegal and void; (4)
subjects under administrative powers have the right to apply for a reconsideration of illegally
performed administrative powers, or to file an administrative lawsuit to the courts for
remedy, and (5) the victim of administrative power abuse is entitled to state compensation
according to law.49
In China's legal system, administrative law has not been well developed either
theoretically or practically, and was thus referred to in the early 1980s as "a forgotten
corner".50 From 1979 to the end of 1987, the NPC and its SC enacted 63 administrative laws
(not including decisions), and the State Council issued more than 580 regulations, local
governments issued over 960 administrative regulations.51 However, these laws and
regulations mainly concerned institutional organisation. The administrative legal system was
not known as a specific subject. At that time, most people (administrative personnel) only
knew the existence of criminal, civil and economic law, but had no idea of administrative
law; they knew how to handle cases according to laws only in [the] judicial sector, but not in
administrative area. Up to the middle of the 1980s, China still lacked basic laws aiming to
regulate administrative behaviour, administrative liability, remedy, and in most
48
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administrative areas, there were no laws to govern at all. Administrative agencies and their
personnel mainly followed policy documents in the work.52
However, since 1989, the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) was enacted and for
the first time in the history systematically provided individuals, legal persons, and even
foreigners the entitlement to sue the state,53 and introduced a system of judicial review over
administrative actions, fundamental changes have been made in the administrative law
system. The courts exercise a function of judicial review, force officials to abide by the law
and give legal remedy to the afflicted. This empowers people where and how they may
legally battle arbitrary or unfair bureaucratic acts. They also send a message to governmental
officials and agencies: in your decision-making, do not act like a tyrant, and your verdict is
neither irreversible nor final.
Since then, a frame of administrative law has been in emergence, including
administrative organic and personnel laws and regulations, where the most important one is
the regulation concerning civil servants; monitoring and supervision mechanisms over
governmental agencies and their officials from both external and internal surveillance, where
the most important ones are Legislative Law and the Administrative Supervision Law
{xingzheng jiancha fa); a relatively complete administrative litigation system, represented by
the ALL and the State Compensation Law (SCL); and an increasingly emphasis of
procedural justice in power control marked by the Administrative Penalty Law (APL) and
the Administrative Redress Law (ARL). At current, a systematic procedural law is in
drafting process.
Under China's legal system, the principles for checking administrative discretion are
much narrower than that in the West. According to the ALL, only a concrete administrative
action (juti xingzheng xingwei, > which refers to an actual action exercised by
an agency such as imposing fines, confiscating properties, detaining people and rescind
licenses) that has infringed people's rights may be sued to the courts. It does not include a
situation where a state agency acts illegally but not infringe the rights of the affected party,
or it acts legally but infringes rights. It is unclear whether both infringement and illegality
needed for the courts to accept a case. Thus the ALL, as the major means ofjudicial review,
aims only to examine the legality of an administrative action. However, for a citizen or
company, he/she can sue an agency only when an administrative action is both illegal and
infringes his/her rights.
52
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Moreover, the ALL is not empowered to check the reasonability or impropriety of
abstract administrative actions (chouxiang xingzheng xingwei, > which refers
to administrative regulations and rules). In other words, the activity of administrative organs
to make administrative regulations, decisions and orders will not be reviewed. When an
illegal administrative action is traced down to a relevant regulation, the courts have no
authority to repeal or correct it but often report the case to the government for instruction or
simply reject the case. This narrow scope of the ALL conflicts with the stipulation in the
administrative redress law, in which both legality and reasonability of an administrative
action may be reviewed by the redress body (it still does not cover regulations promulgated
in the name of the State Council or a provincial governor). The intention of this difference is
likely to leave a chance for the government itself to correct its mistakes, but in practice when
a party appeals to the courts to review a decision made by the administrative redress body,
the courts cannot accept it because they are not authorised to review its reasonability.
3. Control of administrative power in China
In China, means for control over administrative actions include legislative control mainly
through the constitution and the legislative law; administrative control through
administrative laws and regulations carried out within administrative hierarchy; and judicial
control under the administrative litigation law and the state compensation law. Although
supervision by the media and public has a role to play under the constitution, it is never
feasible under the current political framework.
First, legislative control of administrative power mainly works through establishing
a constitutional state with power allocation and separation. One of the usual objectives of a
constitution is to set limits or restrains upon governmental power, which derives from the
theory of constitutionism.54 The supremacy of the constitution is the essence of realising the
rule of law with emphasis on "an institutionalised system of effectively regularised restraints
upon governmental action".55 There may be four ways of restraining governmental actions in
a constitution: the formulation of principles of justice and declarations of rights; the division
of powers amongst governmental bodies according to functions and territory; the adoption of
representative institutions which allow the people to vote governments into and out of office;
and provision for direct participation by the people in governmental decision-making.56
53 In the General Principles ofCivil Law enacted in 1981, there was a brief stipulation of allowing
citizens to bring about an administrative suit.
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Chinese legal scholars acknowledge that the rule of law is actually rule of the
Constitution. They state that the constitution is the key for realising the rule of law because it
is an agreement made by the whole society, particularly between the people and the
government. People and the government all must obey it, but first of all, the government
must obey it, so that people will follow it. If only people are required to obey the law, there
will be a government based on the rule ofman. These scholars realise the difference between
Yi fa xingzheng and xingzheng fazhi in that the latter stresses equality between the
administrators and their subjects, and power co-operation and control. Thus the current
China is far from being a country based on administrative rule of law.57
According to Guo Luoji, the aim of existence of the constitution is to realise the rule
of law, so it is unnecessary to add an article "administering the state according to the law, to
establish a socialist country based on the rule of law" in the Constitution. Because such
revision seems to admit that in the past China didn't adopt the rule of law although the
Constitution existed, and that adopting the rule of law is just to let the whole constitution
rather than a single article play its role. He claims that this only shows that Chinese
leadership does not understand what the constitution acts for.58
Although China has its constitution, it is no more than a political declaration or
charter in that it has no authority to review administrative actions and itself cannot be
enforced through judicial process. Since the founding of the PRC, China has made several
constitutions and many revisions. However, the constitution is difficult to become supreme
since it also legalises the supremacy of the Party leadership in state administration. Although
the senior politicians call on Party acting within the constitution and laws, the law is in fact a
veil for transforming Party policies into laws through administrative agencies.59 In this
situation, the constitution and law are only second authority compared to Party leadership.
Thus Party leadership, as the core in Chinese administration, is not subjected to any judicial
review. In practice, Party policies and guidelines are main sources of administrative powers.
The constitution can do nothing to restrict the Party and its government. Administrative rule
of law requires that the Party must not replace the government and that a clear line must be
drawn regarding the relationship between Party's policy and laws, and between the Party and
57 Guo Daohui, "Fazhi xingzheng yu xingzheng quan de fazhan" [Administrative rule of law and the
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the state. As long as one Party is supreme, neither the constitution nor the rule of law will
work out well.
Since the constitution itself does not have supreme authority, neither the NPC nor its
Standing Committee has the power of control over administrative agencies. According to the
constitution, the NPC exercises legislative supervision over the administrative power through
checking sub-regulations and watching their implementation in order to maintain conformity
between administrative actions and the constitution and national laws. There was not a
legislative law until 2000 in China to specify lawmaking power and procedures. However,
this law has limits set for itself in constraining administrative arbitrariness. In China's
political system, the NPC does not possess sufficient institutional autonomy to impose its
authority over the government, and its legislative power has also been overshadowed by
ever-expanding lawmaking power of the government. The NPC only provides an additional
forum in which "powerful interests can seek to influence the transformation of policy into
legislation in the cumbersome course of decision-making."60 Such is also the case with local
or regional people's congresses.
Control over governmental actions can also be achieved through administrative
supervision conducted within administrative hierarchy. Chinese scholars divide China's
efforts to constrain administrative power into two stages.61 The first stage started in the
middle of the 1980s with the emphasis on restriction over governmental power by
substantive laws, but the substantive laws are always hard put to meet the need in reality for
curbing increasingly-expanded administrative power in a time of reform. This resulted in
consistent abuses of official power, and furthermore, yi fa xingzheng turned out to be
administering according to self-made administrative regulations and rules. Since the ALL
did not existed that time, there was no judicial check over governmental power, and even if
this law came into effect in 1990, the courts only had the power to check the legality of an
administrative act rather than that of a regulation or rule. The second stage of China's
administrative supervision revolved around procedural constraint with the focus on the
enactment of the administrative penalty law and redress law. A comprehensive
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From rebuilding public authority to afterward granting a remedy to private right and
then to direct control over the public power, China's administrative law has made gradual
improvements. Like other administrative legal systems, China's administrative law aims to
safeguard and supervise administrative agencies in exercising their functions and powers, to
prevent and rectify any malfeasant or improper concrete administrative acts, and to protect
the lawful rights and interests of citizens, legal persons, and other organisations. Before the
ARL {xingzheng fuyi fa, administrative redress law, ffV&M1999), APL (xingzheng
chufa fa, administrative penalties law, tfiE&&bpj 1996) and the ASL {xingzhengjiancha
fa, administrative supervision law, r^i) were enacted, it was the Regulation of
Administrative Reconsideration (or Redress, ARR) enacted by the State Council in January
1991 and amended in 1994, that served as a way to examine both the legality and
reasonableness of administrative actions within the administrative hierarchy. According to
this regulation, individuals or legal persons whose rights or duties are affected by
governmental actions may appeal to authorised agencies for remedy. Reviewing agencies,
after examining cases, shall make decisions affirming, repealing or directly changing the
original decisions. These decisions shall be judicially subject to review unless law otherwise
prescribes them. In practice, about 70% of administrative cases have been through the stage
of reconsideration before their submission to the courts.63
Where an administrative action was wrong or illegal, afflicted parties may choose
the following judicial or administrative means to get remedy. Within administrative
measures, five categories of administrative actions may be challenged. The first one is
administrative sanction, including detention, fine, rescission of a permit or a licence, order to
suspend production or business operations, or confiscation of property, which a citizen, legal
person or other organisations refuse to accept. The second is compulsory administrative
measures, including restriction of personal freedom or the sealing up, or freezing of property
which one refuses to accept. The third category is infringement on autonomous management
of enterprises. The fourth is refusal to issue a permit or licence or a failure to respond to an
application. The fifth is refusal to perform its statutory duties with regard to protecting one's
personal or proprietary rights.
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There are four kinds of administrative acts which are not subject to reconsideration,
including abstract actions such as policies, regulations, rules and instructions; internal
actions within administrative system; actions of state; arbitration and conciliation; and other
dispositions of civil disputes. When an administrative regulation or order, which binds the
administrative action, is illegal or unreasonable, the reconsideration organ will not have the
power to handle the matter. It has to report the case to a higher-level administrative agency,
which has the authority to handle the case, to resolve the inconsistency between the
regulation and concrete administrative action. Then the reconsideration organ may resume
the hearing of the case.
The 1999 ARL made some development in that it allows governmental regulations
to be challenged all the way to the State Council. It permits foreign citizens, Chinese
nationals and social organisations to appeal administrative rulings and allow them to "seek
shelter from abuse of state power".64 Appeals can be taken to the village head, county
government, prefecture government, provincial government, and finally to the State Council
which would render a final decision. On the other hand, however, the rules or orders by
provincial governments or the State Council are nonetheless immune from this law. Despite
such limitations, by exercising inherent executive control, the ARL will provide another set
of institutional safeguards against administrative abuses. However, problems remain serious,
such as overloaded cases and low efficiency in accepting cases; narrow scope of redress; the
conflict with the APL; the difficulty in bringing about the applications, due to the relevant
agencies that often failed to notice or give wrong information to the affected parties about
their appeal right; the chaos and limits of jurisdictions; inadequate personnel and
independent institutions; and lack of procedures.65
The promulgation of the Administrative Penalties Law (APL) in 1996 is an advance
in that it generally prescribes the jurisdictions of administrative sanction-deciding process,
the varieties of administrative sanctions, the procedures for imposing sanctions on
individuals, and the remedies for any wrongly imposed penalties. This law for the first time
introduces two fundamental principles of modern administrative procedure. One is the
informing responsibility in which the administrative agencies must inform the subjects of
facts, causes and foundations of action before an administrative action is made. The other is
the involved party has the right to make a statement and defence. It also firstly introduces the
hearing system in which the concerned party may exercise his informed right and defence
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through this quasi-judicial procedure, thus making China's administrative sanction procedure
being closer to the international standard, from a closed and purely administrative process to
an open and party-participating one.
However, the APL fails to specify the contents of these principles and systems,
leaving stipulations concerning protection of human rights vague and narrow. For example, a
hearing mechanism does not apply to some severe administrative penalties such as measures
of restricting personal freedom although some such penalties are far more severe than
criminal penalties. It is also confused with respect to who has the power to exert specific
administrative penalties; what difference between penalties and non-penalties involving
closed-door transactions and corruption; what requirements for a summary procedure,
leaving out many necessary procedures such as keeping a written record, party's signatures,
and using written notification, and how to guarantee a fair and open hearing, unspecified;
narrow scope for applying a hearing (limited in price-deciding area) and lack of effective
mechanism to monitor this process except self-surveillance within administrative authority.
In addition, there are many conflicts between this law and other administrative regulations.
The ASL provides another means for curbing administrative power through
establishment of special supervision institutions (jiancha bu at central level and jiancha ju at
local level, which originated from an imperial tradition of keeping the officialdom under
surveillance). It is similar to the role played by the Discipline and Investigation Commission
at all levels on Party-officials. However, all kinds of administrative supervision are self-
conducted surveillance, which gives rise to a question as to who supervises the supervisors?
The effectiveness and accountability of this supervision is obviously problematic.
The problem with the administrative monitoring system is its lack of transparency,
narrow scope, vagueness, and mutual conflicts, which has resulted in widespread favouritism
and power abuses in practice. To solve this problem, a comprehensive procedural law
governing the administrative work must be made, with more emphasis on requiring state
authorities than their subjects to abide by legal procedures. The purpose of this law is to
realise administrative rule of law by urging officials to abide by legal rules, maintaining
efficiency and protecting citizens' rights.
Currently, China's administrative procedures, except for that in lawmaking,
imposing penalties and reconsideration, remain scattered among other substantive
regulations. Usually a decision is made first and procedures followed later but these
procedures are often generally stipulated with great discretion to officials in the
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implementation. Even the newly introduced hearing mechanism only covers three areas:
where imposing a severe sanction, price-making policy, and drafting administrative
regulations and rules, and the procedures required remain unclear.66 Moreover, many
regulations set procedures for the affected rather than for administrative agencies. This
underdevelopment of the administrative procedures is laid far behind the request for forming
a market legal system and administration according to law.
The third means of curbing administrative power is judicial review. Judicial review
is widely used to restrict state power in modern democratic countries, which is based on the
traditional suspicion of arbitrary power and the belief in the separation of powers and the
independence of the judiciary. 67 The ALL brings the judicial review to China's
administrative law system. According to it, individuals and legal persons who are affected by
administrative actions directly or indirectly may bring cases against such actions to the
people's courts. The courts, exercising virtually the power of judicial review, shall make a
judgement that either confirms the committed action or repeals it in accordance with law, or
even changes it in case "the decision being sued is obviously unfair".68
From 1993 to 1999, after the ALL was enforced, the courts handled 281,947 cases of
administrative litigation at the first instance, with an annual increase on average of 26.7%.69
By the end of 2001, the courts had nearly handled 440,000 administrative cases and 2,566
state compensation cases.70 In recent years there have been an increasing number of cases of
citizens charging the government. This shows that individuals and companies are more
aware of their legal rights and more prone to protect their legitimate rights and interests
through legal means. At the same time, state officials are becoming more cautious about
their actions and decisions. Xiao Yang, President of the SPC, admitted that the ALL was a
key element in determining the progress of democracy and the rule of law, and that it was a
parameter of the level of the rule of law, rights protection, quality of administration and legal
awareness. He asked to meet the challenge of and benefit from entering the WTO in order to
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expand the scope of the judicial review.71 The entry into the WTO caused at least three
challenges to China's judicial review, including transparency in administrative process,
expansion injudicial review's scope, and unification of administrative procedures.72
However, the judicial review is limited and sometimes fails to curb administrative
powers and protect rights and interests. Reasons behind this include lack of judicial
independence in China's power structure, the domination of the political and administrative
powers and the shortcomings in laws concerning judicial review.73 The PRC courts are
restricted from interpreting laws and regulations since this power is exercised by lawmakers
themselves, and are not permitted to repeal any laws or regulations even if there existence of
conflicts or breaching good faith.
Since the principle for judicial review is to check legality rather than include
reasonableness of an administrative action, the courts cannot check and repeal the
regulations or rules on which an administrative action is based. This often caused delays in
some simple administrative cases and failures in protecting rights. For example, a three-year-
old boy was dead with unclear reason at a kindergarten in Shandong in 1998, and the local
PSB ordered the cremation of the child's body. The parents of the child sued the PSB for this
action according to a document (no. 47) issued in 1978 by the then Provincial Revolutionary
Commission, which was already out of date. When the defendant's lawyer asked the
plaintiffs lawyer in the court that "You said that the no. 47 document was out of effect,
please give your evidence"; the latter could not present any such proof and the court finally
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had to adjourn the trial since it had not power to rule against an administrative regulation
under China's legal system.74
Due to narrow scope for judicial review, some state agencies or the organisations
that exercise power of public administration are beyond litigation, and many administrative
actions are not to be checked by the courts. A case in point is the function of PRC police.
They are entrusted with a wide range of power in both maintaining social order and criminal
investigations, which frequently cause infringement on rights of citizens, legal persons, and
other organisations. According to law, police investigations of criminal activities is governed
by criminal procedural law, which belongs to a judicial action rather than an administrative
one, and is thus exempted from judicial review; while police administration of social order is
governed by the administrative regulations, which is an administrative action rather than a
judicial one and is thus subject to judicial review.75 Where any infringement of personal or
property rights happened during a criminal investigation, instead the administrative remedy,
the affected parties should be compensated through judicial process according to the SCL
(which is not tried by the court but ruled by an internal compensation commission
established within the courts at above intermediate level), in order to ensure criminal
investigation and adjudication to be successfully carried out.
It is difficult to distinguish the two police actions, since the PSB are very powerful
in a police state with great discretion on whether or not to bring a prosecution. In practice,
the two functions are often interwoven with the same category of subjects and involvement
of compulsory measures, and thus often result in many abuses. When the police, after
adopting compulsory measures such as detention, confiscation and interrogation, fail to enter
judicial process by bringing a charge, they usually deliberately suspend the case, thus
making it neither an administrative action nor a criminal one. The affected party in such a
case cannot bring administrative litigation against the police, and some of such parties
become victims of long detention in the police station. This situation further encourages the
police in infringing human rights without the risk of bearing legal responsibilities. In recent
years, it is very popular that the police, in the veil of conducting judicial actions, trample on
personal freedom and property rights by interfering in economic disputes.
In order to protect rights of the administered subjects and to prevent the police from
shunning any legal responsibilities for their abuse of power, the courts should check both
police actions according to the ALL. After a case is accepted, it should be the police that
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prove what kind of functions they are carrying out. Although the criminal law as such falls
outside the ALL, management of the police and the penal system often gives rise to disputes
about the exercise of official powers, for example, over the rights of convicted prisoners to
legal protection against the prison authority.76 In China, the police exercise extraordinarily
powerful functions in management of the society, from which numerous illegal actions
emerge.
Loopholes and conflicts are not uncommon in the ALL and its relevant
interpretations. The preface (article 1) states that the purpose of this law is to safeguard and
supervise administrative agencies' exercising power according to law, which is improper in
that its primary purpose and function should be to restrict administrative arbitrariness and
protect citizens' rights rather than protect administrative functions. Article 2 provides that
only administrative agencies may be accused as a defendant in the ALL, their personnel,
since they are performing their duties on behalf of the government, and many other agencies
and organisations which in practice exercise the same functions as administrative agencies
(such as schools, universities, public companies) are beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of
the ALL. In addition, the Party's administrative actions are not subject to such review since it
does not belong to any state agencies. Cases involving governmental inaction (unless a
request is being made) and public welfare (such as road safety, environment pollution, etc)
are also not within the judicial review.
Many other problems in the ALL hamper its effect and meanwhile permit state
agencies to trample on legal procedures. For example, article 33 states that after starting a
suit, the defendant must not collect evidence from the plaintiff and the witnesses, but the
defendants often take advantage of their position to collect evidence during the litigation. In
practice, most decisions are made without any legal basis of or following required
procedures. Again, article 50 provides that "the peoples' courts should not apply mediation to
the administrative litigation." However, mediation is often used outside the court, which may
cause unfair results and further contribute to the low rate of the plaintiffs' success in this type
of litigation.
Article 54 stipulates that an administrative action may be reaffirmed if the evidence
is absolutely clear; and cancelled if the main evidence is insufficient. Thus it seems that
evidence of less importance, albeit insufficient, will not lead to the cancellation of such an
action, which will make such an action able to escape the law. Article 61 (3) even provides a
possibility that an administrative action, which has broken legal procedures and been
rescinded by the courts, may be reached again when administrative agencies re-make
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decisions based on the same facts and causes, since the review is focused on substantive
conformity (legality) rather than on procedural justice. In theory, once an action is cancelled,
whether it substantially or procedurally breaches the law, it is improper for administrative
agencies to make the same action as the original one. This will encourage administrative
agencies to ignore legal procedures, undermining the function of the ALL as judicial control
over the administrative power.
These loopholes in the current judicial review system, together with unrestricted
administrative power, become obstacles in implementing the ALL. As a result, some
individuals are too afraid to use their right to challenge a governmental agency, and there are
many cases that local courts yield under the pressure of governmental agencies.77 The
plaintiffs are usually in a relatively disadvantageous position in administrative litigation,
especially in the collection of evidence. Thus justice and the efficiency of the administrative
litigation have been hampered by administrative bodies refusing to submit evidence or their
delaying in submitting evidence, their collecting evidence illegally, as well as by judges'
being partial to and siding with administrative agencies.78
From 1988 to 1993, Chinese courts accepted 84,305 administrative cases and ruled
82,129, of which 34.1% were decided to affirm the sued administrative agencies, 20.5%
were to order the sued agency to cancel or change the actions, and 35.4% of cases resulted in
the plaintiffs withdrawal. In 1995 alone, the Chinese courts decided 51,370 cases, of which
17.34% were to affirm the sued administrative action, 15.82% were to cancel such action and
50.59% were that the plaintiff withdraws the charge against the government agencies.79
Based on a close analysis of a great variety of data and cases, Pei Minxin concludes
that the focus on the judicial review of "the legality rather than the reasonability of
administrative decisions" has prevented Chinese citizens from invoking the ALL to
challenge substantive government policies.80 Potter also points out that the lack of judicial
autonomy is also an important factor in the court's persistent bias in favour of the
government, as government's greater odds of winning these suits.81 The ALL stipulates that
the Procuratorate may supervise the process of administrative litigation, whereas there are no
particulars about its implementation. In China's political system, the Procuratorate itself is
subject to the Party and local authority.
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"It [ALL] is not a means to limit bureaucratic power and arbitrary administrative
behaviour. The courts may only decide the validity of an administrative action, but cannot
revise or reverse an administrative decision. Administrative agencies may be protected from
judicial review where the law provides that the final resolution of a matter lies in the hands
of the agency."82 This means that a regulation, decision or order is up to the administrative
agency which has the authority to decide whether it is legal or proper, because the principle
in which whoever makes the law will have the power to interpret it exists in China's
legislative practice.
Since China has no tradition of separation of powers, fundamental individual rights
have from time to time been dismissed in the name of collective interests during the state
administration. The Chinese society has never been really impressed by the doctrine of
procedural justice. In practice, means could often be simply justified by ends while
expediency would be appreciated just because of its instrumentality. Therefore, the
establishment of rule of law and the institutionalisation of administrative law are much more
than an introduction of some specific legislation: it actually requires a transformation in legal
culture, social behaviour and political structure.
The SCL, which includes administrative and criminal compensation and was enacted
in 1995, provides criteria, standards and procedures for state compensation. The difference
between the ALL and SCL lies in the judicial process being used in the former while the
internal review being applied to the latter. A state compensation may be possible only when
firstly the responsible agency confirms its misconduct and then the compensation
commission (established in the courts above the intermediate level), approves the application
of the affected party.
Over three years since the enactment of the SCL, there were 364 cases of
compensation involving government agencies among a total of 870 state compensation cases
handled by the courts. During the same period, the Procuratorate handled 762 compensation
cases involving judicial agencies, of which 179 were approved.83 This law provides the right
for the citizenry to get financial remedy resulting from state infringement and meanwhile the
responsibility for the state to undertake.
However, the SCL is also ineffective in protecting rights and constraining officials
because of its narrow scope for application, and low amount and standard for compensation.
It does not include legislative compensation, because legislative actions have been claimed
as state actions, like national defence and diplomacy, and therefore should be immune from
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bearing responsibility of compensation. Actions in military affairs and in mismanagement of
public utilities are also not included. Civil, economic and administrative decisions in which
the courts made mistakes, and abstract administrative actions made by administrative
agencies, are all outside the state compensation.
When the compensation is approved, only direct financial losses (lost wages) will be
paid without covering other financial losses and psychological losses. Consequently, the law
is only restricted to administrative and criminal infringement on personal and property rights.
For example, damages to personal freedom are compensated according to annual average
wage at the national level of the previous year, not taking into account the victims' actual
salary and financial loss; damages to operational losses are compensated based on actual cost,
not including actual interest and profit loss. As for loss from wrong fines, the state only
compensates the net fine, not the interest.
When coming to the enforcement of this law, even if the compensation is approved,
the responsible agency is often reluctant to admit its mistake or refuse to enforce a ruling
concluded by the commission. Since there is a sharp inequality between both sides, one
being a powerful state agency and the other a governed subject, the effect of implementing
this law is very small. In practice, state agencies frequently abuse this system. In most cases,
they are reluctant to admit their misconduct and produce obstacles for the investigation:
either refusing to provide evidence for its wrong action or presenting itself in the courts, or
ignoring the court ruling.
From January 1996 to June 1997, the nation-wide Procuratorate accepted a total of
543 compensation requests, reviewed 397, granted 66, and paid a total of 730,000 yuan.
Since the state compensation law came into effect, the police at all levels have handled 563
cases and paid 7,810,000 yuan. However, there is a big gap between the number of requests
for compensation and that being accepted and approved. For example, the courts at the first
and second trial declared 2,281 people not guilty in 1996, but only 35 applications for
compensation were accepted. The reasons behind this are complicated, including the
ignorance of this law both by citizens and judicial organs, and especially the responsible
authorities deliberately shunned from accepting any compensation which would affect their
performance, and they sometimes even threaten the applicant to withdraw a case.84
The state compensation law intends to let the state carry the responsibility of
wrongdoing during performing public duties. The problem with this law is that the state is
only responsible for one part of official actions rather than all actions, which is much
84 Ma Huide, "Zhidu bianqian zhong de guojia peichang" [The state compensation during the
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narrower than the scope in civil law concerning tort compensation.85 The SCL also
standardises legality as the basis of approving a state compensation request rather than the
consequences resulting from state actions. In other words, if an official action infringes
rights but it does not breach the law, the affected party cannot get compensation. Only when
the action has been illegal and also caused infringement and loss to the ruled party, can the
compensation be required. Actions that lack fairness or reasonability are not within the
jurisdiction of state compensation.
However, in order to hold state agencies accountable for their acts, this law should
be based on the consequence rather than illegality. As long as the action causes damage,
whether it is legal or not, the state must compensate the affected party. This has particular
implications in the judicial process, where the police often detain or arrest people for
criminal investigation but later fail to prove their guilt. Some such detentions and arrests are
legal since they are conducted according to the CPL. In this case, since the prerequisite for
applying for compensation is based on legality, the victims under these coercive measures
are not allowed to request compensation. Similarly, the consequence standard is applied to
damages caused by public facilities despite the fact that there might be no illegality involved.
The procedures of the state compensation are incomplete and not transparent. For
example, judicial compensation requires the judicial organs, which caused damages, to
confirm their responsibility for compensation before deciding whether to compensate or not.
This obviously goes against procedural justice where nobody can act as the judge in his own
case. It is clear that the law is intended for the responsible authorities to correct their mistake
in order to save their reputation. However, without an institutional guarantee, this "good"
intention can be easily used to cover governmental mistakes. In practice, this procedure
requiring the judicial agency to confirm their responsibility has turned the SCL into a "state
non-compensation law", as evidenced by the fact that the majority of judicial compensation
cases failed to be confirmed by a judicial agency. According to a judge in a county in
Yunnan, the law enforcement agencies refused to confirm over 80% of cases of state
compensation in this county, leaving no place for the victims to get remedy.86 This
institutional design is unnecessary and should be abolished because the judicial document
85
Qing Ping, "Guanyu guojia peichang fa de wanshan" [On perfection of the state compensation law],
Fazhi ribao, 27 September 2002, 5 December 2002
(Zhengyi wang, http://211.100.18.62/fzdt/xwar.asp?id=8168,); Hao Jie, "Guojia peichang anjian
youguan falii wenti tantao" [Exploration of the relevant legal problems in state compensation cases],
Renmin fayuan bao, 2 April 2001, 18 September 2001
(Zhengyi wang, http://211.100.18.62/fzdt/xwar.asp?id=6068).
86
Nanfeng chuang, 16 January 2004, 25 February 2004
(http://cn.news.yahoo.com/040116/55/ lyzp7.html).
76
itself, such as the judgement of being not guilty, is sufficient as evidence for requesting
compensation.
Since the review for compensation is an internal process without participation of the
affected parties, the fairness of the result is not guaranteed. Moreover, the compensation
committee is established within the court, which is a part of constituting China's judicial
system. Due to its close relationship with other agencies, the committee can do nothing more
to constrain its "brother agencies" than co-operate or even collude with them. The applicants
often cannot afford the increased costs to apply for reconsideration or judicial review of their
compensation after the responsible agency refused to confirm its mistake. As regards
compensation resulting from wrong adjudication by the courts, China's judicial practice is
that the lower courts must accept guidance from and report a case to a higher level court to
seek instructions. This will inevitably affect the case to be fairly decided by the committee.
In China, there have not yet been any independent institutions to handle cases
relating to judicial compensation. In practice, there is a dilemma in enforcing compensation
rulings due to the resistance from the responsible agencies, the lack of funds for
compensation and the concern for political merits, etc. Instead of applying for the budget
funds used for state compensation from the fiscal department at local level, many responsible
agencies either choose to use their own funds to pay the compensation or simply refuse to
pay, claiming that there is no fund in the governmental fiscal budget for compensation. They
worry more about their reputation, political performance, and promotion than
implementation of the SCL.
There is a bizarre phenomenon with respect to state compensation. In many regions,
the funds specially allocated for state compensation, has rarely been touched although many
cases with state agencies involved in infringement of citizens' rights happened each year.
The law does not stipulate what punishment the relevant authorities will receive when they
refuse to perform their compensation duty. Since the judicial agencies cannot become
defendants under the criminal compensation according to the CPL and SCL, victims, who
have been wrongly detained, arrested and sentenced, often find it difficult to get approval for
compensation. The appeals for expanding the judicial agencies into the scope of criminal
compensation come from both academic circles and some representatives of the NPC. This
motion has met strong objection from the judicial authority, especially from the
Procuratorate. It claims that it has the constitutional authority to supervise judicial activity,
and that to be charged as a defendant in the state compensation would hamper its function.
However, the problem is that administrative agencies in the ALL can be sued as
defendants, while the judicial agencies are not under such jurisdiction. Since the constitution
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(article 5) stipulates that no organisation and individual may have power above the
constitution, the judicial agency must not enjoy such a privilege.
4. Conclusion:
After the reforms in the late 1970s, the CCP began to increasingly use the law as a
significant means in the organisation and operation of the government, and to use legislation
for the implementation of its new policies. The importance of legislation and the NPC itself
is growing. On the one hand, the Party wants to curb governmental officials' arbitrary actions
in order to build a highly efficient administration. On the other hand, this curb is limited and
subject to political needs.
As the CCP is still supreme over the law in China, the difficulty remains for Chinese
legal reformers to define the relationship between the legislation and the policy. In spite of
the relatively complete laws and regulations made in China over these years, there is an
important lack of clarity about the power of legislation and the interpretation of the law. It is
hard to identify a consistent principle to distinguish the order of various laws. This further
poses a threat to the implementation of laws and causes uncertainty of rights and
responsibilities. Administrative agencies are practically granted legislative, executive, and
judicial powers. However, the rule of law requires administrative agencies to exercise their
power in accordance with the law, and the NPC should have the power to check the legality
and reasonableness of administrative actions.
In addition, the people's courts have a limited power to review some administrative
actions. It is worth noting that because the nature and effectiveness of all kinds of
administrative regulations and rules have not been virtually differentiated or explicitly stated,
conflict of laws proves to be a serious problem in an administrative law system. The
constitution provides the administrative branch with a wide range of power, including
making administrative regulations and rules; implementing laws and regulations and rules;
interpreting laws and regulations, and reviewing administrative cases.
Judicial review plays an important role in constraining the state agencies and their
officials in countries based on the rule of law. The ALL and SCL, as the main part of China's
judicial means for control over the political power, are inadequate and confusing. Thus, the
administrative legal system, including laws and regulations governing administrative action
and responsibility, cannot effectively curb authorities and officials. As a parameter of the
rule of law, China's administrative law system is inadequate in legal stipulations and limited
in practice for curbing arbitrary governmental actions. The inadequacy and flaws will result
in frequent abuse of individual rights and interests granted by the constitution and law.
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Chapter Three: Abuse of Administrative Power
—Infringing personal rights and freedom
The rule of law first requires public servants to know, observe and use laws, in order to
safeguard individual rights and interests. At present, disorder and inadequacy in China's
administrative law system create great difficulty in implementing the rule of law. Since
administrative agencies enjoy a wide range of powers, the potential for abuse of power and
breach of law is great. Moreover, the lack of supervision and control over state and
government power has caused frequent ignorance of and infringement on individual rights
and freedoms by state agencies and officials.
The regime has taken various measures to prevent malfeasance among public
servants. The revised Criminal Law in 1997 increased the punishment for this crime to
fifteen years of imprisonment from five years. The Procuratorate at the national level
handled 76,069 cases of malfeasance of government officials over the three years after 1997,
out of which 646 officials involved were investigated or punished. Some 26,827 cases
remain under investigation, with the officials accused of abuse of power or infringing
citizens' personal or civil rights.1
In 2001, the Procuratorate investigated 36,447 cases involving administrative
misconduct, in which 40,195 officials were convicted of corruption and bribery, recovering
4.1 billion yuan of state assets. They included 8,819 cases of dereliction of duty, in which
1,983 cases involved illegal custody, torture, forcibly collecting evidence and retribution
against citizens. Other cases of illegal activities were not prosecuted, as when cases were not
filed, criminal acts for which there was clear evidence were not investigated, fines replaced
imprisonment, punishments were unlawfully reduced, false trials were conducted, and
unlawful temporary releases from prison were granted. Torture, extended detention and
arbitrary change to sentences also happened frequently.2
Overall, economic development has not led to a substantial improvement in
governmental behaviour and China's record on human rights continues to be criticised by
international communities.3 Despite new laws aimed at redressing official behaviour,
' "China Deals Heavy Blows to Malfeasance," People's Daily, 1 May 2000
(http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200005/01/eng20000501_40101.html).
2 Fazhi ribao interview with Han Zhubin, the Procurator-General of the Supreme People's
Procuratorate, Fazhi ribao, 3 March 2002, p. 1.
3 For example, see Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights (LCHR, now is known as Human Rights
First, HRF), Wrongs and Rights: A Human Rights Analysis ofChina's Revised Criminal Law (New York:
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political repression and the arbitrary exercise of administrative power remain systematic.
There are no signs of fundamental changes in official policies in regard to human rights or in
the legal system.
A report about China's human rights published by Amnesty International (AL) in
2002 concluded that during 2001, "thousands of people remained arbitrarily detained or
imprisoned across the country for peacefully exercising their rights to freedom of expression,
association or belief. Thousands of others were detained during the year. Some were held
without charge or trial under a system of administrative detention; others were sentenced to
prison terms after unfair trials under national security legislation. Torture and ill-treatment
remained widespread and appeared to increase against certain groups. A 'strike hard' [yanda]
campaign against crime led to a massive escalation in death sentences and executions. The
limited and incomplete records available at the end of the year showed that at least 4,015
people were sentenced to death and 2,468 executed; the true figures were believed to be far
higher."4
The SPP requires the Procuratorate at all levels to focus their investigation of misuse
of administrative power on the following four categories.5 (1) the dereliction of duty and
abuse of power by officials above the county level; (2) the practice of favouritism, perverting
the law, extorting confessions by torture, and unlawful detention; (3) the misuse of
administrative power and irregularities in law enforcement on the part of authorities in
charge of economic order and social security; (4) the violation of legal and democratic rights
and interests of citizens.
I will examine official abuse of powers in this and the following chapters. In this
chapter, after a preview of the position of individual interests in China, my discussion will
focus on abuse of personal rights and freedom by the government, such as illegal detention,
torture and the lack of redress for victims. The following chapter will deal with issues
concerning infringement of property rights.
LCHR Publication, 1998). For its online website, see http://www.lchr.org or directly go to
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org.
4
Amnesty International, 2002 Report—Asia and Pacific—China
(http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2002.nsf/asa/china?0pen4/)tne5ty International).
5 "China Deals Heavy Blow to Malfeasance," People's Daily,
1 May 2000 (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200005/01/eng20000501_40101.html).
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1. The conflict between individual rights and state interests
One day in July 1999, Yao Li was having lunch with her two female colleagues when an
armed robbery took place at the Daqing branch of the Construction Bank, where she worked
as a teller. She pressed the alarm, but it was not in working order. She tried to call the police
while pretending to look for the key to the cash box, but the telephone was also out of order.
The robbers took 13,568.46 yuan from Yao's cash box and 30,190 yuan from other boxes.
When the robbers asked Yao to open the safe, she lied to them, saying that there was no
money inside. In fact, there was 250,000 yuan in the safe. The robbers believed her and ran
away. Yao immediately reported the robbery to the police. The next morning, she repaid the
money taken from her cash box from her own savings.
However, the bank dismissed her from her post and cancelled her Party membership
on the grounds that she had failed to do enough to protect state interests, although neither
the alarm system nor the telephone line to the police proved to be in working order. It was
implied that Yao should have stood up and fought the robbers, even at the risk of her life.
Yao applied unsuccessfully for administrative redress. She then applied for labour
arbitration and won her case. The bank was ordered to repeal its decision.
The bank disagreed with the arbitration settlement and brought the case to the court,
but the court supported the arbitration commission. However, in January 2000, the bank
defied both the arbitration and litigation, and refused to withdraw its decision, insisting that
"there was no failure whatsoever in the alarm system at the bank when the robbery
happened, that Yao gave in to the robbers by allowing them to take away the money when
her life was not under threat, and it was not Yao who prevented the safe from being opened
by the robbers".6
This case is only one example of conflict between individual rights and the public
interest. Throughout most of Chinese history, ordinary people have been required to sacrifice
their own rights and interests for the sake of the state interest. Thus, governmental agencies
often ignore people's rights while performing their public functions. In practice, the
overemphasis on instrumental facets of the law has led to the neglect of many fundamental
individual rights. In the PRC period, rights of citizens are always linked with their duties to
the state on the ground that no rights exist in isolation from duties. A right is not inherent or
inalienable, but rather something granted by the state and the dominant class.
Article 33 of the constitution states that citizens enjoy some basic rights and
freedoms. However, it does not provide any detail of citizens' rights. Since the constitution is
6 This case is quoted in Liu Zuoxiang, "Quanli chongtu: yi ge zhide zhongshi de falii wenti" [The
conflict of rights: a problem worth our attention], Zhejiang shehui kexue, no. 3 (2002), pp. 54-61.
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a political manifesto of the state system, China has in practice no mechanism to enforce its
constitution through judicial process. The constitution makes no mention whatsoever of
human rights since it is regarded as a bourgeois conception.7 China is a socialist country in
which citizens' rights derive from statutory laws rather than from any divine sources.
Therefore, citizens' rights will not necessarily restrict the legislative power of the
government. As a political right, citizenship may be restricted or even taken back by the state
whenever it feels it is necessary to maintain the social order. This replacement of human
rights with citizenship has led China's theory in human rights to an instrumental perspective
to serve state, collective, and social interests. "All of these have the potential to be used to
restrict individual freedom."8
In its response to international criticism about China's human rights record, the
Chinese government claims that it recognises the universality of human rights standards
stipulated in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), but at the same time
argues that states must be free to implement these standards according to their specific
cultural, historical and political circumstances. China views the international scrutiny of its
human rights record as interference in its internal affairs. Meanwhile, it asserts that the
principles enshrined in international human rights standards emphasise individual civil and
political rights at the expense of collective economic and cultural rights, which are
paramount for the Chinese people. China's white papers of human rights published regularly
since the 1990s all state that China is still a developing country, and that social stability and
state independence are the most important rights, and that the right to subsistence is the most
basic right.9 It has long been taken for granted by the Chinese government that citizens
should sacrifice their own rights or even their life for the state when a conflict emerges
between individual and state interests.10 In this case, the bank's decision is simply a
reflection of the prevailing ideology and tradition.
In a society based on the rule of law, sacrifice of individual rights is more a moral
requirement than a legal one. Although the court followed a current trend to protect personal
7 In early 2004, the revised PRC constitution has provided that the state respect for and protect human
rights. However, there is still a long way for this article to be enforced injudicial practice.
8 June Teufel Dreyer, China's Political System: Modernisation and Tradition (London: Macmillan
Press, 2000, 3rd ed.), p. 171.
9 The Information Office of the State Council: "Zhongguo renquan fazhan wushi nian baipishu" [The
white paper of Fifty years of the development of China's human rights], issued in February 2000, in
Zhongguo falii nianjian [PRC law yearbook] (Beijing: Zhongguo falii nianjian chubanshe, 2001), pp.
43-51.
10 Ibid. For an account of Asian values of human rights, see Michael Jacobsen and Ole Bruun (eds.),
Human Rights and Asian Values: Contesting National Identities and Cultural Representations in Asia
(Surrey: Curzon, 2000); and for a historic account of the development of China's human rights, see
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rights, in deciding in favour of Yao, this confusion of law with morality will not be clarified
in the foreseeable future in China.
2. Administrative detention without judicial procedures
The belief that individual rights are subordinate to the state's need for maintaining social
order and public interests will inevitably give rise to a situation in which legal procedures are
ignored and individual rights infringed by law enforcement agencies in the name of
protecting public interests. The constitution and national laws have given the public security
bureau (the PSB) great power in restricting and taking away individual freedom. According
to the Criminal Procedural Law (CPL) and the "regulation of administration and punishment
concerning social security" (RAPSS), the police are authorised to maintain social order
through criminal detention (which can last up to 10 days, longer than anywhere else in the
world), administrative detention (up to 15 days), and arrest. The police also have wide-
ranging powers with regard to bail [qu bao hou shen, and surveillance [jianshi
juzhu, USffiJiriH;] of suspected offenders awaiting trial.
In China, a wide variety of administrative agencies have the power to handle "social
deviance among the people."" The RAPSS have a more important role in people's life than
the criminal law. This regulation, which was enacted in 1957 and revised in 1986 and 1994,
empowers the police, not the courts, to decide punishments for minor offences. Typically,
the PSB and their numerous substations may issue a warning or levy fines up to 200 yuan
against offenders. They can also impose a detention of up to fifteen days; in practice, this
limit is often exceeded many times over. The annual rate for such cases handled by the
police amounts to over three million.12
However, the police remain unsatisfied. They feel that restrictions imposed by law
and judicial agencies seriously hamper their actions. For example, they must follow the CPL
procedures and obtain warrants when they want to detain or arrest a person. Besides,
according to the administrative penalties law, they may be required to provide a public
hearing on administrative detentions according to the RAPSS.
Stephen C Angle and Marina Svensson (eds.), The Chinese Human Rights Reader: Documents and
Commentary 1900-2000 (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2001).
11 Donald C. Clarke and James V. Feinerman, "Antagonistic Contradictions: Criminal Law and
Human Rights in China", in Stanley Lubman (ed.), China's Legal Reforms (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), p. 141.
12 For example, in 1998, the police dealt with 3,232,113 such cases, and handled 3,356,083 in 1999.
The State Statistic Bureau: Zhongguo tongji nianjian [PRC statistic yearbook] (Beijing: Zhongguo
tongji nianjian chubanshe, 2000), p. 752.
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The "shelter and investigation" [shourong shencha, i|ft § S, SI] and "re-
education-through labour" (laodong jiaoyang or in short laojiao, zfo Wi If sK fit,
RETL] provide convenience for the police to jail individuals without having to justify their
detention through the judicial process and other supervision. For many years, these measures
have resulted in serious abuse of human rights in China. The two kinds of administrative
detention are based on regulations made by the State Council and the Ministry of Public
Security, but there have never been any laws in China to empower the PSB to restrict and
take away people's freedom under the SI and RETL system.
The constitution does not have any stipulation permitting the PSB at county level to
restrict or take away citizens' personal freedom. The constitution also requires that measures
against personal freedom must be made by the national legislature only, namely the NPC or
its Standing Committee, and no other authority has such power. Article 37 of the constitution
explicitly declares that citizens' personal freedom should not be infringed. Both the
constitution and the legislative law require that any administrative regulation that conflicts
with laws must be repealed. This extension of police power through regulation rather than
law has seriously undermined the constitution and legal system. At the same time, legal
stipulations about detention and arrest fail to play their role properly. According to an
important principle in the administrative law, excessive power or ultra vires is illegal, and
any administrative regulation on which this illegal action is based must be repealed.13
One remarkable feature of contemporary China's legal system is the large number of
internal regulations that are unpublished, not transparent and mutually conflict, which
encourages officials to disregard formal laws and regulations. This also undermines the
integration of the legal system and the emergence of a legal culture. The promulgation of
laws aims to form a mechanism for promoting and safeguarding freedom in which, on the
one hand, the government will carry out its functions according to law and there are laws for
them to follow, and on the other hand, the citizen may effectively scrutinise the government
to see that it complies with the law. In this mechanism, the government can justify requiring
citizens to act legally, and the citizens are only required to comply with the law. It is a basic
principle that the law must be transparent and open to the public, but internal regulations
issued by administrative agencies are neither transparent nor open to the public, yet have the
status of law, or even superiority over law.
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(1) Shelter and investigation
SI was first introduced in the 1950s to deal with problems arising from the unchecked flow
of population from the countryside into cities. However, in 1975 SI was used to "detain and
investigate those people who commit a minor crime and who commit crimes away from their
home place".'4 The SI system originated from a social welfare policy to provide temporary
accommodation for beggars or vagrants until they were sent back to their original hometown
or village after their identity and address were checked out. It was formally adopted in 1961,
managed by local civil departments and enforced by the police.15
The State Council instructed the PSB to set up particular shelter centres at regional
cities. In 1979, the Ministry of Public Security made a series of stipulations regarding SI, and
in 1980 the State Council issued a notice about the incorporation of SI and forced labour into
RETL (hereinafter refers to the 1980 notice). According to this notice, the new system was
extended to include mainly three categories of people, that is, those who commit minor
crimes, those who commit crimes away from their home place, and those who conceal their
real names and addresses and have an unclear background or origin.
After SI was incorporated into RETL, it has no longer been used to deal with the
unchecked flow of population as was originally intended. Since then, the three notices, the
1980 notice and other two issued in 1985 and 1991, are major legal basis of SI for the police
to handle minor criminal suspects in urban areas. Thus SI became an added measure to be
taken in criminal investigation, and its original function as a means of providing social
welfare for beggars and vagrants who migrated into cities from rural areas was then replaced
by a system known as "shelter and repatriation" [shourong qiansong, i&Willtit], which will
be discussed as a separate issue later in this chapter.
SI, together with RETL, in practice, has become a great abusive means for the police
to arbitrarily restrict and take away people's freedom. Before being incorporated into the
revised CPL in 1997, SI had been widely used as a form of administrative detention. By this
system, the PSB is authorised to detain people without charge for up to three months, merely
on the suspicion that they may be involved in crimes, such as prostitution and drugs. Since
13 Arts 5 and 67 (7) of the constitution.
14
"Guowuyuan guanyu jiang qiangzhi laodong jiaoyang he shourong shencha liangxiang cuoshi
tongyi yu laodong jiaoyang de tongzhi" [The State Council's notice of the incorporation of
compulsory labour and shelter and investigation into re-education through labour], adopted in 1961. In
Zhonghua renmin gongheguofalii quanshu [The complete collection of the PRC law] (Changchun:
Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1989), p. 1582.
15 In 1961, the Central Committee of the CCP approved "Guanyu jianjue zhizhi renkou ziyou liudong
de baogao" [The report on a firm prevention of free flow of the population], which was made by the
Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in Falii Quanshu, p. 1582.
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the 1980s, several hundred thousand people have been detained every year under this system.
In 1991 the PSB reportedly stated that there were 930,000 such cases in 1989 and 902,000 in
1990.16 In some regions, 30 to 40 percent were held beyond the permitted limit of three
months.
Local PSB organs expanded the scope of SI at will so that almost anyone might be
detained under this system. Among the detainees, some were not beggars or vagrants but
local residents with valid urban household registration cards; some were criminals and
should have been detained or arrested according to the criminal law; some had only breached
administrative law without criminal elements; some were loitering suspiciously in public
places such as dock or railway stations; some were involved in economic disputes; and some
were suspects who could not be arrested because of insufficient evidence.
In the 1991 notice, the MPS admitted that the scope of SI was too wide and
detention was too long. It was often used to replace criminal detention, investigation and
punishment. Some PSB detained people as required by other state agencies. People were
detained for only making minor mistakes, breaking transport rules, remarrying without
divorcing their first spouse, committing adultery, illegally cohabiting, breaching state policy
on birth control, driving without a licence, or even being mentally disabled. Around 70% of
the cases under SI should not have been handled as criminal acts.17
Since economic reforms began in the late 1970s, China has become an increasingly
money-oriented society. Encouraged by the slogans that "to get rich is glorious", people
across China strove with each other to develop regional or departmental enterprises and
improve their life. The police, like other governmental agencies, took this opportunity to
exercise their influence and power in pursuit of economic benefits. A short cut for them to
take was to impose administrative fines on people. Police fines enriched the police
individually and collectively. Some police even went so far as to make up cases to "expand
sources of income" [chuangshou, There soon arose a new type of business known as a
"law-enforcing economy" [zhifa jingji, ft $r] in China.
Most of those held under SI are less educated or less privileged. They are not
released until they pay the fines. Regulations as how much they are fined vary from person
to person and from case to case; usually the police have the final say. SI is also used to
detain political dissidents and parties in economic disputes, and to coerce them into
confession when there is no substantial evidence to justify arresting them under the criminal
16
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Criminal Justice with Chinese Characteristics (New York:
LCHR Publications, 1993), p. 70.
17
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo falii quanshu (zengbu ben) [A complete collection of PRC laws: an
newly-added edition] (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1993), p. 1153.
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law. This form of administrative detention circumvents the minimal guarantees of due
process recently incorporated into Chinese law, and violates both Chinese law and
international law.
Typical of this are cases generally known as "virgin girls commit prostitution"
[chunii maiyin an, which have frequently been exposed in the press and
attracted a wide attention over recent years. There is much in common between these cases.
The victim is usually a young woman. She is detained on suspicion of prostitution by the
police, who torture and humiliate her until she admits committing being a prostitute and
gives the names of her customers. They then release the woman and fine her so-called
customers. Later medical checks show that the young woman is still a virgin, and the victim
appeals to the press or local authorities for justice. Such cases are not taken seriously by the
PSB until superior officials intervene.
One such case happened in Jingyang, Shaanxi, in January 2001,18 At around 8 in the
evening, Ma Dandan, a 19-year-old woman, was watching TV together with some customers
in a hairdressing salon owned by her sister when suddenly two men in plain clothes, who
claimed to be policemen but produced no warrant of arrest or search, took Ma away by force
into a van. Ma was detained in Jianglu police substation, where the two policemen
interrogated her in turn for the whole night. They even hung Ma from a basketball post
outside in the chilly winter wind, beating and kicking her until 4 am the next morning. She
was then taken back into a closed office to be "ideologically educated" [sixiangjiaoyu,
i&W] by the head of the police station for half an hour. Ma was tortured physically and
mentally, and almost lost consciousness. Finally, Ma signed a prepared confession and was
released at 7 the next evening. A few days later, the Jingyang county PSB announced an
administrative decision against Ma, in which Ma was described as a male who had been
detained and punished for visiting prostitutes.
Ma applied to the county PSB for an administrative redress. The bureau made the
hospital staff exam Ma's hymen twice [which breached her privacy]. The medical check
proved that Ma was still a virgin. Under pressure from the press, the bureau reluctantly took
disciplinary measures against two policemen, although they had violated criminal laws and
should have been punished accordingly. The first trial of this case at the county court
resulted in the defendant being ordered to pay Ma compensation of only 74.66 yuan, which
amounted to her pay for two day's work. Upon further appeal, the compensation was
increased to 9,135 yuan but at the same time her request for a public apology and
n Hua shang bao, 21 March 2001, p. 1; Nanfang doushi bao, 23 March 2001, A17.
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rehabilitation were refused. The case was thus closed, but the harm done to Ma, body and
soul, would likely remain with her for the rest of her life.
It needs to be pointed out that Ma's case is only one ofmany.19 Many such cases fail
to come to light because of interference from law enforcement agencies and also because of
the ordeal endured by women. Of the known cases, quite a few "virgin prostitutes" were
tortured and forced into fabricating a list of their "customers". The men on the list were then
tracked down, detained and heavily fined, or forced to run away from home and hide
elsewhere for years without returning home for fear of being persecuted. What is worse,
some of them were divorced by their wife and even sacked by their employers because of the
unfounded charge of visiting prostitutes.
For example, in November 1998, in Baishui, Shaanxi, a 19-year-old woman
confessed that she had illicit sexual relationships with over 50 men, and named them at
random. Most of the listed men were found to be non-existent, but the other on the list were
detained, beaten, and fined. After they were released, they took revenge not on the police but
on the victim's family for being wronged. When the police later found the list to be faked,
they took the woman back, detained her for much longer than stipulated in laws or
regulations, and beat her again. She then narrowed the number down to 16. The police
conducted a door-to-door search for these 16 men. Some escaped and the remaining were
detained, beaten up, and forced to pay heavy fines. Some were divorced by their wives. They
then sought revenge against the young woman's family.
There are common features in cases of this type: (1) the police assumed the women
to be guilty in the first place; (2) they breached procedural justice by failing to follow legal
procedures and using torture; (3) their tough action against these young women were more
motivated by economic interests than maintenance of social order. In these cases, the women
were treated as criminals with deep humiliation. Some of them were tortured physically and
sexually attacked when detained by the police. They lost their freedom and dignity, and they
were left with nothing to prove their innocence but their body. "If a woman can only prove
her innocence by presenting her naked form (i.e. her hymen), stripping of clothing and
dignity, her redemption is even more shamed, a burden of shame borne by the whole
population, including all men."20
19 For more reports of such cases, see Zhongguo xinwen wang, 28 May 2002 and 23 December 2001
(www.chinanews.com.cn); Renmin ribao, 21 December 2001 (www.peopledaily.com.cn); Chutian
doushi bao, 4 August 2001, p. 1; Zhonghua wang, 2 December 2002 and 14 December 2001
(www.china.com).
20 Li Fang, "Yisibugua de qingbai bu shi ren de qingbai: ping Henan 'chunii maiyin an'"[It is not a
person's innocence hung by a thread: a discussion of the case concerning virgin prostitution in Henan],
Zhongguo qingnian bao, 10 June 2002, p. 7.
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If a man were wrongly accused of visiting a prostitute, how can he prove his
innocence without the evidence of a hymen? If a married woman is accused of prostitution,
how can she prove her innocence since she is not a virgin? Many people are wronged and
lose their cases because they cannot produce "hard evidence" to convince the police. Under
this system, anyone can be found guilty if she/he cannot prove his/her innocence in a
convincing way, and no one can feel secure when the police can override the law and
arbitrarily detain a person. One victim has reported the police saying, "If I beat you, what
can you do to me? At worst, I will get the sack."21 This shows that some police have no
respect for law and basic human rights. However, in these cases, when a PSB decision was
challenged, the police defended themselves vigorously. For example, in March 2002 in
Yancheng, Jiangsu, a young woman was forced to confess to prostitution and was sentenced
to serve six months of re-education through labour. On the way to the labour camp, she
threw out a letter to her father, saying that she had been tortured into making a false
confession. When two lawyers retained by her father asked to meet her in the labour camp,
their request was rejected by the camp guards on orders from the PSB.22
Later, the lawyers went to see a senior PSB official in charge of legal affairs, asking
for the case to be reconsidered. The official refused, claiming, "Firstly, our bureau is very
serious about this case and has already called on six meetings to study it; secondly, the fact
of being a virgin does not prove that she did not perform prostitution. Could not she satisfy
her clients by means of masturbation or oral sex? Thirdly, our cadres and police are of good
character. Extracting confessions by torture is a high-tension wire for us, so they would not
have taken this risk." Finally, the lawyers and journalists who investigated the case gave it
up after receiving threatening telephone calls.
Although efforts are occasionally made to rebuild public confidence in law
enforcement, most come to no avail. One reason is that there are no clearly defined and
strictly observed laws regarding the scope of the power of state agencies. In most cases,
these agencies collaborate in the name of protecting the interests of the state, because
individual rights are negligible. Secondly, the police usually enjoy more power in Chinese
legal practice than judges and procurators, and once the police decide a suspect guilty, it is
very difficult to reverse their decision. Thirdly, there is almost no restriction or supervision
of police powers. Finally, law-enforcing agencies are more often than not linked by common
interests.
21 Renmin ribao online, 21 December 2001 (http://www/peopledaily.com.cn).
22 Ibid.
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All these factors combined together render the court or procuratorate neither able nor
willing to offend the police by reversing their decision even when the evidence is found to
have been obtained illegally or is inadequate. With almost unrestricted power, the police
infringe citizens' rights without fear of being investigated and held accountable. Moreover,
the court treats with great care cases in which corrupt law enforcers are involved. When
members of the police are found guilty, they are usually dealt with according to
administrative penalties rather than criminal law. When they are finally sentenced, the court
is quite lenient towards them. In the foreseeable future, there is not much of hope of
improving this situation.
In recent years, China has achieved a great deal in lawmaking by international
standards. The problem in China, however, is not that there are no laws but that law
enforcers do not abide by laws, and sometimes even violate laws. Many abuses to people
detained under the SI system, as we have seen, arise from the unrestricted power of
administrative agencies in the disguise of maintaining social stability. SI is completely
manipulated by the PSB alone. There were no judicial reviews of SI cases until 1990 when
the administrative litigation law for the first time was expanded to cover SI. Before this,
individuals unlawfully detained under this system had no place to seek remedy. The new
revised CPL, which was put in effect in 1997, requires that the police should follow CPL
procedures and accept prosecutors' supervision rather than only follow internal decisions if
they want to SI a person. Those originally subject to SI can now be detained for a maximum
of 37 days before approval must be obtained from the prosecutor for formal arrest. In
practice, however, the police frequently breach the laws and regulations in regard to
detention and custody. As Amnesty International observed, "the police [in China] still have
the power to detain the same categories of people without charge and without judicial
review," and "the human rights violations which have characterised 'shelter and
investigation' may continue".23
China has not acted to abolish the regulations on SI, namely three internal notices
issued by the administrative agency, even if it is cancelled as an administrative detention.
The incorporation actually legalises the police and state security bureau actions in using SI to
detain political dissidents and religious cults without charge by setting a time limit for
detention in the revised CPL. At the same time, the PSB have resorted more and more
frequently to another more "effective and secure" system known as RETL of handling minor
criminals and ideological dissidents.
23
Amnesty International, China: Law Reform and Human Rights: Not Far Enough, 28 February 1997
(http://www.oneworld.org/amnesty/press/28feb_china.html ).
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(2) Re-education through labour
RETL is a form of administrative detention which is usually combined with SI to sentence
minor criminals to labour camps for a fixed period. Both measures are similar in terms of
functions and procedures, the only difference between them being that SI is unlawful
detention while RETL is illegally forced labour. The PSB has the power to place suspected
offenders in detention centres or labour camps without a court order. Under the RETL
system, the term of forced labour on camps can last as long as four years.24 Labour camps
are notorious for harsh labour conditions and torture.
In addition of 1957 regulation, the State Council issued "Guanyu laodong jiaoyang
de bucong guiding" [The supplementary regulation on RETL] in 1979. In 1982, the MPS
issued "Laodong jiaoyang shixing banfa" [The method of enforcement of RETL] and revised
it in 1989. An enforcing method of 1982 regulation was issued in 1992, titled "Laodong
jiaoyang guanli gongzuo zhifa xizhe" [The enforcing particulars for managing RETL work].
Above three administrative regulations are only guidance for the PSB to carry out RETL
work. This system, which started in 1957, has been used to detain minor criminals, political
dissidents and members of unrecognised religious groups.
As described in a report issued by Amnesty International,25 Tong Yi is a prisoner of
conscience, serving a two-and-a-half-year sentence of re-education through labour, without
charge or trial. She had acted as assistant and translator for Wei Jingsheng, the political
dissent famous for his role in the Democratic Wall Movement in the late 1970s. She was
taken into custody days after revealing to the foreign press that Wei had been seized by the
police on 1 April 1994, and was sent to Hewan Labour Camp in Wuhan, Hubei, in January
1995. Shortly afterwards, she was brutally beaten by two inmates who were camp "trustees",
according to a letter to her mother smuggled out of the camp. She said she was being forced
to work 15 hours a day in order to fulfil production quotas. Tong Yi complained to camp
officials about the beatings, but they took no action to protect her. The following day, more
than 10 women prisoners beat her again, leaving her face and body swollen and covered in
bruises.
Members of her family were warned that they would lose their jobs if they tried to
make her complaints public. In July 1995 Tong Yi's mother was told she could no longer
visit her daughter and that her daughter would be transferred to Shayang RETL farm in
24
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo falii qianshu, 1989, pp.1574 and 1583; Guowuyuan gongbao, no. 26
(1992), p.1055.
25
Amnesty International, China: No One is Safe: Political Repression and Abuse of Power in the
1990s (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1996), p. 76.
92
Hubei, where "forceful measures" would be used against her, if Tong Yi persisted in
working no more than the legal maximum of eight hours per day.
The official figures show that about 150,000 people are held in labour camps at any
one time.20 In Guangzhou alone, over 9,200 people were placed in labour camps in 1999.27
Since 1989, hundreds of dissidents and members of religious or ethnic groups have been
detained under the RETL system. According to official sources cited in 2002 annual report
by Amnesty International, some 260,000 people were detained through RETL in early 2001,
a substantial increase on the number officially reported in 1998. The use of this form of
arbitrary detention increased particularly against Falun Gong practitioners since 1999 and
during the "strike hard" campaigns against crime.28
Liu Wenping was a Falun Gong follower in Liaohe, Liaoning. When doing Falun
exercises on the Great Wall, she was arrested and sentenced to three years ofRETL. She was
tortured and forced to sign a prepared statement renouncing her beliefs and then released in
2000. She was arrested and sent to the labour camp again in 2001. This time, she suffered
even harsher physical and mental abuse. She was tied to an open, barred window for a day
and night in November, but she still did not give in. She was then sent to a psychiatric
hospital for treatment after a mental collapse caused by the endless torture. In 2002, after she
was permitted to go home, she committed suicide by jumping from her flat.29
With its inherent incompatibilities and conflicts with the Chinese constitution, the
law [especially the legislative law and the administrative penalties law] and international
conventions for human rights, RETL does not comply with the requirement of the rule of
law.30 According to the UN Body of Principles for "The protection of all persons under any
form of detention of imprisonment", no one may be kept in detention without being given an
26
Zhongguo falii nianjian [The law yearbook of China] (Beijing: Zhongguo falii nianjian chubanshe),
various vols, throughout 1989 and 2001.
27
Yangcheng wanbao, 13 September 2000
(http://www.ycwb.com/history/96/2000/09/13/ycwb/zhxn/Lhtml).
28 China rarely declares the figures in these areas. But according to some unofficial or overseas
sources, since July 1999 when the CCP started to crack down the Falun Gong, a total of 100,000
members have been sent to the labour camps, and over 600 have been tortured to death. See
Falungong website: Minghui wang (http://huiyuan.minghui.Org/html/articles/2003/3/607.html); and
Qingzhou wang (http://qingzhou.sytes.net/news/shownews.asp?newsid=6613).
29 For a detail report of this case, see http://media.minghui.org/gb/case/liuwenping09252002.html and
http://minghui.ca/mh/articles/2002/10/27/38733.html.
30 There has been much discussion over the legality ofRETL. See Shen Fujun, "Guanyu feichu
laodong jiaoyang zhidu de sikao" [A reflection of abolishing RETL system], Faxue, no 7 (1999), pp.
18-20; Lin Xiaochun, "Laodong jiaoyang zhidu de gaige" [On reforming the RETL system], Faxue
yanjiu, no 5 (1997), pp. 114-117; Zhang Shaoyan, "Lun laodong jiaoyang lifa de jiben xingshi" [On
the general situation of making laws regarding RETL], Fazhi ribao, 20 February 2001, p. 1; Liu Jian,
"Lun Zhongguo laodong jiaoyang zhidu yu guoji renquan gongyue de congtu ji tiaozheng" [On
conflicts of China's RETL system with international conventions for HRs, and adjustments ofRETL],
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effective opportunity to have his or her case heard promptly by a judicial authority.31 The
detainee has the right to be held according to the law, the right of access to lawyers and
family members, and the rights to not be subjected to forced labour.32 RETL is also conflict
with Chinese law. As an administrative penalty, detainees are sentenced to heavy labour in
harsh conditions and deprived of freedom from 6 months to one or three and even four years.
The infringement of personal freedom often exceeds that in criminal punishment.33
There are no rules governing the procedures in carrying out RETL and the
management of this system. An individual may be sentenced to years of hard labour without
court trial and access to lawyers, and all this can be through the closed door by
administrative agencies. The RETL management commission is composed of heads of the
police, judicial, civil welfare and labour departments. It entrusts the police to carry out both
approval and enforcement of a RETL decision, and the procuratorate has no supervision over
it. Thus, the commission performs no function in this mechanism.34
Many cases concerning RETL are difficult to challenge under the current
administrative redress and litigation law. The PSB tends to assess the police by the number
of cases they handle and reward the police according to how many cases have been brought
to a close. This encourages the police to detain as many people as they can, since RETL
cases do not go through the legal procedures required under formal arrest. As a result, many
innocent people are detained under RETL, while at the same time some criminals are
protected.35
The practice of RETL also shows that the administrative power overrides the
authority of the constitution and law. Only the police have the power to make such a decision
on how long a person is sentenced to RETL. RETL is neither a criminal punishment nor a
measure of education but a grey area between criminal law and administrative regulation.
RETL has been in effect since 1957. As the conflict between RETL and the rule of
law has become more and more apparent, many people, including the famous legal scholars
Xiangtan daxue xuebao\ posted at Kan Zhongguo, 26 May 2003
(http://www.secrctchina.eom/news/articles/3/5/26/43360.html).
31 The principles adopted by the UN General Assembly 43/173 on 9 December 1988, see
http://www.hric.ca/uninfo/treaties/36.shtml.
32 Ibid.
33 See Liu Jian and Shen Fujun, supra note 30.
34
Dang Guoqing, "Qian tan laodong jiaoyang xuexiao" [A brief discussion of the RETL schools],
Zhongguo fazhi bao, 29 April 1985, p. 3.
35
Tang Shimin, "Qian tan Zhongguo laodong jiaoyang jinxing gaige de biyaoxing" [A brief
discussion of the necessity of reforming China's RETL system], Dongfangfazhi wang, 21 September
2002 (http://law.eastday.com/epublish/gb/paperl 0/1/classOOl 000001 /hwz582109.htm).
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Ma Huide and Chen Xingliang, have advocated its abolition.36 However, there are still some
who regard it as an effective means to maintain social stability during transition periods.
They advocate strengthening rather than abolition.37 A third group proposes its reform and
legalisation through legislative procedure, in order to transform it something resembling
magistrates' courts in England.38 The future of the RETL system is still uncertain, but it is
arousing increasing concern among academic circles and the general public.
(3) Shelter and repatriation
SR [shourong qiansong, is a civic welfare mechanism designed to provide aid
for homeless people in urban areas. It began with a 1982 regulation made by the State
Council concerning "the method of shelter and repatriation of beggars and tramps in urban
areas." Local civil agencies are required to set up shelters with governmental funds to
provide basic living facilities for such people. The local police are responsible for carrying
out sheltering and repatriating them.
Since the mid-1980s, there has been an ever-increasing gap in wealth between the
rich and poor, the east and west, and the city and countryside. The redundancy of labour in
rural areas has long been a serious problem. To make matters worse, the requisition of
farming land by local authorities to develop village and town enterprises has left many
landless, and the only way out for them is to look for work in large cities. Every year
millions of peasants migrate into the cities, leading to the collapse of the policy of restricting
labour migration in effect since the 1950s. A document known as No. 48, titled "A proposal
concerning reform of problems in shelter and repatriation work", was issued in 1991 to
extend the current SR system to cover people "without three papers" [san wu renyuan,
Aw], who are so called because they have no ID cards, no temporary residential card and
no work permit.
36
Song Lu'an, "Laodong jiaoyang yin yu feichu" [RETL should be abolished], Xingzhengfaxueyanjiu,
no 2 (1996), pp. 26-31; Zhao Bingzhi, "Zhongguo xingfa xiugai ruogan wenti" [Some problems
concerning the revision of China's criminal law], Faxue yanjiu, no 5 (1996), pp. 6-54.
37 Bi Xusen, "Cong lishi kan laodong jiaoyang de shuxing" [A study of the nature of RETL from a
historical perspective], Zhongguo laodong jiaoyang, no 2 (1999); "Laodong jiaoyang gongzuo zhi
neng jiaqiang buneng xueruo" [RETL can only be strengthened rather than weakened], Fazhi ribao, 3
August 1997, p. 1.
38 Liu Renwen, "Laodong jiaoyang zhidu jiqi gaige" [RETL system and its reform], Jiancha ribao, 4
May 2001; Chu Huizhi, "Lun jiaoyang chuyu de helixing" [A discussion of the rationality of
education through a magistrature], Zhongguo laodongjiaoyang, no 3 (1999); "Jinkuai wei laodong
jiaoyang Ufa" [The legalisation of re-education through labour must be put on the agenda], Nanfang
zhoumu, 21 September 2000, p. 13; Wang Zhonghuan, "Zhiding you Zhongguo teshe de shourong
jiaoyang fa tansuo" [A exploration on making a law concerning shelter and education with Chinese
characteristics], Shandongfaxue, no 1 (1998), pp. 48-49.
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SR has been used nationwide to deprive several million people a year of their
freedom without any judicial process. Local authorities have also issued similar regulations
to deal with local problems in relation to people without three papers, and often the scope of
this application is even wider than that in Document No. 48. SR has become another source
of abuse of HRs, as reported officially and unofficially. Some people are put into SR simply
because they walk along the street in a "suspicious way", as in the case of an 80-year-old
man in Shenzhen, who was sent to the shelter station in February 2001.39
Some people are even tortured to death under this system. For example, in October
1994, Zhang Sen, a 25-year-old man was taken to the shelter by the police when he was
walking along a street in Guangzhou when was stopped and asked to show his residence
permit. Although had a permanent job in Guangzhou, he was not carrying his residence
permit with him. Although it would have been very easy to check up on his identity because
he had a bank card issued by the Construction Bank of China, he was detained and sent to a
shelter. His uncle, Zhang Sen's only relative there in Guangzhou, was contacted and asked to
pay 200 yuan for his redemption, but Zhang had been transferred to another shelter when his
uncle came to pay the money. Later, the redemption was increased to 800 yuan, but Zhang
was transferred again before his uncle arrived at the second shelter. When his uncle finally
saw him, Zhang was already dead from an inside beating, and his body showed signs of
massive injuries.
In order to cover up the cause of Zhang's death at the shelter, the doctors were
instructed by the authorities to tell Zhang's uncle that the body must be cremated at once, or
he would be unable to collect the ashes because the body would be disposed as
unidentified.40 Zhang's uncle then signed the cremation certificate. Since the evidence of
Zhang's death had been destroyed, the court rejected the charge brought by Zhang's parents
against the SR agencies.
In this case, the victim should not have been subject to SR according to the relevant
regulations. Although Zhang had not brought his residential card with him, he had a stable
job and a fixed residence in Guangzhou. It seems that the only reason he was stopped was
that he seemed to be a migrant (he was a member of the Zhuang ethnic minority).
On some important occasions, such as National Day and Spring Festival, or during
campaigns for improving the city's image, many people would be put into SR in order to
clear the streets of those deemed undesirable by urban authorities. The vast majority of them
39 See Boxun, 4 February 2001
(http://peacehall.com/news/gb/yuanqing/2001 /02/2001020420151 .shtml).
40
"Shourongsuo li jianzhuang qingnian liqi siwang" [A robust young man died oddly in the shelter
centre], Zhongguo qingnian bao, 27 August 2001, p. 7.
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are ordinary migrant workers. Others held in shelters include street children, homeless
people or people who are mentally ill or disabled. They are first locked up in SR stations and
then sent away under police escort to their hometown or village. For example, on 26
November 1999, the police in Beijing brought in 4,167 persons for sheltering. On the eve of
New Year's Day, the Beijing authorities mobilised a police force of 9,940 persons and
allocated as many as 123 train compartments to repatriate the so-called people without three
papers.41 It is estimated that hundreds of thousands of people spent their National Day in
more than 700 SP detention centres across the country in 1999.42
In many places, SR measures against people without three papers have turned out to
be a highly profitable business or even a source for gang crime. The practice of charging SR
fees on detainees has encouraged the police to hold as many people as they can. In some SR
stations, corrupt police and criminals have even conspired to sell sheltered women for
prostitution.
The Xuzhou Civil Bureau set up a transfer station for sending people back home
under SR in a small village to the west of city Xuzhou, Jiangsu. In collaboration with the
villagers, the station management made the transference of SR people into a profitable
business. The villagers first bailed the SR people out of the station and detained them in their
houses. The men were held for ransom while the young women were sold into prostitution.
The village and the station soon made great profits.43
This system has long been hidden from the public because most of its victims are
poor and obscure. They can be detained at the whim of the police because they supposedly
sully a city's image and pose a potential threat to social stability. This is a flagrant abuse of
human rights, and reflects the fact that China's rural dwellers remain second-class citizens.
Campaigns are regularly launched on festival occasions every year in Chinese cities to clear
public places of people without three papers and drive them back to their home village.
Rather than maintain social stability, the SR system has caused widespread resentment
among migrants from rural areas.
Recently there has been much criticism of the SR system from scholars and the
public as more and more SR cases are exposed in the press. They call for a re-assessment of
this system on the grounds that according to the legislative law, regulations concerning
41 Renmin ribao, 20 December 2000, p. 9.
42 Human Rights in China (HRIC), "Not Welcome at the Party: Behind the Clean-up of China's Cities-
a Report on Administrative Detention Under "Custody and Repatriation," 29 September 1999, in
Hong Kong Voice ofDemocracy website
(http://www.democracy.org.hk/EN/sepl999/mainland_19.htm).
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compulsory restriction of personal freedom must be enacted by the NPC.44 But until the
implementation of the legislative law, State Council's two documents issued in 1982 and
1991 on which SR is based remain effective in practice although it is already in conflict with
law.45
3. Torture for confession and miscarriage of justice
Although torture is strictly prohibited by law in China, it is very common in detention
centres and prisons to extract confessions or to intimidate and punish suspects and prisoners.
Torture most frequently occurs when people are held in administrative detention, since this is
outside the judicial process and beyond the scope of public monitoring.
Torture in detention centres, prisons and labour camps is sometimes carried out by
inmates against other inmates at the instigation of, or without interference from, officials.
People detained in these stations are classified into different groups according to their
performance and attitudes. Those who have "reformed well" are better treated and often
assigned the task of supervising their cellmates. They are allowed to enjoy some freedoms
and privileges which are denied to their fellow inmates. As a reward for carrying out the
tasks, they are even instructed to carry out torture against "hardened bad guys", particularly
ideological dissidents.
According to Amnesty International, torture in SI and RETL institutes is epidemic
and extreme. Death from torture happens frequently. The mismanagement of SI facilities
also resulted in the death of 28 people through torture in 1988 and eight deaths during the
first three months of 1989 alone.46 In Henan alone, it is reported that 41 prisoners and
innocent suspects died as a result of torture during interrogation between 1990 and 1992.47
Party criminal policy is that confession is dealt with leniently, but resistance is deal with
severely. This policy encourages confession, exposing collaborates and repentance. Since
1989, it is believed that torture has been used more and more frequently as means of
punishing political and religious dissidents. It was reported in 1995 that 412 cases involving
43 In the first major case resolved in Beijing involving forcing teenage girls into prostitution, it was
found that many were sold right from this village in Xuzhou. See Renmin ribao, 12 October 2001
(http://www.people.com.cn/gb/guandian/26/20011012/579606.html).
44 Arts. 8 and 9 of the PRC Legislative Law, for a full print version, see Zhongguo falti nainjian [Law
yearbook ofChina] (Zhongguo falii nainjian chubanshe, 2001), pp. 257-263.
45 SR was abolished in June 2003 and replaced with a new system known as "shelter and aid"
[shourongjiuzhu, after Sun Zhigang, an university graduate, was reported to have been
beaten to death in a shelter station in Guangzhou. This tragic death triggered a national appeal for
abolishing this system.
46 See chapter 4, "Torture and Impunity," in China: No One Is Safe, pp. 63-78. For a recent detail
report of cases in this type, see Amnesty International, "Torture—A Growing Scourge in China—
Time for Action", 12 February 2001 (http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa 170042001).
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torture, 4,627 cases involving illegal detention and other illegal cases involving infringing
personal freedom were investigated.48
Countless other cases are believed to have been ignored or covered up by officials. It
is difficult to assess the extent of torture quantitatively, but there is evidence, as shown above,
to indicate that torture is widespread, systematic and far more serious than suggested in
official reports. In many cases, the police often illegally torture suspects into confession.
This is because that the government attaches greater importance to maintaining public order
and suppressing political opposition than to observing legal norms and protecting individual
rights.
The PSB tend to assume suspects are guilty, and feel justified in using torture to
extract confessions. Victims of torture often lose faith in the law and the legal system. For
example, in October 1986, Xing Wei's pregnant wife was murdered at home in Yingkou,
Liaoning. Xing was regarded as the suspect in spite of insufficient evidence.49 He was
tortured for three days and nights, and his mother was held in the detention centre. He was
forced to confess and sentenced to life imprisonment. During his time in jail, he appealed
against the sentence hundreds of time but he was only released in 2000 when the real
murderer was caught.
Another case involving Qian, director of the Agricultural Bank of Zhaodong,
Heilongjiang, who was stabbed in August 1994. Sui Hongjian, a colleague of the victim, was
targeted as the suspect, and his two brothers and one cousin were regarded as accomplices.
During the investigation and trial, the four suspects plus twelve other family members were
detained for a total of nearly 19 years.50 While these adults were in custody, their 11 children
aged between 3 and 14 were left alone at home without parental care for almost one year.
The four main suspects were sentenced to five years imprisonment and served their full term
in 1999. In early 2001, the real criminal was caught. The Sui brothers then appealed to the
relevant authorities for justice and compensation on the following grounds.
First, when the police notified Sui Hongjian and other three that they were being
held under SI at the Zhaodong detention centre, they did not present any documents or give
any explanation. A special case team [zhuan'an zu, "1? ^li.] was formed to interrogate Sui in
turn day and night. The police said to Sui: "It is definitely you who has stabbed Qian. You
must admit your crime." "It's for your benefit to make a full confession. Now your father,
brothers, sisters and wife are all in custody. If you confess, they will be set free so that the
47 Henan fazhi bao, 7 October 1993, p. 4.
48 Zhang Siqing, then SPP Chief-Procurator, "SPP working report", in Zhonguo falii nianjian, 1996,
p. 119.
49 Fazhi ribao, 22 December 2000 (http:// www.legaldaily.com.cn/10791 .htm).
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children in these families will be looked after." Under great pressure, Sui Hongjian finally
agreed to sign his name and put his fingerprint on a confession pre-pared by the police.
The other three suspects were forced to confess in a similar way. Later, the police
wrote a detailed report of the case stating that after a quarrel with Qian over work, Sui
Hongjian resolved to take revenge on Qian. He called on his two brothers and one cousin to
kill Qian, but the plan miscarried. The police were praised by the local press for their "quick
and effective resolve of a murder case despite lack of clues and evidence." The case seemed
to have been officially closed.
But things did not go as the police had wished. The suspects were put on trial four
times, retracting their confession at each trial. At the first trial in September 1996, Wu
Zhengrong, a lawyer and member of the Standing Committee of the NPC, launched a
defence for the four suspects, and the case was adjourned for a second trial. The second trial
was conducted in 1997, but the court made no decision; instead, it reported the case to the
Suihua Intermediate Level Court (SILC). The latter reviewed the case and ruled that it
should be retried because the facts were unclear and there was insufficient evidence.
During the judicial process, the police adopted coercive measures against 10
witnesses, and detained one of them for over 5 months to force him to give false testimony.
A third open trial of this case was held in November 1998, in which all the witnesses for the
prosecution overturned their previous statements. Chen Dewang, a witness aged 75, told the
court: "I joined the Party even before the founding of the PRC. I will take any legal
responsibilities for my testimony. My statement given in October was not true. The police
forced me to give false testimony. They brought me to the detention centre and made me sit
in a chair for two days and nights. They did not let me sleep. Whenever I dozed off, they
would drag my ears, not allowing me a moment of sleep. They would not have released me if
I had not signed the testimony they wrote in advance. They even threatened to send me to
prison. I am a Party member. If I am lying, you may shoot me at once outside the court."
The court still found that the four suspects were guilty on the grounds that their
confessions corresponded with each other, disregarding the fact that the four suspects and
witnesses repeatedly withdrew their confessions and testimony. The court stated that there
was no evidence to prove that the police had used torture to extract the confessions. Thus,
the four suspects were sentenced to four to five years of imprisonment for intentional murder.
In January 1999, the four defendants appealed to SILC. The case was tried for the fourth
time, resulting in a lighter sentence of three years' imprisonment for deliberate injury. They
50 Shenghuo bao, 31 August 2001, p. 5 and Fazhi wencui bao, no. 741, p. 1.
100
were set free in August 1999 after serving their reduced term. When they left jail, they were
found to be suffering serious bodily injuries.
Sui Hongjian appealed again in 2000 to SILC to rescind the previous judgement. At
this time, the real offender was caught in Harbin in another criminal case. In 2001, Sui's
appeal attracted the attention of the Heilongjiang Political and Legal Commission, and the
Provincial Higher Level Court (PHLC) instructed SILC to reinvestigate this case and bring it
to a fair end within two weeks. In its report, SILC stated the reason why its ruling for retrial
failed. "Our court contacted prosecutors many times requiring a review of this case. They
admitted that some doubts existed in the case relating to investigation and trial, but that they
found it difficult to rescind the decision because if Sui and his brothers were regarded as
innocent, then there would be, first of all, an investigation of the police having used torture
for confession and fabricating reports. Our court suggested that the prosecutor investigate
police torture since this issue was beyond our jurisdiction, but the prosecutor claimed that he
could not do so unless authorised from the relevant agency. Thus the retrial of the case was
postponed."51
It is worth mentioning here that two other similar cases also happened in Zhaodong.
A worker, Zhao Naiwen, was killed outside a public toilet in Zhaodong in November 1994.
His fellow worker Yang Yunzhong was targeted as the suspect. Although Yang consistently
denied the charge, he was sentenced to death penalty in 1996, but in 1998 his sentence was
changed to death with two years' suspension, and finally to life imprisonment. At the same
time, Yang's parents and a classmate were placed on probation for covering up his crime.
Another case involved a railway worker, Shi Yansheng, who borrowed a tape from a
local video shop in December 1993. During the same night, the janitor of the shop was
murdered. Shi Yansheng was detained as a suspect. He and six members of his family were
detained for a total of 5,105 days. In November 1994, Shi Yansheng was sentenced to death
with two years' suspension. In 1999 SILC ruled that Shi Yansheng was not guilty and set
him free because of unclear and insufficient evidence.
The Chinese government has signed the UN Convention against Torture (CAT) in 1988, and
the Criminal Law also contains articles concerning torture. However, the definition of torture
is significantly different from that of the Convention in several respects. First, torture in the
Criminal Law (CL) refers mainly to two types of acts: using torture to "coerce a statement";
and subjecting imprisoned persons to corporal punishment and abuse for this same purpose.52
51 ibid.
52 Arts. 136 and 189 of the PRC Criminal Law.
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By defining torture narrowly as the use of force to "coerce a statement," the concept of
torture in Chinese law falls short of the requirements of the Convention.
Second, the penalties prescribed for torture in the CL are relatively light compared to
those for other crimes. Torturing to coerce a statement usually only merits a fixed-term
sentence of no more than three years or criminal detention ranging from 15 days to six
months. Torture that results in disability or death is subject to a penalty of over three years of
fixed-term imprisonment. Third, there is no mention of psychological torture in Chinese law.
Some articles in the General Principles of the Civil Law (GPCL) address the issue of mental
damage, but they are not applicable to psychological torture. In fact, solitary confinement, a
common form of psychological torture, has been employed in excess of legal time limits to
punish those who supposedly are not willing to submit to "education" and "reform."
Fourth, under the CPL, investigation of the crime of torture is to be handled
exclusively by the procurators. The Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP) established
various standards to determine whether particular torture cases should be prosecuted, which
further define the concept of torture described in the CL. In these standards, two elements are
of primary importance in determining how a case should be handled. The first is the
intention of the torturer: if he carries out the act for personal ends or in revenge, the case
should be investigated. The second is the end result of the torture: an investigation should
only be initiated if the torture caused disability, death or other serious consequences. Such a
narrow definition of torture compounds existing ignorance and appears to encourage officials
not to view torture as a serious matter. One reason that evidence obtained from torture is
used in court may relate to an official theory on which evidence is based called "seeking
truth from facts" [shi shi qiu shi, Jd]. This means that each piece of evidence should
be examined according to whether or not it is a fact, regardless of its origin. This principle
means that if a piece of evidence is proved to be true through the trial process, it is to be
considered as legal evidence even if it was obtained illegally. In practice, the use of evidence
obtained from torture at trial is common practice in the Chinese judicial process. The police
are not held responsible for torture and excessive detention as long as the suspects are finally
proved guilty. Although the Chinese criminal law states that a defendant's statement is not
necessary for the determination of whether a criminal act has been committed, oral
confession occupies as high as 70% in China's criminal process.53
The emphasis on social order and stability also influences official tolerance towards
torture. Attitudes toward criminals are closely related to a social system in which all persons
53 Tian Wenchang, "Guanyu xingxunbigong de shenceng sikao" [An intensive study of distracting
confession by torture], Fazhi raibao, 6 November 2002, p. 6.
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are subordinate to the needs of the state. Defendants and witnesses must respond to
interrogation from the investigating and trial authorities.
In these circumstances, the assumption of innocence, which was first introduced in
the 1997 criminal law, has not made any difference to the mentality of judicial officials. The
legitimacy of torture to extract confession has a long history in both pre-modern and modem
China. Many ordinary people as well as officials believe that the use of torture for criminals
is wholly justifiable. Whenever the regime perceives itself to be under threat, it is likely to
launch campaigns to maintain law and order, and suppresses all kinds of criminal and semi-
criminal behaviour. The media report all criminal cases and the authorities exert pressure on
judicial agencies to resolve the case quickly. The PSB particularly enjoy a great power in
maintaining social security and thus many abuses including torture are related to them.
When the assumption of innocence was transplanted into China's criminal legal
system, the process was only partial. Other related concepts such as the right to silence, strict
surveillance over interrogation through CCTV and tape-recording, the presence of defence
lawyers at the interrogation, and the exclusion of evidence extracted by torture, were not
introduced. The prosecution is not obliged to prove that torture is not being used in
extracting confession. The low incidence of witnesses giving evidence in the court means
that oral confessions are rarely challenged in court.
Thus the new lie-detection machines introduced after the new criminal law came
into force have not had much practical impact. The judicial agencies still tend to regard
suspects as guilty, and torture is an easy way for them to get other evidence in order to
resolve the case. They do not trust the lie detectors and rarely use them. The rate of bail
remains as low as 10% because it remains in the hands of the police whether or not to grant
bail according to legal stipulations.54
In principle, confessions extracted under torture should be supported by independent
evidence before a conviction can be made. Where there is no supporting evidence, cases are
usually returned for supplementary investigation or retrial. However, the courts, which are
under heavy pressure from the media and the authorities, would rather make a wrongful
conviction than wrongly set a suspect free. In such a case, the court must bear responsibility
for unlawful convictions. In cases of supplementary investigation and retrial, the fact that the
suspect has already been detained for a long period also affects the chances of a fair trial in
that the compensation would be correspondingly heavy. All these factors affect the annual
assessment of the judiciary. In the end, the court often sentences the detainee for a period
54
"Ershiyi shiji fazhi he qu he cong?" [What course to follow for the rule of law in the 21st century?],
Fazhi ribao, 26 December 2000, p. 3.
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similar to his actual detention or continued his detention without sentence, even if he is
innocent.
In Chinese law, defendants are not permitted access to lawyers in the preliminary
stage of the investigation, which is the time when torture is most likely to take place. In one
county during 1990, 67 defendants withdrew their confession when their cases went to trial.
This accounted for 39 percent of total cases surveyed in this county.55 In these cases, the
major reason for the defendants' retraction was that they had confessed only in order to avoid
further torture. Although the 1997 CPL permits lawyers to meet with detainees in the
presence of police officers "following the first interrogation", the specifics are left undefined.
In practice, from both my observation and information provided by the Bar Association, it
remains at the discretion of the police and procuratorate whether lawyers are permitted to
meet a suspect at an early stage of the investigation, since the revisions contain no
guarantees for such access. Suspects are still in custody for long periods without any
monitoring.
Even if defence lawyers finally participate in the case, they are not really able to
play the same role as their Western counterparts. There is plenty of evidence that lawyers'
involvement in trials is subject to the control of Party Political and Legal Commissions (PLC)
at all levels. In political cases and cases in which defendants plead not guilty, lawyers are
required to submit their defence statements to the Bureau of Justice in advance for approval.
In cases brought against the use of the torture, defendants are generally state officials and the
charges would likely be regarded as damaging to the image of state organs. Lor this reason,
lawyers representing the victims of torture and their families often encounter a great deal of
obstruction from the local Party and administrative officials.
In sum, the incomplete conception of torture and other failures in the legal system,
including the lack of an independent judiciary, the denial of the suspects' right of early
access to lawyers and the acceptance of evidence obtained through torture by the courts,
creates many opportunities for torture in China's criminal justice. Under the influence of
central and local Party PLC, many torture cases have been handled in an overly tolerant
manner. The courts generally have imposed light punishments on perpetrators and the
prosecutors have often exempted abusive police from prosecution.56 Lurthermore, in order to
55 Ibid.
56 For example, Zhao Baohong was 21 years old when he was suspected of rape in 1999. He was
detained for 98 days, during which he was beaten, resulting in his nose and teeth being broken, his
toenails tore off, and his genitals so badly damaged that he became impotent. The police used boiling
water and electric prods to beat his genitals for four hours until he confessed his guilt. When the real
rapist was caught, Zhao was released. But when Zhao asked for legal punishment for police who
tortured him and the procuratorate also filed prosecution against these police, the court rejected the
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cover up any incidents which could damage the image of the security organs, the CCP
ordered in 1986 that any media reports concerning the PSB and any other state functionaries
had to be approved by the CCP Central Committee or its local committees before release.
Thus the Chinese authorities have failed to introduce the most basic safeguards to
prevent torture, or to bring many torturers to justice. Safeguards against torture in law are
manifestly inadequate and anyone detained or arrested is vulnerable to such treatment. The
government's approach to investigating and prosecuting cases of reported torture is arbitrary
and inconsistent, offering impunity to members of the PSB who carry out torture. This
suggests that torture often results from institutionalised practices and official policies.57
4. Insufficient State Compensation
In a society based on the rule of law, citizens are entitled to state compensation when their
rights are infringed by state agencies. In China, however, the individuals whose personal
rights and freedoms are infringed by a state agency may not be compensated sufficiently or
at all. Since individuals' private rights and interests are all subject to the public interest, state
compensation is more symbolic than real. Shortcomings in compensation law mean that in
practice there is little to discourage state agencies from infringing people's human rights.
Since the PSB and other state agencies are not adequately monitored, victims who
file complaints to the court to review an official action are rarely granted compensation.
Sometimes lodging a complaint may bring only further abuse and infringement. Many other
administrative fiats are not under judicial check even if they are conflict with the constitution
and NPC laws. Judicial reviews are limited in both scope and effect, as is also state
compensation.
The PSB has a dual responsibility in maintaining public order and conducting
criminal investigations. According to law, if a suspect detained by the police is transferred to
the procuratorate for prosecution, and the latter brings a prosecution against the suspect to
the court, then the police action is judicial (conducting a criminal investigation), and is
immune from judicial review. But if a suspect is not brought into the judicial process, then
the police action is regarded as administrative (maintaining public order), and is subject to
judicial review.
case by issuing a verdict stating that the prosecution exceeded the time limit, and that police torture
was not necessarily a prosecutable action. In a later appeal, the police were sentenced to two years'
imprisonment with two years' suspension. Zhao's request for civil compensation was rejected. The
police remained at work in the judicial sector until July 2001. See Boxun, 4 December 2001
(www.boxun.com.hero/bigoing/4-l.shtml).
57 James C. F. Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction (6th ed.), Chapter Six:
"Reform for a Creditable Socialist Legal System," (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1999), p. 3.
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The following cases demonstrate how China's state compensation works in practice.
In November 1992, Zhao Bijian and three other men in Chongqing were detained on
suspicion of committing a crime. Zhao Bijian was forced to confess his "crime" to the police,
but later he withdrew his confession. In 1999 the court decided to acquit the four suspects
and set them free the next year. Zhao Bijian asked for 200,000 yuan in compensation for the
economic and psychological damage sustained as a result of wrongful detention, but he was
only awarded 70,000 yuan covering his direct economic loss, namely his lost wages.58
Shi Yansheng was wrongly charged with robbery in Heilongjiang and was sentenced
to death with two years' suspension (in effect, to life imprisonment). Seven family members
including his mother were charged with obstruction ofjustice and were detained for a total of
over five thousand days. Shi himself had lost nearly 14 years of freedom by the time the real
criminal was caught. However, his compensation was only 6,000 yuan, one yuan for each
day.59
In June 1995, Wang Chunyu was arrested in Tieli on suspicion of rape. His alleged
victim, who was unsure of the identity of the attacker, set fire to Wang's factory in a random
revenge. Her arson led the police to target Wang as her rapist. In May 2000, the Tieli
procuratorate dropped the charge against him because of insufficient evidence, and Wang
applied for compensation. The first court hearing ruled that he was not entitled to full
compensation on the grounds that he had "deliberately made a false confession".
In 2001, the Yichun Intermediate-Level Court accepted Wang's second application,
but decided to compensate Wang for only the 345 days' extended detention after he was
wrongly arrested, excluding the previous 210 days' detention at the police station before a
formal charge was laid. The court stated that Wang could not obtain compensation for the
pre-arrest period because he could not provide evidence to prove that his confession was by
torture or entrapment as required under article 17 of the State Compensation Law. This
article stipulates that "where citizens deliberately make a false confession or forge other
evidence to prove a crime, which results in their detention or punishment, they are not
entitled to compensation."
In these cases, the prosecutors apparently know that the evidence for the charge is
insufficient or even internally inconsistent, but they still decide to prosecute and approve the
arrest. The stipulation about a false confession is unfair because the suspects are not
58 This amount was based on a notice issued by the SPC Compensation Commission Office in 2000,
known as "Guanyu zhuanfa guojia tongjiju fuhan de tongzhi" [The notice of forwarding the reply
issued by the State Statistical Bureau]. The notice provides that economic loss should be determined
according to the annual average wage per worker in the previous year. This amount in 1999 was 8,346
yuan. Other costs were not included.
59 Fazlii ribao, 4 February 2001 [ http://www.legaldaily.com.cn).
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voluntarily undergoing interrogation or confession. A false confession usually happens when
a suspect is in custody and subject to coercive measures. The problem here is that the charge
of "deliberately making a false confession" is vague, and it is not clear which party is
responsible for producing a "false confession". This vagueness has been used by some
judicial agencies to escape legal liability for infringing citizens' rights.60
In other words, in Chinese courts, if a person makes a false confession, then the
arrest was not wrongful and no compensation is due; but if a person does not make a false
confession but is in fact guilty, then the arrest is not wrongful, and therefore even more no
compensation is due. No matter what the circumstances, a person is responsible for the way
in which he/she is treated. The only infringements caused by administrative agencies that are
included in state compensation are arbitrary detention, arrest and sentence during the judicial
process. Article 17 of the SCL provides that a detainee who has committed a minor offence
(less than a felony) is not entitled to compensation. The question of compensation arises only
when a law-enforcer breaks the law and causes damage to a person. In practice, this article
seems to convert the SCL into a law which rules out compensation since it is difficult for a
victim to prove that a law-enforcer has breached the law.
In the period from the 1990s up to the end of 2001, the people's courts handled
nearly 440,000 administrative cases and 2,566 cases for state compensation, thereby
safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of those citizens and enterprises.61 There was
an increase in this type of litigation over that decade. But the increase in this type of case is
much lower than that in other types. For example, the Shenzhen Intermediate-Level Court
only handled 13 cases for compensation in 2001, involving 500,000 yuan. Of these cases, 9
were awarded compensation involving a total of 418,000 yuan. Since 1995, this court has
accepted 31 such cases and settled 28, of which only 13 cases were compensated. The
highest compensation awarded by this court was made in 1993, when a person was wrongly
charged with rape. He was granted compensation of 70,000 yuan for the financial loss but
received no compensation for his emotional suffering and damage to his reputation.
Nationwide, a total of 1,300 suspects were found not guilty at the first trial or on appeal in a
single year in the mid-1990s, but only 30 persons got compensation.62
Citizens who are detained or arrested for crimes that they did not commit usually
suffered both financially and psychologically. Even if the state compensation is sufficient to
60 Fazhi ribao, 6 September 2002, p. 8.
61 Information Office of the State Council, "Zhongguo renquan fazhan wushi nian (baipishu)" [White
paper on the fifty years' development ofChina's human rights], in Zhongguofalii nianjian, 2002,
p. 49.
62 Ma Huide, "Guojia peichang fa san ren tan" [A discussion of the SCL among three people], Fazhi
ribao, 14 January 2001, p. 2.
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cover financial loss, there is little or no compensation for psychological damage. The
purpose of judicial review of administrative action and state compensation is to provide a
remedy for individual suffering resulting from official misconduct. The other purpose is to
punish governmental agencies and their personnel for unlawful actions. Such mechanisms
are crucial for building a state based on the rule of law. If the punishment for governmental
agencies was inappropriate, for example, the compensation awarded to the victim was too
low, which would increase administrative arbitrariness and abuse. On the other hand, if the
compensation for death as a result is high, it would put heavy pressure on the government to
reduce such cases. Thus, despite an immediate increase in the state budget for high amounts
of compensation, in the long term, there would be substantial savings in the total amount of
compensation at the same time as rule of law would be strengthened.
5. Conclusion
The cases discussed above are only a small proportion of rampant abuses of HRs by state
agencies. Government agencies, especially the PSB, enjoy a wide range of discretionary
powers which have a direct impact on citizens. In the name of reducing crime and
maintaining social order, the police frequently abuse citizens' human rights through illegal
detention, wrongful arrest, and torture. Punishments made under two administrative
measures, SI and RETL, are often longer and harsher than that under criminal law.
Although these cases differ from each other in detail, they have some common
features. Firstly, the police detain or arrest suspects while ignoring legal procedures such as
presenting their IDs, warrants, and other documents. Secondly, they ignore the principle of
assumption of innocence. They assume a suspect to be guilty and treat him or her as a
criminal from the beginning. They try every possible means including fabrication of
evidence, entrapment and torture to force a suspect to confess.
Third, the police demand co-operation from the suspects and their family members
without any respect for their human rights. In order to resolve the case, the police extend
illegal measures to suspects' family members and even to witnesses. Fourth, the PSB are the
most powerful of the three judicial organs. The procuratorate has weak supervision over the
PSB, and the courts are far from being independent in upholding and maintaining justice. In
order to protect the authority of the state judicial organs, they often co-operate and even
collude.
Finally, even when a case cannot be solved due to insufficient evidence, the suspect
may remain detained without charge or sentence for long periods. It is common for case files
to be returned to the police for re-investigation or to the original court for retrial because of
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unclear facts and insufficient evidence. However, these judicial organs which are responsible
for further investigation and correction either ignore the requests or make excuses for their
failure to produce sufficient proof, irrespective of a suspect's suffering and social justice. The
failure of China's legal system in guaranteeing a fair and just trial leads to large scale
violation of suspects' legal rights, which have seriously undermined the authority and
reputation of the legal system and people's belief in and respect for the law.
In theory, the administrative litigation law permits a person to challenge the legality
of his/her detention, torture, and wrong sentence. In practice, however, lack of access to legal
counsel inhibits the effective use of this law to obtain prompt judicial decisions. There are
thus no rights to silence for detainees and the rate of bail is low. Especially when the police
use internal regulations to exercise SI and RETL, they disregard or circumvent limits on
detention since there is poor supervision over these administrative measures. The scope for
administrative litigation is narrow and the victims face great difficulty even in bringing cases
to court.
The state compensation law provides a legal basis for citizens to recover damages
from illegal treatment. Although the majority of the Chinese people remain unaware of this
law, there is evidence that it is having some impact. However, the weakness in this law and
its enforcement has failed to protect individual rights. In sum, neither administrative redress
nor state compensation can effectively protect citizens' rights and restrict official behaviour
under current circumstances.
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Chapter Four: Abuse of Administrative Power
— Infringement of Property Rights in China's New Marketplace
It is widely believed that a market economy requires property rights to be well defined and
be enforced with sufficient predictability. In order to protect property rights, legal guarantees
are necessary, including a Weberian legal and rational mechanism required for fostering and
promoting a market mechanism. It is particularly crucial in the transition to a market
economy that the government redefines its function and gradually eliminates its interference.
That is to say, the government must exercise its power in accordance with the law and serve
the market actors as an impartial third party, and the judiciary must have the authority to
restrict administrative arbitrariness.
According to a senior U.S. judge and scholar, a state which wants to establish a legal
infrastructure centred on the protection of property rights may start by carrying out essential
legal reforms either through precise defining legal rules rather than leaving these rules open-
ended, or through focusing on the elevation of its judiciary. Any way, according to him, will
result in "a virtuous cycle" to economic development and further reform of the legal system.1
In China, legal reform is primarily designed to provide an effective legal framework for the
market economy. In order to establish a market economy, the definition and protection of
property rights is essential. In China, such rights are uncertain, unpredictable, and poorly
recognised. The main reason for the poor development of property rights may be attributed
to ideological and political constraints on modifying the ownership system.2 The need for
redefining property rights has been frequently reiterated since the introduction of economic
reforms, but this task has been hampered by the political and economic sensitivity of
reforming huge unprofitable state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the land ownership system.
For a long time, the Chinese concept of rights was closely connected with the state and
collective interests, leading to the neglect and rejection the concept ofproperty rights.
With fast emergence of diversified interests from the economic reforms, there have
been many disputes involving property rights. Scholars like Liu Junning, Ji Weidong and
Zhang Weiying have called for a revision of the constitution and laws in order to build up a
1 Richard A. Posner, "Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development", address at the World
Bank Workshop on Legal Reform on 14 April 1997, World Bank Research Observer, 13:1 (February
1998), acc. 3 January 2001 (http://wbro.oupjournals.org).
2 Jean C. Oi & Andrew G. Walder (eds.), Property Rights and Economic Reform in China (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 13.
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network of legal protection for various property rights. They advocate the acknowledgement
and protection of property rights as the cornerstone for establishing a market economy.3
Although the government and some laws emphasise protecting property rights enjoyed by all
kinds of market actors, there are no constitutional and institutional safeguards for doing so.
Therefore, governmental agencies and officials at all levels remain ignorant of this right and
continue to interfere in market operations. Infringement of property rights in a newly
emerging marketplace is widespread.
The main types of infringement are: (1) infringing farmers' property rights to land
contracts through, for example, forceful land appropriation without legal procedures and fair
compensation; (2) infringing various enterprises' rights and interests through intervening in
their autonomous operation and imposing arbitrary penalties; (3) hampering free market
competition through control over many important industries, which restricting the
development of private property rights and infringing the interests of general public.
1. Farmers' property rights to land contracts
PRC land is divided into two parts: state-owned land in urban areas and some rural land
expropriated by the state according to law, and collective-owned land mainly in vast rural
areas. Since the economic reform began, villagers have had the right to contract a piece of
land [tudi chengbao jingying quan, A:.Mi TpC fA AAl 't=i ], and they are entitled to use the
assigned land to grow crops or vegetables, but they cannot dispose it, for example, to transfer
or sell it. According to the 1999 revised land law, farmers as a whole have collective land
ownership, and the Collective Economic Organisations [jiti jingji zuzhi, £R] or
Villagers' Committees [cunmin weiyuanhui, and Villagers' Groups [cunmin
xiaozu, are entrusted to manage and administer collective-owned land.4 It is
unclear whether these three institutions also have ownership rights to land, and it is nowhere
stipulated that they can legally represent farmers' collective rights, exercise ownership rights
or reap the profits from ownership.
3 For example, Ji Weidong, "Zhongguo xianfa gaige de tujing yu caichanquan wenti" [The problem of
property rights and the way of China's constitutional reform], Dangdai Zhongguo yanjiu, no. 3 (1999),
pp. 26-53; Zhang Weiying, Qiye de qiyejia: qiyue lilun [Enterprises' entrepreneurs: contract theory]
(Shanghai: Shanghai renrnin chubanshe, 1995), chapter three; Liu Junning, "Feng neng jin, yu neng
jin, guowang bu neng jin: zhengzhi lilun shiye zhong de caichanquan yu renlei wenming" [The wind
can come in, rain can come in, but the king cannot come in: property rights and human civilisation in
the perspective of political theory], in Gonggong luncong: zhiyouyu shequn [Public forum: freedom
and the community] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1998), pp. 141-148.
4
Arts. 8 and 10 of Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tudi guanli fa [PRC land management law], effected
in 1 January 1999. In Luo Haocai and Sun Wanzhong (eds.), Zhonghua renmin gongheguo faku [A
comprehensive collections of PRC laws] (Beijing: Renmin fayuan chubanshe, 2002), vol. 7,
Administrative Laws : part four, pp. 4865-4874.
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The land law defines the ownership of rural land as shared between three holders: the
Villagers' Committee, the villagers' group, and the township. Like state ownership, it is not
clear who is legally entitled to the ownership of land. Thus, this law still leaves collective
ownership unresolved although it gives the impression of having done so. The main reason
for vague collective ownership is the sensitivity of this topic. As Peter Ho notes, the central
government fears a clarification of land ownership will cause great increase in land disputes
and thus affect social stability.5 With the economic reforms progressing, many weaknesses in
this legal structure have been revealed. The imprecise definition of collective ownership is
the underlying cause of arable land loss, as basic level government such as township or
county governments sell land for profits in the wave of land development.
In practice, it is the village committees that act as the representative of collective
ownership, co-operating with the township or county government to exercise land
appropriation. This assignment of land property rights leads to conflicts between lower-level
government and farmers. As Xiaolin Guo concludes, local county and township governments
show a great initiative to enforce land expropriation in order to gain promising revenue while
showing not much interest in renewing land contracts, and the difference of revenue in land
development shows "why the central policy on the renewal of land contracts was postponed
while land expropriation was so enthusiastically pursued."6
It maybe reasonable for vague regulations regarding land contract system due to the
changeable situation in the economic reform, but "the deliberate nature of the institutional
ambiguity becomes apparent in the ownership shifts of collective land."7 It is obviously that
to define land ownership as "collective" is comply with socialist ownership system, and if
farmers become the owner of their land, the whole privatisation in rural area will start. In
terms of vast size of China's countryside, this will bring great concern to the regime of rural
disorder and damage to socialist ideology. However, this vagueness of collective ownership
has resulted in continuous land expropriation and breach of farmers' land contract in the
name of land planning and construction. China's farmers in fact have not property rights to
their land.
Land reform in China does not adopt widespread privatisation as some former
socialist countries do, according to Ho, rather, it is conducted from top to down controlled by
the government with limited freedom in land market, allowing only leasing and transferring
5 Peter Ho, "Who Owns China's Land?—Policies, Property Rights and Deliberate Institutional
Ambiguity", The China Quarterly, no. 166 (June, 2001), p. 407.
6 Xiaoliu Guo, "Land Expropriation and Rural Conflicts in China", The China Quarterly, no. 166
(June 2001), p. 438.
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users' rights to land.8 Thus the regime attempts to promote economic growth while at the
same time not sacrificing the existing ideology regarding state and collective land ownership.
This attitude will make it difficult to resolve the problem underlying land system.
The expropriation of rural land for urban construction and rural development has become a
serious concern since land reforms started in the late 1980s. Millions ofmu of farm land has
been commandeered. The recession in rural industry and financial pressure on local
governments have also prompted the growth of "development zones" in county and town
levels10.
According to the land law, land expropriation is a governmental action and should
be exercised by the government at county level or above." The purpose of this action is for
public interests in need of constructive land both in urban and rural areas, and the user of
expropriated land must pay compensation for his action according to the standard in land law.
At the same time, however, the state law empowers governments at all levels to make
particulars for carrying out land expropriation in terms of actual conditions of their regions.
Abuses of this stipulation are common. In practice, individual officials, town and village
authorities, and even the construction units of a project, have made such requisitions.12
According to the head of the State Land Bureau, Pan Mingcai, the main forms of such illegal
practices include requisition of land without superior approval, excessive requisition,
approving requisition beyond legal authority, and illegal transference of the requisitioned
land for other uses at a high profit.13
Coercive measures by the police and other agencies are often used during the
appropriation process, such as banging on the doors late at night to force farmers to sign
unfair compensation agreements, roving around in utility vehicles in the fields destroying
crops, and even detaining "diaomin " [canny and crafty people, <J [?c] according to local
officials. For example, in 2000, a town government in Zhejiang sent the police to forcibly
appropriate a total of 453 mu of cultivated land for a housing development. In 1999, village
cadres in Gansu sold 119 mu in batches for building a private factory. A town in Hunan took
7 Peter Ho, p. 400.
8
Ho, p. 396.
9 A traditional unit of area; one mu is equal to 0.165 acre.
10 Xiaoliu Guo, p. 424.
1 Art. 40 of 1988 Land law, in Editorial committee for textbook of legal science (ed.), Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo changyong falii quanshu [A complete collection of PRC laws] (Beijing: Falii
chubanshe, 1988), pp. 504-512; and art. 46 of 1999 land law.
12 Chen Fang, "Qi ke lanyong zhengdi quan: yi fen zhengdi de diaocha" [How could the right of
requisition of land be misused: a survey of land requisition], Banyue tan, no. 18 (2002), p. 36.
13 Ibid.
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over a total of 2,000 mu within four years, of which 250 mu of arable land was treated as
"wasteland".14
Under the 1988 land law, the legal standard for compensation for loss of crops was
three to six times the value of the average annual output of the land calculated over the three
years prior to expropriation.15 Under the 1999-revised law, the amount of compensation has
increased to six to ten times the value.16 In practice, however, the compensation for land
appropriation was always at the lowest rate provided by law. In some places, compensation
was not given directly to each household whose land was taken, but was distributed among
towns, villages and villagers' groups and even paid in arrears.
For instance, the Fuzhou municipal government accumulated 40 million yuan of unpaid
compensation for appropriaeded land over four years. In August 2000, the Jinzhou
government in Hubei appropriated over 300 mu of land from a village in Shashi to build a
highway which had no approval from the State Council. The compensation was 6,000 to
8,000 yuan per mu, although according to the average annual production over the three
previous years, the income from per mu of appropriated land was around 30,000 yuan per
mu. In Longyou, Zhejiang, several hundred mu of land, originally a prosperous and
environmentally-friendly market garden, was taken away from farmers, and the
compensation was 625.9 yuan per mu.iS However, the price per mu actually was over 12,000
yuan per mu according to law and the local rate. The actual value per mu, in terms of the
market demand for vegetable produce, was even higher than the stipulated standard.
As a result of massive and continuous land expropriation, huge numbers of rural
people lost their livelihood without the possibility of alternative employment. At the same
time, the state and local government agencies imposed heavy taxes and levies in the
countryside. These governmental actions have caused frequent conflict between rural areas
and local administrations, even leading to outbreaks of violence. Farmers consider that the
government has deprived them of their basic living resources without fair compensation.
They accuse the local administrations of exercising power without authority. Riots in rural
areas have been frequently reported in recent years.1 Farmers have become the most
underprivileged group in contemporary China, their interests frequently infringed by almost
14 ibid, p. 37.
15 Art. 27 of 1988 land law.
u> Article 47 of 1999 revised land law.
17
Boxun1 8 January 2002 (http://www.boxun.com.cn).
18 "Dianfu fading zhengdi buchang biaozhun" [To overthrow the legal standard of compensation for
land acquisition], Renmin fayuan bao, 9 October 2002 (http://www.rmfyb.com).
19 For example, farmers in Willow Gully, Shandong, had a violent conflict with law enforcement
officials during protesting forceful tax collection. The Independent, Thursday, 4 April (2002), p. 14.
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all other sectors of society. It seems that rural areas and farmers have been left outside
China's prosperity and modernisation.
The right to contract farmland is also frequently infringed or even ignored by local
officials. One such case is what happened to Zhao Yurong in Fuyang, Anhui. Zhao signed a
contract with the Villagers' Committee (VC) in 1994 to operate 1.721 mu of land for a term
of 30 years. Zhao's husband was employed by the Huaibei Coal Bureau and had urban
residency right in Fuyang. In early 1992 he had been granted the right to transfer his family's
urban residency as a bonus for having worked over 10 years. At this point, Zhao and her
children paid a fee of 500 yuan each as a levy to ease the strain on urban facilities. Under
local regulations, people who paid a levy for urban residency were still permitted to contract
farmland in their native village on the condition that they continued to live in the village
despite their urban residency rights.20
However, the VC Party Secretary claimed that Zhao had deceived them when she
signed the contract and declared the contract void. In 1995, the village cadres stopped Zhao
from collecting the harvest on the grounds that she had changed her residence registration.
Zhao was forced to return the contract to the VC and the wheat on her land was confiscated.
In the summer of the following year, Zhao was prevented from gathering the harvest by a
VC document which declared that any attempt to do so would be treated as theft of collective
property. When her 74 year-old father-in-law tried to gather the harvest, he was detained for
four days and nights before breaking a window and escaping.
Zhao sued the VC in August 1996. The court ruled that her contract was valid and
that the VC should compensate Zhao for two years' yield of wheat. The VC appealed, and
Zhao lost her case on appeal. Later, she petitioned against the appeal decision with the local
procuratorate which had the power to contest court decisions. The local procuratorate
accepted her petition in 1999, and filed a case against the appeal decision in December 2000.
The final trial affirmed the court's decision at the first trial. However, the compensation for
Zhao fixed at the first trial was only 3304.95 yuan, which covered her losses in 1995 and
1996, and did not cover her economic losses between 1996 and 2000.
Behind such apparently arbitrary practices, there are tremendous economic interests
propelling local authorities to expropriate land. These interests include increase in revenue,
administrative funds and profits for group officials. During this process, farmers who rely on
the land for a living turn out to be least compensated. Sometimes, officials even breach other
public interests, such as environmental protection, national laws, and superior regulations. A
20
Zhang Yan and Liu Peijun, "Nongfu qi nian susong" [A female farmer's seven-year litigation],
Fazhi ribao, 5 November 2002, p. 5.
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comparison of the distribution of income from land development illustrates the exploitative
nature of land expropriation.21
Land expropriation is a matter of unilateral action by government agencies. It
ignores farmers' interests and is an unequal transference of land property rights. The unclear
definition of farmers' land rights results in their interests being widely infringed. The public
interest is the major ground for expropriation of land. However, since the scope of the public
interest is broad and vague, most such actions are taken more for particular interests than for
the public interest. Many different kinds of projects take rural land while the compensation is
not paid in accordance with the law and the market. The distribution of compensation is also
unfair and lacks transparency.22 Both officials in the state land department and scholars
criticise flaws in land expropriation with respect to compensation, in that standards are
decided in the planned economy, rather than in the market. Because of differences in price
and yield, it is in practice difficult to standardise average output.
The government plays an active role in reassigning land property rights. According
to law, the village collective has the right to use and supervise the use of land, but it has no
right to transfer land for compensatory use. The state, on the other hand, may, in accordance
with the law, expropriate land which is under collective ownership if this is in the public
interest.23 In this assignment of property rights, land development proceeds in two steps: land
expropriation by the government from villages, and the transfer of users' rights priced
according to their market value. Land expropriation, in a sense, is a procedure by which all
rights formerly held by the village collective are relinquished to the local government.24
The insecurity in the land contract system will prove harmful to China's economic growth. It
suggests that the Chinese government is not committed to guaranteeing property rights as a
precondition for development, but regards the structure of property rights as the natural
outcome of social evolution resulting from the economic reforms. In this respect,
privatisation in state and collective ownership cannot be brought about through institutional
efforts but only gradually guided under the proper socio-economic and legal conditions.25
21 Xiaoliu Guo, p. 439.
22
"Zhengdi zhidu fei gai bu ke le" [The system of land expropriation must be reformed at once],
Department of Propaganda of the CCP Central Committee via Xinhua News Agency: Ban yue tan, no.
18 (2002), pp. 39-41.
23 Art. 2 of 1999 land law.
24 Xiaoliu Guo, pp. 424-445.
25 Peter Ho, p. 398.
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2. Infringing on enterprises' property rights
In order to foster a market economy based on property rights and a modern enterprise system,
the government has many functions to perform in managing and guiding the economy, but
these functions must be legalised and the administration must be transparent, open, and fair.
The government must not over-regulate, manipulate, or intervene arbitrarily in the
economy.26 However, on the grounds of "regulating the market" and "macro control", the
Chinese government regularly intervenes in the economy without aware of the interests of
private sector so widespread that it is undermining market development.
For example, governmental agencies have the power to approve or issue business
licences, and to confirm professional qualifications and industrial standards. They also have
the power to impose fines, cancel registration of enterprises, hold properties and even detain
people. They control prices in important industries and hamper free competition in the
market. They also interfere in the judicial process in their jurisdictions. The expanding of
administrative power is common in modern societies, the problem is how to exercise these
wide discretion by following legal rules without abuse of this power.
A competitive market requires the government to be an impartial rule enforcer. At
the same time, China's reform model emphasises an authoritarian government to enforce
universal reform measures. Thus, there is a conflict between the requirement for a limited
government in a market economy and for a powerful government in reform. Since
governmental agencies at different levels have complicated connections with overlapping
interests, it is difficult for them to remain neutral in making and enforcing rules. A higher-
level agency may show a favourable bias towards its subject agencies and enterprises.
Sometimes the regulating agency itselfmay be a market actor.
Thus, it is common for governmental agencies to encroach on private property rights.
Local and departmental protectionism has become a major element for undermining market
integration and property rights. The arbitrary exercise or abuse of power mainly happens in
procedures involving administrative licensing or enforcing penalties. Almost every aspect of
business operations needs to be approved by administrative agencies.
For example, in preparation for China's entry into the WTO, a rectification of
administrative measures was carried out in some regions. It was found that thousands of
items in each region for which administrative approval could be dispensed with: 2027 in
Shanghai, 1106 in Chongqing, and 2308 in Zhengzhou. Although government agencies at all
26
Qian Yinyi, "Market Economy and the Rule of Law", Perspectives, 1:5 (10 May 2000)
(http://www.oycf.org/Perspectives/5_043000/modern_market_economy_and_the_ru.htm).
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levels reduced the number of items requiring approval by up to 50%, systematic reform is
unlikely to take place without specific legal restrictions on these agencies.27
Yang Jinyu, the head of the legal affairs office of the State Council, has identified
five problems connected with administrative approvals. (1) Too many agencies that have no
authority for approvals, such as village or county governments, and internal branches of
administrative agencies, are exercising such power in practice. (2) The scope for approval is
too broad, and the stipulations for approval are vague and dispersed. The practical
administration emphasises checks and approval while less stress is given to service and
protection. (3) The process for obtaining administrative approval is time-consuming,
involving complicated and obscure internal procedures. (4) Even when approval is obtained,
there is no guarantee of an orderly market and fair competition because of lack of effective
supervision. (5) Some administrative agencies use the power of approval as a means of
pursuing profits, so that administrative approval has become a major source of corruption.28
For example, officials may pursue private interests through approving loans or quotas; they
may take bribes for conferring project contracts, land leases and tax privileges; they make
deals in approving rural residents' transfer to urban residency, issuing visas for permanent
residency in Hong Kong or Macao, or through allocation of tight resources; they may also
pursue profits through approving cadre recruitment, transfer and promotion, and even sell
official posts.29
Governmental departments often come into conflict with each other for fighting to
exercise an administrative approval. In Jinan, Shandong, there have been over 70 incidents
involving jurisdictional conflicts between different agencies, causing problems in local
construction. For example, the Jinan technical supervision bureau for quality control and the
Department of Construction Administration both exercised their power to check and test
construction equipment at the same time, leading to the same equipment being double-
checked and charged. The technical supervision bureau claimed that the construction
department's action was illegal and imposed a penalty against them. As a result, the
construction work had to be suspended for 18 months before the relevant authority
intervened.30
27 Zha Qingjiu, "Ru shi yu Zhongguo de xingzheng fazhi" [The entry of the WTO and China's
administrative legal system], People's Daily, 13 December 2001, (http://www.peopledaily.com.cn).
28 NPC news website, 26 August 2002 (www.npcnews.com.cn).
29 Ibid.
30 Du Gangjian, "E'zhi xingzheng xuke de fanlan" [To curb rampant administrative approval],
Zhongguo jingji shibao, 21 September 2002 (www.cet .com.cn/20020921 l.htm).
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Powers of licensing and enforcing penalties have serious consequences for people's personal
freedom and property rights.3' This power is expanding through lack of effective supervision
from constitutional and judicial sources. Although administrative hearings have been
introduced in the price-fixing sector, in practice, a hearing may not be more than a formality,
in that the legal procedures for the hearing may not be observed.
For example, a hearing held in 2002 about the price of Beijing subway fares was
closed to the media, and the whole process became an internal matter. The subway company
told the journalists that the Price Bureau would decide the fare but the final decision on fares
and attendance at the hearing was up to the Propaganda Department. However, the
Propaganda officials told the journalists that it was an internal hearing, for the purpose of
gathering evidence from transport experts, the Price Bureau, the subway company and other
agencies to draft a proposal on price before going public; and that opening the hearing to the
media would hamper decision-making.32
Professor Ying Songnian, the president of the State Administrative College, pointed
out that a hearing was not a decision-making process and that its main purpose was to
explain the basis on which fares would be decided. He claimed that a genuine hearing should
be conducted in public, where all parties should have a chance to make statements
representing their particular interests.33
Arbitrary and growing administrative interference has seriously undermined the
growth of all kinds of market forces. Enterprises' autonomy and property rights are
frequently infringed in practice. For example, in May 1998, the Lingyi Chemical Company
signed a lease with the Lingyi county economic commission to operate a cement factory. The
term of the lease was five years. But when the factory started to make profits, some officials
in the county government colluded to find fault with it, tore up the lease and closed it down
in order to take it over themselves.34
In other cases, some local governments deliberately sacrificed private investors'
interests by taking advantage of enterprise ownership reform to help state-owned enterprises
escape tremendous debts. For example, the Liangzhong government in Sichuan transferred 3
million yuan of debts incurred by a local state-owned pharmaceutical factory to a private
company in 1997. Then by virtue of its administrative power, the Liangzhong government
31 Ma Huide, "Guifan xingzheng xingwei: fangzhi fubai de biyouzhilu" [It is the only way to prevent
corruption by regulating administrative actions], Jiancha ribao, 13 September 2000
(http://www.icrb.com.cn/ournews/asp/readnews.asp?id=3411).
32
Tong Fuyong, "Jiage tingzheng hui liuyu xingshi?" [Is the price hearing turning out to be a
formality?], Zhongguo jingji shibao, 2 September 2002, p. 3.
33 Ibid.
34 Fazhi ribao, 30 November 2002, p. 1.
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dissolved the private company, claiming that it was unable to repay its debts, and forced it
into liquidation.
In this case, the private company went to court in May 1998, claiming that the local
government infringed its right of autonomous operation. The court was reluctant to accept
the case and soon rejected it on the grounds that the government had the jurisdiction over
matters concerning local SOE assets, creditors' rights and debts during the reform of
enterprise ownership. When the company appealed to the Nancong intermediate level court,
its general manager was detained on the charge of driving an unregistered vehicle by the
local PSB for over one year before he was released on bail. The manager then found that his
company had been ordered to dissolve in spite of there being no legal basis under company
law.35
Firms engaged in foreign direct investment (FDI) have repeatedly complained about
the poor legal environment for doing business in China. FDI has penetrated every corner of
the Chinese market since the open-door policy was introduced, from joint ventures,
technology transfers, export manufacturing and public securities to construction, real estate,
heavy industry, finance and telecommunications. However, to the foreign investor, Chinese
laws are vaguely drafted, misapplied, and arbitrarily enforced. China's administrative legal
system, in particular, seems incoherent and even contradictory with respect to encouraging
foreign investment.36
A suggestion made by the Hong Kong Trade and Development Council (TDC) in
2000 may explain the concern of foreign investors. The TDC suggested that the central
government should maintain a higher level of stability and transparency in policies and
regulations, simplify judicial and arbitration procedures, contain the interference of
administrative departments in the judicial system, increase the legal awareness of officials at
all levels, and prevent corruption. In relation to administration, the TDC hope that the
government will reduce formalities in the examination, approval and registration of investing
projects, unify different local practices, gradually set up a commercial administration system
in line with international standards, enhance administrative efficiency, and improve the
quality of investment "software".37
35 "Ruci gaizhi, hai ren bu qian" [A great damage results from such a reform of the ownership], Fazhi
ribao, 30 December 2000, p. 5.
36 Peter Howard Come, Foreign Investment in China: The Administrative Legal System (New York:
Trans-national Publishers, 1997). Book review by Robb M Lakritz
(www.law.emoy.edu/EILR/volumes/spg97/LAKAR.html).
37 The Hong Kong Trade Development Council, 22 May 2000
(http://www.tdctrade.com/tdcnews/0005/00052201 .htm).
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Although the Administrative Litigation Law (the ALL) permits economic actors,
including foreign investors, to challenge the legality of governmental decisions, the limits in
this law deter the affected parties from seeking legal protection.38 Moreover, administrative
laws tend to strengthen governmental power. For instance, the requirements for the
formation and operation of foreign enterprises reflect the control of the state. The state
controls the approval and supervision of foreign investment projects, foreign exchange and
taxation through an investment incentive system and tax preferences. For this benefit, FDI
enterprises must submit documentation indicating income and tax due before the incentive
adjustments are made. Also, in "export oriented" or "advanced technology" status, these
enterprises must establish export figures and the conditions of technology use. The state
seeks to strengthen its capacity to obtain information on the financial conditions, sale
activities, and technology base of foreign investment projects.39
Another case shows how a joint venture is affected by China's uncertain
administrative law enforcement and local protectionism.40 In 1996, a district Industrial and
Commercial Administrative Bureau (ICAB) in Shanghai decided to re-structure a bonded
zone within its jurisdiction. During this action, the bureau ordered a Sino-foreign joint
venture to move out of the zone, to re-purchase a site in the zone and to register again with
the bureau. When the company did not accept the order, its operational licence was
confiscated and its annual industrial check was suspended. In August 1998, the bureau
revoked its license claiming that the company failed to accept the annual check. The
company was unaware of this sanction until 2001 when it became involved in a civil action
and found that it was unqualified as a litigant.
The company then filed an administrative lawsuit at the district court. The court
found against it, an appeal followed, and the appeal was also rejected. In this case, the
defendant (the bureau) illegally withdrew an operational licence from a joint venture
company. According to the relevant laws in regard to the registration of a foreign enterprise,
the state Industrial and commercial Administrative Bureau (ICAB) is the management
agency, and the local bureau only has the authority to register it and not the power to impose
any sanction such as revoking a licence.41 In other words, the local bureau cannot impose
such a penalty unless it has been empowered to do so.
38 Pitman B. Potter, "Foreign Investment Law in the PRC: Dilemmas of State Control", in Stanley
Lubman (ed.), China's Legal Reforms (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 155-185.
39
Potter, ibid, p. 173.
40 Hou Jie, "Women li 'yi fa xingzheng' haiyou duo yuan?" [How far are we from 'administration in
accordance with law'?], Guo fa wang, 29 Argust 2002 (www.law.com.cn/pg/newsshow.php?id=2265).
41 Article 64 of "Qiye faren dengji guanli shishi xize" [The particulars concerning the management
and registration of legal persons in the form of enterprises] and article 1 of the ICAB "Guanyu jinyibu
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The defendant also failed to provide a public hearing for such a serious case. The
administrative penalty law and the Shanghai municipal hearing procedure stipulate that a
hearing must be held according to legal procedures before a serious penalty is imposed. The
local bureau failed to send a hearing notification to the company. The only notification was
issued by its superior, the Shanghai municipal bureau. It was published in a local newspaper
and displayed in the municipal bureau courtyard, addressed to all enterprises that had not
accepted annual checks for its operation and financial status, and not specifically issued to
this company.
Thus the bureau exceeded its authority and failed to observe legal procedures in
revoking the company's licence. The courts in both instances ignored this fact and upheld the
bureau's decision. Over three thousands enterprises were affected by such sanctions on the
day that the notice was issued. To maintain social stability in line with Party concern, the
courts tend to protect the reputation of administrative agencies at the expense of the legal
rights of enterprises.
In most circumstances, local protectionism plays an important role in breaching
property rights. The next case illustrates collusion between officialdom (including the
judiciary) and local businessmen in infringing the interests of a foreign enterprise. In 1992
and 1993, the Hong Kong Lihua Investment Ltd. and the Zhuzhou Tailian Housing
Developing Ltd. signed an agreement to establish two joint ventures, the Taihua Housing
Development Ltd. and the Tianli Interior Decoration Company.
Liu Guanghui managed the new joint venture, Tianli, for the Chinese side. He
controlled all information in relation to Tianli's operation, including its financial documents.
He refused to follow decisions made by the Board of Directors, and failed to allocate any
profits to Lihua (the Hong Kong side). At the same time, he embezzled Tianli's money,
seriously undermining the new venture and Lihua's rights and interests.
After efforts to resolve this problem through consultation failed, Lihua filed an
application for arbitration to China's International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission (CIETAC) in 1997, together with an application to seal Tianli's books.
However, Liu colluded with the judge, Li Guobing, who was in charge of the evidence, to
move the evidence out of Li's office. Then Liu instructed over ten accountants, including
some from the local accountancy agency, and some tax officials to alter books to destroy the
evidence.
mingque waishang touzhi qiye dengji guanli gongzuo zhize youguan wenti de tongzhi" [The notice on
relevant problems concerning a further confirmation of managing the registration work of foreign
enterprises]. See Zhongguofaxue hui website (http://www.lawchina.com.cn/engIish/fagui/fal.htm).
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At the same time, Liu called upon local hooligans to take over another company
solely owned by Lihua in Zhuzhou. The company was forced to stop operation and all
personnel and staff were threatened with dismissal. None of the relevant authorities (the
local government, Party committee, departments in charge of foreign investment and judicial
departments) provided protection for the foreign investor's interests. On the contrary, the
municipal government issued a document in which the incident was attributed to a long¬
standing conflict between the two sides. The document did not condemn Liu, whose next
move was to take over another joint venture, Taihua. As his hooligans moved, over one
hundred policemen and some governmental officials stood by without attempting to
intervene. In 2001, Liu began to sell residences developed by Taihua at a cheap price.
In spite of Lihua's repeated appeals to the Zhuzhou authority since July 2001, there
has been no response from the official side. The situation in Taihua remained unchanged. As
early as 2000, an audit of Tianli provided clear evidence of Liu's fraud, showing that at least
11,814,082 yuan had been embezzled, and that taxes of 2,311,991.'74 yuan had been evaded.
In spite of all this, the local authority insisted that the case was an internal conflict
concerning operational affairs of the joint venture.
The complicity of the local authorities made Liu more and more arrogant. He
claimed that nobody in Zhuzhou, neither the mayor nor the Communist Party, could handle
him and that he was a villain and could shut out the heavens with one hand. In September
2001, the vice-mayor of Zhuzhou even ordered Taihua to dissolve, on the grounds that the
Chinese side of the joint venture had made such an application.
This is a serious case of infringing foreign investors' interests. The local Party
Committee, the government, and the court exerted their power to interfere in the local
economy. The court, which is subject to local administrative power, had no authority to
resolve the dispute. On the contrary, it directly participated in the illegal act.42 This also
revealed serious abuse of power within the local officialdom.
In comparison to all other types of enterprises, private enterprises find it difficult to
survive. The next case shows that even in governmental purchases, where the government
acts as an ordinary buyer under civil law, the decision-making process is arbitrary and lacks
transparency. Governmental purchases are poorly regulated and the government always
dominates, resulting in breaches of contracts and causing great loss to other tenders.
The Jinghua Yidi Medical Equipment Company in Zhejiang is a private enterprise. In July
2000, it decided to take part in a tender competition for medical equipment launched by the
42 Lihua zai xian, 18 September 2002 (http:// www.liliuaonline.com/ajiT/dxal.htm).
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Agricultural Ministry, publicised in the Economic Daily and the China Tender News.4i The
company considered that the competition would be fair since the sponsor was a state
ministry. Since it had a long history and a good reputation for its goods, the company was
full of confidence that it would win the contract on the item for which it was bidding.
After spending 3,800 yuan for a one-page tender document and 30,000 yuan for the
guarantees, the company formally entered its bid. At the tender meeting, the officials in
charge stressed that the tender would be conducted according to law. After going through all
procedures, the company became the top contender for its low price and good quality. In
January 2001, Ministry experts and officials inspected the factory and gave it their approval.
In February, however, the company was instructed to send three sets of sample equipment
for further inspection. In May the inspection report stated that one of three samples did not
comply with the bid standard.
The company did not believe the report because it had made repeated inspections
and tests before sending these samples to Beijing. Moreover, there were some irregular
points in the inspection report: it was not signed or dated, and the standards and facilities
were not specified. The report did not comply with the state's requirements for the inspection
of product quality. The company requested a second check but was refused because the
terms of the tender had been changed. The company received no compensation for its loss.
Thus a governmental agency arbitrarily changed the tender irrespective of the interests of
other parties involved. It turned out that the Ministry had already signed a contract with
another company.
According to the regulations on tender, the assessment committee should comprise
an odd number of experts, and each expert should have over 8 years of professional
experience. In this case, however, there were 24 experts on the committee, and the report did
not list their qualifications. Moreover, there were only two bidders for this particular item,
and according to regulations, the process was invalid and a new round of tender was
necessary since there were only two companies making bids, it was illegal for either to be
awarded the contract. However, the Ministry signed a contract with the other party. Here, the
Ministry performed a double role as buyer and assessor at the same time. The effective
period of a tender is within 120 days from the date of opening, but the result of the tender
was only made public a full year later.
43 "Shui lai jiandu 'yangguang caigou': quanguo shouli zhengfu caigou an zhuizong" [Who will
supervise the "(government) purchase under the sun": An investigation of the first case in China
concerning governmental purchase], Xinhua wang (Hangzhou), 13 June 2002
(http://news.xinhuanet.com).
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Governmental purchase programs are required to be transparent. But illegal practices
including undue and unfair procedures, high charges, arbitrary interference, and even fraud
and corruption overshadow government purchasing. Frequently the winner for the tender is
not the best-qualified party. In this case, the winner turns out to be a company that had no
such product, no registration for medical equipment, and no licence for this product.
In connection with the separation between land ownership and users' rights in rural
areas, the government started with SOEs' ownership and operation rights. The property rights
of enterprises are divided into three kinds: rights of operation [jingying quart, jX], rights
of contract [chengbao quart, fX] and rights of lease [zulin quart, fEjSjX]. The term
operational right was used in order to comply with the socialist ownership system. In this
way, the SOEs may only have the rights to use and manage the enterprises without rights of
market transaction of their property rights. The ownership [suoyouquan, here is
equivalent to the term "property rights" in the West, but China deliberately leaves the two
concepts vague in order to maintain its socialist ideology.
However, Chinese scholars suggested that the term "legal person's property right"
[faren caichan suoyouquan, SAMAjX], in distinction to state ownership, should be
used in order to acknowledge the SOEs' property rights. In this way, the SOEs may not only
have operational and management rights but also have the rights to make transactions of
their property in the market. At the same time, SOEs remains state assets and the ownership
rights belongs to the state while the enterprises become a legally established entity, a legal
person, to go to the market on the behalf of the state. The law used the concept of a
"representative" scheme to separate property rights and ownership. In this way, the state
became an investor and shareholder by entrusting property rights to enterprises, while the
latter became the agent for state property and obtained a legal person's property rights. The
SOEs were thus entitled to autonomous operation and to the pursuit of profits without
enjoying ownership.
This transformation of SOEs' rights from operational rights to legal person's property
rights has touched an important socialist principle in which public ownership is inviolable
and may not be infringed. However, there must be legal guarantees to safeguard enterprises'
property rights against claims from a third party in order for the property rights to enter into
the market and also to be enforced through judicial procedures. This requires that private
property rights be established through revising the constitution. Yet, this will endanger the
current ideology and political goals.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is greatly encouraged by the Chinese government.
Laws and regulations promoting FDI are many. Non-public enterprises have also been
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regarded as an important supplement in the socialist economy. The 1999 revised constitution
even elevated individual and private businesses to a position of "important actors in the
market economy and major representatives of China's non-public ownership." It declares
that the state will protect the lawful rights and interests of this category.
However, the revision of the constitution did not accept the scholars' suggestion that
the state refrain from intervention in private enterprises. Instead, the constitution repeatedly
stresses that the state must administer and supervise the non-public economy. It did not
define a private economy or adopt the expression "protecting private property rights". The
revision ended up as a compromise among different power groups, and even went backward
in some areas. The amendment of the constitution leaves the problem of property rights
unresolved. As in land reform, this vagueness was deliberate and institutional in order to
maintain both the dominant ideology in ownership and flexibility during the economic
reforms.
The unclear definition of property rights and the private economy provides
consistent flexibility for administrative intervention in the enterprises' operation and for
infringing their property rights. Without institutional safeguards for property rights, no
matter how the state endeavours to regulate and guide them, it is hard for private property to
flourish. At the same time, if the non-public economy in practice proves to be more efficient
and competitive, the problem of whether the dominant position of public ownership still
needs to be maintained will confront the authorities. If the answer is yes, the market
economy will suffer; if the answer is no, the socialist system will be undermined.
The main task of China's economic reform is to introduce a market mechanism based
on mutual agreements and performance of contracts. But this mutual acknowledgement does
not automatically make the property rights secure, rather, their safety and expansion depend
on state protection. The unresolved problems of definition and content of property rights in
the constitution create disorder and abuses in administrative and judicial practices,
undermining the emerging market economy.
Once the state legalises property rights, its arbitrary intervention over all kinds of
enterprises would be restricted. In China, this problem is very complicated since it relates
directly to the sensitive topics of the current political system and ideology. The
incompatibility between the changing socio-economic structure and the Leninist style state is
becoming more and more apparent.
There is one other difficult task facing the state potential conflicts between social
justice and private property rights. It is unclear whether the rule of law will safeguard fair
play during the allocation of profits. On the one hand, from a formal point of view, if the law
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fails to provide protection for private property, the latter would be subject to administrative
power and become political capital. However, since political capital amounts to corruption, it
would be improper for the law to protect such property.
On the other hand, from a substantive point of view, since the rule of law requires
state power to be neutral in the market economy, a limited government and an autonomous
society are necessary, with governmental functions being limited during re-allocation of
social profits. However, since a great gap between the rich and poor has emerged in the new
Chinese market, it is important for the government to decrease this gap through social
welfare. Once the state steps into this process, it will be difficult for the government to
maintain neutrality.44
Without effective control, government intervention will create abuses of
administrative power. Thus it is necessary to rely on administrative laws and judicial review
to restrict state authorities. The judicial review over administrative actions and regulations
should be strengthened. Since interest groups in China are still relatively few in number, the
judicial review is especially important in keeping the government neutral and impartial. In
this area, judicial review will go a long way in reducing the current legal chaos and
improving the status of the judiciary.
3. Administrative monopoly and control
In addition to frequent interference in the economy and infringement of property rights, the
government directly manipulates important industries such as transport, telecommunication
and the share market, not allowing free competition. Administrative monopoly refers to the
practice in which government agencies or SOEs, by taking advantage of their public powers,
deliberately limit or exclude private capital's participation in certain industries that are solely
controlled by the administrative authorities. Monopoly directly results from governmental
interference in the economy and the increasing expansion of administrative power. Since
powerful government agencies become market players in competition with other market
actors, the development of a free market and property rights are seriously hampered.
In contemporary China, there is not an anti-monopoly law or any independent
institute to regulate state monopoly. In other developed societies, competition is considered a
cornerstone for developing modern enterprises and a precondition for market operation.45 To
44 In 2004, the PRC revised its constitution and added the article of "the state respect for and protect
private property rights", which is a great progress. But the effect from it remains to be seen in practice
since all problems relating to the property rights are not changed.
45 Ying Qiaohong, "Qianxi woguo fannongduan lifa zhong de jige wenti" [A brief discussion of
several problems of anti-monopoly legislations in our country], Jiancha ribao website: Zhengyi wang,
4 March 2002 (http://www.jcrb.com.cn/zyw).
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date, the only relevant stipulation is found in the PRC Law against Improper Competition,
promulgated in 1993. Article 7 in this law only roughly provides that the government and its
departments may not abuse power to force transactions, prevent outside products from
entering into the local market or local products going out of the local market. Article 30
stipulates the legal responsibility for breach of this stipulation, which only requires the
relevant agencies to correct their misconduct (or bear administrative sanctions in case of
serious circumstances) rather than by law. It is obvious that this law cannot limit
administrative monopoly.
Efficiency in monopolised industries is so low that they find it hard to meet the
demand in the market. Like telecommunication and public transport, the share market, for
instance, has been a state monopoly since its inception. Fraud, corruption and other illegal
transactions are rampant in the share market, seriously undermining its function, and at the
same time, shareholders' interests, especially small shareholders, have no legal guarantee.
For example, in June 1998, the Southern Security Exchange Centre in Guangdong was
suddenly instructed to stop transactions of all circulating shares because of its "illegal
transactions outside the exchange centre".46 The minority shareholders (1 billion individual
shares) received no remedy from the interruption since they could not sell their shares.
Moreover, the court refused to accept their request for compensation because of a notice
from the SPC, which ordered the courts to suspend any economic disputes arising from
illegal share transactions outside the exchange centre or enforcing any decisions if such cases
had been tried. The Chinese Security Supervision Commission, as the direct administrator of
the share market, failed to adopt any measures for protecting individual shareholders'
interests while the institutional shareholders simply absolved their losses in their operating
costs.
Telecommunication is another area of administrative monopoly. Private operation in
this sector is strictly prohibited. For example, in December 1997, the Fuzhou
Telecommunication Bureau accused Chen Yan of illegally running an internet telephone bar
on the ground that it should be exclusively operated by state Post and Telecommunication
departments.47 The PSB accepted this case on the basis that Chen had breached the criminal
law under article 225 (crime of illegal operation). The police interrogated Chen and
confiscated his telephone, computer as well as 50,000 yuan they found at the site as illegal
income.
46 Xingzhengfa luntan, 11 October 2002 (www.1488.com.cn/bbs/showannounce.asp7id)
47 Zhou Qiren, Xingzhengfa luntan, 18 September 2002
(www.1488.com.cn/bbs/showannounce.asp7id).
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Chen Yan sued the police but the court identified the police action in this case to be
a criminal investigation (a judicial action, which is not within the jurisdiction of
administrative litigation) under the CPL and not an administrative action, and therefore it
rejected Chen's lawsuit. He then appealed. The appellate court decided in January 1999 that
Chen had not broken the law and that the PSB was wrong. The court ruled that the PSB had
infringed Chen's personal freedom and property interests, and that Chen was entitled to bring
administrative litigation. The original court was ordered to retry the case but it made the
same decision again. The PSB did not in the end return the confiscated property to Chen.
Technically, the use of internet phone (IP) is different from the telephone services in that IP
does not need a telephone line and the cost comprises the local rate, internet service charges
and recipients' payment. According to a Notice issued by the State Council in 1993, IP was
defined as a "computer information service" and a "public multi-media telecommunication
service" open to the public. It is distinct from another Notice issued in 1990, which
stipulated that only state postal departments were entitled to long-distance and international
telephone business.
However, soon after this case, the Ministry of Information Industry issued a notice to
control IP service to the public by requiring its approval. Such restriction hampered the
development of advanced technology by restricting it from entering the market. By doing
this, the government gained huge profits. It was reported that in April 1999, only six months
after introducing IP service, three major state-owned telecommunication companies earned
each month an average of 0.1 billion yuan from this single business. It is estimated that to
2002 the national income from this service would amount to 100 billion, almost half of the
whole telephone market.48 However, such great profit is at the expense of social progress and
growth in the private economy. Long-term economic growth and rule of law have been
compromised for the sake of short-term economic interests.
The case of the urban taxi monopoly in Beijing is especially complex.49 Up to 1985,
the taxi industry was solely operated by the municipal transport bureau. There were few
companies and a limited number of vehicles. The regulations were relaxed in 1985, allowing
some state-owned and collective-owned taxi companies to be established. The industry
expanded over the next few years to include 259 companies and around 10,000 taxis. As the
pace of economic reform increased after 1992, the Beijing municipal government declared
48 ibid.
49 The case is carefully sieved and fdtered from following sources: Wang Keqin, "Beijing chuzuche
nongdun heimu" [The inside story of taxi monopoly in Beijing], Zhongguo jingji shibao, 6 December
2002, pp. 1-5; Wang Jun, "Zhengfu guanzhi de jingji he falii wenti: Beijing shi chuzu hangye ge'an
fenxi" [The economic and legal problems of governmental control: analysis of an individual case in
Beijing's taxi industry], Zhongguo gonggongguanli, 22 September 2002 [Electronic journal, no. 117].
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an ambitious goal: there must be five taxis available whenever a customer waves a hand. In
1994, there were 1,400 companies and 60,000 taxis. Each driver invested a sum of money
[chuzi kuan, ttowards the cost of the vehicle (amounting to almost half the purchase
price) and thus enjoyed relative freedom of operation after paying a management fee to the
company. However, due to poor regulation, this expansion turned into chaos as even primary
schools and kindergartens became involved in the taxi business.
In order to control the situation, the transport bureau started to re-structure the taxi
market in 1996 by preventing taxi companies from selling vehicles to drivers. All taxi cars
had to be returned to the companies irrespective of the fact that the drivers had invested a
large sum of money in the vehicle when they signed the contract. Thus, the restructuring
turned over the drivers' investments to the companies. At the same time, the driver became
subject to the whim of the company, since the previous co-operation changed into employer-
employee relationship. The company did not refund drivers the money they had invested.
Instead, they turned this money into risk guarantees [fengxian baozhengjin, 'n
effect, confiscating the individual driver's property.
Drivers were also required to pay about five thousand yuan each month as a monthly
rent [yuefen qian, R ())!%]. Many taxi companies became prosperous. In 2000, the municipal
government encouraged businesses to expand by merger or acquisition, and small companies
that had fewer than 200 taxis were urged to incorporate with big companies. Through the
process of incorporation, the number of taxi companies was reduced from 1,000 to 200.
Twelve major brands emerged at the end of this process. At present, there are a total of
67,000 taxi vehicles in Beijing. Only 1,000 of these are operated by individual drivers who
enjoy autonomy and only pay a management fee. The other taxies are driven by company
drivers who sign contracts with the taxi company.50 Company drivers are requested to submit
risk guarantees, which are equal to half of the car price, plus a monthly rent to the company.
Throughout this process, the taxi drivers became the biggest victims while the
companies became the biggest beneficiaries. Mostly farmers and redundant workers from the
SOEs, the drivers contributed almost their whole savings to purchase vehicles, only to find
them become the companies' property. Although now they became employees of the
company, they had to pay a monthly rent on the vehicles and were denied their legal benefits
such as pensions, redundancy payments, insurance and medical treatment. They also had to




Drivers were particularly disadvantaged by the so-called risk guarantees, i.e. the sum
of money roughly equivalent to the price they had invested in the taxis, were held by the
company against the risk of damage or other loss to the vehicle. When a driver left the
company, however, this sum was often withheld in part or wholly by the company. The
companies often sought pretexts for deducing sums against the risk guarantees, and some
companies even used fines to resolve their own financial crises. For example, in 2000 Wang
Xueyang was fined by the traffic police 1,000 yuan and given a two-month suspension from
driving for a breach of traffic regulations. His company used this pretext to fire him and also
confiscated 35,000 yuan from his risk deposit.
The law requires companies to make provision for pensions and insurance for their
employees, but taxi companies failed to do so. One reason is that rural workers are not
included in the urban benefits system in China. Another reason is the financial cost of
insurance. The annual insurance for a taxi vehicle worth 100,000 yuan would be 5,350 yuan
at national standard rates. In other words, companies would have to pay 67,000 drivers in
Beijing a total premium of over 0.3 billion yuan. Instead of providing insurance, some
companies adopted an internal insurance scheme which further justified the charge of a high
monthly rent. However, this internal scheme would not apply to individual drivers in case of
accidents or breaches of traffic regulations. On the contrary, the company would fine such
drivers.
In these circumstances, taxi drivers became one of the most vulnerable groups of
employees, working long hours for little pay and benefits and having to contribute rent and
risk guarantees to their employers. When their interests were infringed, there was nowhere
for them to seek justice, since the Beijing Supreme Court issued a notice on 7 September
1999 preventing courts from adjudicating disputes between taxi drivers and their companies.
Even if the courts were open to them, most drivers could not afford the litigation fees.
Deng Shaolong is a taxi driver. In 2001, he was treated by a hospital for a condition
resulting from long-term driving. During the four months of his medical treatment, the
company still charged him a monthly rent of 5,100 yuan, although he was unable to work
and had no income. Deng wanted to return the taxi to the company but was refused. The
company warned him that returning the taxi would be a breach of contract and he would
have to compensate the company 15,000 yuan, to be deducted from his risk guarantee. In
order to cover hospital fees and his monthly taxi rent, Deng had to go back to work before he
had made a full recovery.
Zheng Zisheng was required by his company to hand over the sum of 115,000 yuan
in 1995 to buy an old car which was actually worth 50,000 yuan. He also paid 1,850 yuan in
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monthly rent. In 2000, the company sold his car for 70,000 yuan. Qiu Yuejin paid 100,000
yuan for an old taxi from his company. A year later, he had earned around 10,000 yuan. The
company then sold the taxi and Qiu was fined, losing some 80,000 yuan in the transaction.
The same fate also happened to many other drivers in Qiu's company.
Usually taxi companies got rich in two ways. One was to use the drivers'
investments to expand. The Sheng Da Li Taxi Company is such an example. This company
now has 262 taxis and nearly 30,000,000 yuan in assets. According to its general manager,
he applied for a certificate to operate taxi service from a village government in a suburb of
Beijing in 1992. After the village government stamped the certificate, he then submitted an
application to the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Transport for approval to operate passenger
transport. At this stage, he was given a quota of 60 taxis. He recruited 25 drivers who each
invested 50,000 yuan for their vehicles, obtaining a total of over 1,200,000 yuan. He himself
invested no money whatsoever in building up the company.
The other way was to buy cheap cars on borrowed money and then sell them to
drivers at a higher price. Zhang Huiyu bought 46 taxis and sold them to his drivers at a profit.
His company became prosperous by 1996. Soon after, he bought back these taxis from the
drivers at a price far lower than that the drivers had paid, claiming to upgrade standards in
order to charge higher monthly rents. After the restructuring, the monthly rent increased to
over 4,000 yuan, plus 30,000 to 50,000 yuan of risk guarantee. Zhang further expanded his
company to 262 taxis through purchasing small businesses, transforming what had been a
one-man village enterprise into a joint-stock company. He claimed that all of the taxis
belonged to the company and had nothing to do with the drivers any more.
The governmental control over the taxi service in Beijing is an example of problems
revealed by governmental supervision. It undermines the interests of the state, the drivers
and the public. The tax revenue from the whole number of taxi companies is very low. If the
individual drivers of the taxi service now operating nation-wide were allowed to own their
own vehicles, of the 780,000 taxis country-wide, there would be an annual increase in tax
revenue of over 14 billion yuan. In Beijing, the annual tax revenue from owner-driven taxis
would amount to 1.2 billion. In addition, the state could obtain a huge amount of money
from auctioning taxi licences. The fee for a ten-year license could amount to at least 200,000
yuan. In this way, the income on the 66,000 taxis in Beijing would amount to 13 billion
every ten years or 1.3 billion a year, equal to 2.9% of Beijing's revenue in 2001.
Drivers' interests have also been seriously infringed by governmental control.




month. However, after deducting costs (including the monthly rent of around 5,000 yuan),
the net income is 1,900 yuan per month. Without companies to act as the intermediary
between the state and the individual drivers, a driver would be able to retain around 6,300
yuan per month.
The annual average wage in Beijing in 2001 was 17,300 yuan per worker for the
requirement of an annual 220 working days at 79 yuan per day. At this rate, a taxi driver,
who may work up to 585 days a year [since they usually work long hours], should have an
annual income of 46,215 yuan or 3,851 per month. However, the Beijing Taxi Association
found that the average monthly income of taxi drivers in Beijing was only 1818 yuan. This
highlights the low wages and long hours worked by taxi drivers.
The governmental control over the taxi service also results in high costs to customers.
Without taxi companies to act as an intermediary between the state and the individual drivers,
competition between drivers would reduce costs to customers.
The current situation also reveals lack of clarity in property rights. According to
regulations, the taxi companies are collectively-owned enterprises in which all assets belong
to the drivers. Before the restructuring, drivers purchased their vehicles and the taxi
companies represented their collective interests as investors. However, they did not enjoy
investors' rights, for example, to receive a bonus or to take part in decision-making. In this
period, the drivers were in effect employees of the companies. Their position became even
weaker as a result of the restructuring process, which deprived them of their property. At the
same time, taxi companies became the legal owners of the vehicles and other company
property through registration with the government (local ICAB). That is, the owner-
managers became the sole shareholders in the company.
According to the Beijing Labour Bureau, an employment involves four elements: a
contract, a wage, a job and social security benefits. In this case, although some companies
gave contracts to drivers under pressure from the labour authority, most companies did not
give contracts to their drivers. The law does not permit enterprises to collect any risk
guarantees from their employees. Thus the relationship between the drivers and the
companies seems to be more like a labour-capital relationship than an employer-employee
one.
Since the taxi service is controlled by the government (the Beijing Transport bureau),
disputes resulting from the restructuring process between the companies and drivers are
many and complicated. The courts are reluctant to be involved in this type of dispute for fear
of causing conflict with governmental policy or risking social disorder. The courts have
failed to play a role in resolving social disputes and protecting individual property and
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employment rights. The courts in Beijing have accepted 160 such disputes since the
restructuring, some of them as group litigation. In order to protect their rights, drivers
frequently appealed to the superior authorities and even in some cases held demonstration
outside the courts. This situation came to the attention of the Beijing Supreme Court in 1999,
which required that all such disputes should be resolved within the companies or their
superior management agencies.
The control over the taxi market is in conflict with the market demand for free
competition. The only solution is to replace a management agency within a planned
economy by a market mechanism. The taxi companies should be dissolved in order to
guarantee the autonomous operation of individual drivers. The government should
concentrate on assuring quality through regulations concerning admission and fair
competition.
This situation also shows that during the transition from a planned to a market
economy, conflicts of interest between the state and society will greatly increase. It requires
a re-allocation of interests and risks among the government, enterprises and individuals
through specifying property rights and providing legal guarantees for their enforcement. At
the same time, the government is required to play a role as an independent and reputable
rule-enforcer, in order to keep a balance among various interests.
4. Conclusion
Property rights are not simply a kind of civil right, but rather a constitutional right in the first
place.52 If the constitution does not stipulate property rights to be a basic right, then civil
laws which include some stipulations on property rights generally do not offer adequate
protection. Property rights has been acknowledged worldwide as basic human rights and a
constitutional right, and private property may not be transferred, separated, or taken away by
force without the consent of their owner. To define and then safeguard this right will greatly
promote the development of a market economy and the rule of law.
The specification and safeguarding of property rights have been proved to be a quite
desirable model for smooth functioning of capitalism. The establishment of the concept of
property rights is necessary for promoting economic welfare and social efficiency, leading to
an increasingly autonomous and strong private sector in social and economic areas. In the
long run this trend is likely to form a civil society to provides a balance to the state sector.
Recognition of property rights is a preliminary step for the emergence of private interests.
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The rule of law is founded on the protection of property rights and on the distinction between
public and private interests. Thus it is the state's duty to provide guarantees for property
rights.
At the same time, property rights will facilitate market operation. If market actors
are not entitled to the ownership of their property, they will not be able to take part in market
activities. If the constitution does not provide protection for individual property rights equal
to that of state and collective property rights, there will be widespread infringement or
ignorance of this right in practice. In a socialist planned state, the means of production are
owned by the state, so there is no need for legal protection of state rights against its own
infringement. However, in a market economy, it is important to create a balance between the
rights of market participants and state intervention through a set of well-defined rules and
effective enforcement of these rules.
In contemporary China, laws and regulations in relation to the concept, operation
and protection of property rights are full of conflict and confusion, leaving wide spaces for
the state sector and governmental agencies to neglect or ignore the interests of enterprises
and individuals. The law is particularly vague about the nature of private property rights,
resulting in the vulnerability of rapidly growing township-village industrial enterprises in
rural areas to intervention and exploitation. With the growth of a new market economy, the
formally-marginal non-public sector is producing more than half of China's industrial output.
In order to gain more revenues from local enterprises, local governments try to maintain
these businesses within the public domain without defining their private nature, although
they can be tradable in local markets. There are many signs that China's economy is
increasingly becoming reliant on interdependence between the state agencies and the
enterprises within their jurisdiction. Governmental officials and their relatives are themselves
deeply involved in public and private enterprises, especially at the local level. In this
situation, the distinction between public and private property is easily blurred.
Although the CCP has realised the importance of a rational legal system to economic
growth, legal reforms are constrained by the pace of economic development. As an
instrument of serving the socialist market economy, law in today's China is flexible and
pragmatic, but its flexibility can also undermine the autonomy of the market economy.
Moreover, when adjudication on unclear property rights is conducted by state institutions,
their rulings tend to uphold the system of socialist ownership. Even in FDI investment,
although the reformers have looked to Western-style laws to attract foreign capital, the
52 Zhao Shiyi, "Lun caichanquan de xianfa baozhang yu zhiyue" [A discussion of constitutional
safeguarding and curbing of the property rights], Faxue pinglun, no. 5 (1999), quoted in Xingzhengfa
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extent to which these Western legal norms can take root in Chinese society is open to
question without legal guarantees for FDI property rights.53 The implementation and
enforcement of such norms is at local government's discretion. Social connections have
much more importance than predictable legal rules in guiding foreign investment, and the
"rule of law" is only a slogan at present in China.
The demand for a legally limited government will become more pressing than before
following China's entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The market economy
requires that the government exert its power according to the rule of law in order to
safeguard the interests of both domestic and international enterprises. The government may
neither interfere excessively in the market nor participate directly in market operation. In
this area, the regime and its officials remain unprepared for such a transformation from
master to servant within a short period. Moreover, the top-down model of reform which
emphasises government role increases the potential difficulties in balancing government
functions in future.
luntan, 11 July 2001.
53 Articles on legal restraints on FDI are many. See, for example, Peter Howard Come, Foreign
Investment in China: The Administrative Legal System; Pitman Potter, Foreign Business Law in China
(London: The 1990 Institute, 1995) and also his article entitled "Foreign Investment Law in the PRC:
Dilemmas of State Control" in Stanley Lubman (ed.), China's Legal Reforms, pp. 155-185.
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Chapter Five: Judicial Independence: A Long Way to Go
The decline of Party influence and the decentralisation of political power allow the
possibility of professional and independent development of the courts. Since the 1990s,
reforms of court institutions, recruitment of judges and adjudication procedures have been
carried out. The PRC courts have become more active than ever before, with ever-increasing
caseload year by year. However, the courts remain weak in protecting individual rights and
interests. Their capacity to restrict political and administrative power is especially limited. In
contemporary China, civil relations have become more complex than ever before in China's
history with the progress of economic reforms. The versatile interests require the courts to
play an impartial and efficient role in resolving conflicts, protecting private rights and
fulfilling social justice.
In China, the judiciary is no more than an administrative agency and the judges are a
part of governmental officialdom. The PRC adopts one Party rule without separation
between the administration and judiciary. The courts safeguard state and public interests to
which individual interests are always subordinate. As Anthony Dicks notes, this situation
"necessarily throws doubt on the authority of the courts as exponents of a generalised and
universally applicable view of the law".1 The judiciary has always been exposed to a wide
range of internal and external interference. Within the current power structure, judicial
independence is not guaranteed, which makes it difficult for the courts to assure judicial
fairness and efficiency.
The courts are required to carry a wide range of tasks in addition to adjudication,
including resolving the ever-increasing civil disputes arising from the new market
relationship, dealing with the same quick-increasing crimes, curtailing administrative powers
and keeping their judgements in line with Party imperatives.2 Challenges facing the courts
include the difficulty in defining court tasks and adjudication style, following legal
procedures in trial, enforcing judicial decisions, and protecting human rights including
personal and property rights. The biggest obstacle affecting court authority comes from Party
and government interference. The courts continue to be regarded as a forum of the Party and
state to keep in line with Party policy and propaganda in their daily work. The lack of
independence results in poor efficiency in resolving disputes and widespread judicial
corruption, not to mention checks or curbs on the state power.
1
Anthony R. Dicks, "Compartmentalisation of Power and Judicial Restraints", China Quarterly, no.
141 (March 1995), p. 109.
2
Qianfan Zhang, "The Peoples' Court in Transition: the Prospects of the Chinese Judicial Reform",
Journal ofContemporary China, 34:12, (2003), p. 71.
1. Judicial independence: a hard goal to gain
A fundamental principle of judicial independence, according to Professor Paul Gewirtz in
Yale University, is its "capacity to decide cases in a lawful and impartial manner free from
improper control and influence."3 Judicial independence is a cornerstone of a society based
on the rule of law and a prerequisite for judicial fairness. The public wishes the courts to
play their function impartially, including resolving legal disputes, articulating legal norms
that people can rely on, protecting legal rights, and constraining illegal governmental
actions.4 Each of these functions, particularly in a market economy, requires judicial
institutions being independent from other state powers. Judicial independence not only
includes institutional independence of the courts as a whole from external authorities but also
from each other within the court system; it also includes the autonomy of individual judges
from internal interference within court hierarchy. In other words, judicial independence
includes autonomy of both the courts and judges. In this way, the courts can meet a
Weberian requirement for a politically neutral arbitrator, and the judges can independently
try cases and take responsibility for their decisions.
The PRC constitution has provided, without using the term "judicial independence,"
that the courts independently exercise their powers of adjudication and are not subject to any
interference from any administrative agencies, social organisations and individuals. The
organic law of the courts and the Judges' Law also assure that the courts independently
exercise the power of adjudication and are subject only to the law.5 However, these
stipulations cannot immunise the courts from a variety of influences. Public debate on the
rule of law in contemporary China has increased awareness of the need for judicial
independence. Nevertheless, an autonomous judiciary is far from established in China.
For a long time, the courts has become an administrative agency under the Party-
state structure; localised, as an administrative agency subject to local authority; non¬
professional, as the courts being a government branch and the judges are public servant; and
non-independent.6 Senior politicians including Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin have
repeatedly asserted that the Western idea of a tripartite division of public powers and the
3 Paul Gewirtz, "Independence and Accountability of Courts", Global Law Review, 24:7 (2002), p. 2.
Its electronic version can be accessed in The China Law Centre of Yale Law School
(http://chinalaw.law.yale.edu/html/publications.htm).
4 Ibid.
5 Article 126 of the constitution; article 4 of the Organic Law of the Courts. Both in Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo falii huibian , 1985, pp. 34 and 82. Also see article 7 (2) of the PRC Judges' Law enacted
in 1997 and revised in 2001, in Zhonghua renmin gongheguo Faku, vol. 4, 2002, pp. 61-68.
''Zhang Weiping, "Sifa tizhi yu jingji tizhi" [Thejudicial system and the economic system], Renmin
fayuan bao, 8 February 2002, p. 3.
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judicial independence is derived from bourgeois liberalism, and is thus not suitable for a
socialist judiciary.7 Their concept of judicial independence [sifa duli, does not
refer to the independence of the courts from the Party and state but to that of daily
adjudication [shenpan duli, which is limited independence without going across
the lowest political bottom line. Moreover, China's judicial independence excludes the
autonomy of individual judges from other senior judges and court officials.
The courts occupy a marginal position within the centralised power structure of the
Party and state. The supremacy of the Party constitutes a fundamental conflict with the rule
of law for an independent judiciary. Court presidents are not part of the top decision-making
process. At the local level, for example, court presidents are normally not members of local
People's Congress and the Standing Committee of local Party Committee; similarly, the
president of the SPC is not even an alternate member of the Central Committee of the CCP.
A parallel situation exists with respect to the position of judicial and other state agencies.
Lven within the legal system, the court ranks lower than the PSB and the Procuratorate.
Sometimes a PSB chief, not a court president, may become a concurrent official of the
Party's Political and Legal Commission (zhengfa weiyuanhui, or shortly zhengfawei, the
PLC, which is the direct leadership of the Party on the judiciary at
each level. This power structure does not provide the courts with sufficient authority to
ensure a fair trial, especially those cases involving state agencies and officials.
The current judicial reform is not an integral and coherent process among different
judicial agencies.8 Court reform is conducted by the SPC separated from reform of other
agencies. The two goals for judicial reform are judicial fairness and judicial efficiency.
Although some adjustments in the current political system are necessary for supporting these
goals, a genuine independent judiciary is still a distant task. According to the SPC Outline of
Five-year Reform of the People's Courts issued in 1999, four problems in the judicial sector
were to be resolved in a five-year span from 1999 to 2003: (1) local protectionism, which has
seriously undermined the uniformity of law; (2) the overall low professional and moral
quality of the judges, which have made them prone to corruption and unfit for impartial
administration of justice; (3) bureaucratic management, which is at odds with judicial
7
Deng Xiaoping (3 September 1979), "Guanyu zhengzhi tizhi gaige wenti" [On the issues of
reforming the political system], DengXiaoping wenxuan, vol. 3, p. 178.
8 In the PRC, the word "judicial" refers to the courts, the procuratorate and the PSB as well as
agencies of Justice at all levels. I use this word here, in correspondence with most democratic
countries in the world, to refer to China's courts, so does the judiciary.
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independence and efficiency; and (4) a lack of resources necessary for effective functioning
of the courts, especially at local levels.9
At the Thirteenth CCP Congress held in 1987, a motion to abolish the Party PLC at
all levels was brought forward in order to enforce judicial independence, but the regime's
concern with such disturbance as the 1989 Democratic Movement caused a halt to approval
of this motion. Since then, Party control over the judicial work has been strengthened, and
any advocating of judicial independence criticised as an attempt to deviate from Party
leadership. Ren Jianxin, then SPC president, stated at a judicial meeting in 1990 that "the
political nature of the practice of law in China is to guarantee political stability, namely the
supremacy of the Party. Judicial cadres must abide by the instructions of the Party as much
as legal codes. In addition to law books, judges must delve into Marxist and Leninist theories
on the state and law as well as Mao's writings on class struggle." He continued: "courts at all
levels must self-consciously follow Party leadership," requiring all court trials to be
conducted in favour of maintaining social stability and safeguarding Party rule and the
people's democratic dictatorship.10
Xiao Yang, current SPC president, called attention to the distinction of judicial
independence between a Western liberal legal system and a socialist one, reiterating the
importance of keeping a distance between Western ideas of power separation and the need to
uphold the Party leadership." The social order and stability have been all the time the top
concerns of the Party during the promotion of economic reform and the open door policy.
From the goal of establishing a market economy to the rule of law, the Party endeavours to
improve its image and strengthen its rule without systematic change to the Party-state
structure. In correspondence with Party tasks, the current focus of the courts is to facilitate a
socialist market and consolidate Party leadership by resolving conflicts fairly and efficiently
rather than trying to be independent from the Party.
(1) Party control over the judiciary through its PLC
Although the Party is constitutionally required to be subject to the law, "the Party must
ensure that the legislative, judicial and administrative agencies and the economic, cultural
and people's organisational work will all actively carried out with initiative, in an
9 For a detail analysis of problems facing the courts and the outcomes of the five-year reform
programme, see Qianfan Zhang, supra note 2 and also see Lubman (1999), chapter 9, pp. 250-297 for
major problems facing the courts.
10
Wo-Lap Lam, Willy, China after Deng Xiaoping: the Power Struggle in Beijing since Tiananmen
(Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 1995), pp. 263-264.
" Xiao Yang, speech at a national conference of presidents of the higher-level courts in 1999. Fazhi
ribao, 6 August 1999, p. 1.
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independent, responsible way, and in harmony."12 As the only ruling political Party, the CCP
is also the guardian of socialist legality. It conducts educational programs to ensure the
implementation of its ideology and the maintenance of Party line injudicial work. The Party
also selects judicial officials who have good political awareness, and constantly checks
whether the judiciary has strictly enforced the law.13
In practice, the Party controls court work through its PLC at all levels. The central
PLC is composed of the heads from the Ministry of State Security, the PSB, the Ministry of
Justice, the SPC, the SPP, and a representative from the General Political Department of the
People's Liberation Army. Similarly, local PLC are composed of chiefs from local judicial
and security agencies. The main duty of the PLC is, generally, to set yardsticks for
promoting social security and preventing crimes, and to discuss major cases and decide
punishments. It is directly subject to the Party Committee at the corresponding levels and
further to the Central Party Committee.
Since the founding of the PRC, it has been a common practice that the Party, through
its PLC, guides and co-ordinates judicial work, aiming to eliminate conflicts among different
agencies and to assure Party policies are being enforced. The emphasis on Party leadership
of judicial work through reviewing court cases continued until 1979, when the first criminal
law was enacted. Since then, instead of directly reviewing cases, the role of the PLC has
changed to guiding and supervising by controlling appointment of judicial personnel and
discussing major or difficult cases.
For a long time, the courts and judges have been highly politicised. Anybody who
complies with the constitutional stipulation of being a citizen, with short-term training, was
deemed qualified to be a judge. According to the PRC Judges' Law promulgated in 1995, the
requirements for recruiting judges greatly emphasise their political consciousness rather than
their legal skills. It stipulates that any person of PRC nationality, over the age 23, who
supports the constitution, has a good awareness in political and legal policies, is virtuous,
healthy, and has a college-level (or above) degree in law or in other areas with at least two
year's legal experience, may become a judge.14 In practice, internal training programmes
within the courts have maintained most of the old personnel in their posts. The five-
year outline of judicial reform plans to decrease the gross number of current court
12 The preface of the constitution.
13 Folsom and Ralph Haughword, "Constitution and the Party", in Law in the People's Republic of
China: Commentary, Readings and Materials edited by R H Folsom and J H Minan (Dordrecht:
Nijhoff, 1989), p. 28.
14 Article 9 o f the PRC Judges' Law.
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personnel by 10% within five years, but the general level of education in judiciary
remains low and the post ofjudgeship is not very appealing to law students.
For a long time, the major sources of recruiting judges and procurators come from
retired army officers, who had accepted strict political education to be loyal and obedient to
the Party. This politicisation of the judiciary has been deliberately carried out by the CCP in
order to enforce its political and economic tasks. Since the reforms, the appeal from scholars
for professional construction of the courts and judges have increased, but practice of
absorbing army veterans continues,15 and political elements in selecting and promoting
judges remain important. Career advancement of the judges is based on a wide range of
criteria. Their professional duties consist of trying cases, enforcing the law, summing up trial
experiences, taking a leading role in judicial work, and making suggestions for judicial
reform. In addition, they are also expected to safeguard state, collective, and individual
interests from major losses, participate in campaigns against criminal activities, and protect
state and judicial secrets.16
The annual assessment of "good judges" or "judges with whom the people are
satisfied" [renmin manyi de faguan, evidences the politicisation of the
courts. In 2001, Gu Shuangyan in Heilongjiang was honoured with the title of "good judge"
for having correctly handled 2,000 cases in accordance with Party policy and law since she
became a judge. Liao Wei in Guangxi was commended for sacrificing his life in confronting
criminals who threatened a local school. Two judges in Zhejiang and Guangdong were
commended for having collapsed and died at their post from their heavy workload. At the
same time, a nation-wide campaign was launched to select judges with whom the people are
satisfied. The SPC and the media co-sponsored a series of national commendations such as
the "ten national judges with whom the people are satisfied", "the ten eminent young women
judges", "young judges who are pacesetters", and "courts awarded first-class merit". In the
same year, a total of 110 judges were commended, and 103 courts won the honour of
"national model courts" or "collective first-class merit".17
Legal training to court personnel is a tremendous project due to their huge number
and overall low level of education. According to a statistics in 1995, there were 250,000
court personnel nationwide, and among them only 5.6% had a university undergraduate
15 When I went back to Shanghai in the summer of 2001, I was told that two former army veterans
who are relatives ofmy friends were transferred to the Shanghai Higher-Level Court.
16 Article 30 of the PRC Judges' Law.
17 Xiao Yang, "Zui gao renmin fayuan gongzuo baogao" [the SPC working report], in Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo falti nianjian [the PRC law yearbook] (Beijing: Falii nianjian chubanshe, 2001), p.
30.
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degree and only 0.25% had a master degree. Even to the end of 2000 in fast developed area
such as Shanghai, 49.2% court personnel had a university undergraduate degree [which was
not amounted to half of the whole personnel] and only 1.94% had a master's degree.18 To
date, the process of improving the education and legal skills of judicial personnel continues
but it has not been easy. According to official sources, in 2001, 540 judges were regarded as
unqualified and dismissed, while more than 1,000 judges were found incompetent even after
intensive training and had to be transferred to other posts.19 Xiao Yang admitted recently that
"a significant number (ofjudges) do not have a degree in law, and many are too incompetent
to hold their posts," and that "courts have often been taken as branches of government, and
judges viewed as following orders from their superiors".20
The poor quality of court personnel is one reason for low efficiency and corruption
in the judicial sector. One direct result of this situation is the frequent ignorance of law and
the wide discretion allowed to the courts. With the rapid development in the market economy
and in science and technology, the demand for a competent and fair judiciary will increase. It
is clear that PRC judges and courts will face severe challenges in future.
In practice, under the co-ordination of the PLC, the power of adjudication has
actually been devolved to various agencies. Moreover, the PLC emphasises mutual co¬
operation rather than mutual restriction, often leaving the police and Procuratorate superior
to the judge. Its role is to eliminate disagreement rather than guarantee justice. Judicial
process is highly professional, and unprofessional interference often results in unjust
outcomes. In dealing with serious or politically sensitive cases, the courts have to report to
the local PLC for advice; if conflicts arise among different judicial agencies, the PLC often
steps forward to co-ordinate.
Local Party secretaries regularly review cases which can affect the outcome of
specific cases. For some sensitive cases involving high-ranking officials or having potential
impact on social stability, the Party (sometimes the Politburo or even the top politicians)
makes decisions. For example, major cases involving senior officials such as Chen Xitong,
Cheng Kejie, Hu Changqing, and cases like the Xiamen "Yuanhua" smuggling scandal and
serious workplace accidents and disasters, were all tried under the instruction from the
18 Xu Ping, "Wanshan wo guo faguan xuanren zhidu de ruogan sikao" [Some thoughts about
perfecting the system of selecting and appointing judges in China], Falti tushuguan: Falti lunwen
ziliao ku, 25 November 2002, acc. 30 November 2002 (www.law-lib.com/lw)
19 Xiao Yang, supra note 17, p. 31.
20 Xiao Yang, "Zuigao renmin fayuan gongzuo baogao," in Falii nianjian, 2001 and 2002, pp. 31-32
and p. 29, respectively.
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Central Committee of the Party or even by top politicians. The courts did no more than
follow these instructions, turning the trial into a complete show.21
The Party policy always determines central tasks of the courts in correspondence
with its goals, and the courts are obliged to take part in all kinds of Party campaigns in
conjunction with other agencies, such as campaigns of anti-corruption and "comprehensive
rectification of social security" [shehui zhian zonghe zhili, ftzHn ^^n1=fVnfi]. The latter
includes "attacking black and evil (forces)" [da hei chu e, refers to organised
crimes emerging in China recently], rectifying market order, popularising legal knowledge,
and promoting citizens' moral standards. All of these campaigns aim to maintain social
stability and Party rule.
In practice, some PLC often abuse their power to serve their own interests. For
example, according to state law, the State General News agency is the only authority with
the power to issue accreditation cards to journalists, and these cards authorise the holder to
conduct interviews with all state agencies. However, the Hunan provincial PLC required
additional accreditation for journalists, especially from outside their region, to interview
local judicial agencies and personnel.22
The following case reveals that the PLC often manipulates the judicial authorities
within its jurisdiction.23 In the 1980s, Party and administrative agencies at all levels were
widely involved in business activity. Following this trend, Lan Hai, an official in the Sichuan
PLC, resigned in 1994 and established a company under the name of "Sichuan zheng-fa-wei
fazhi xuanchuan zhongxin" [Sichuan PLC centre for promoting the legal system]. The
company produced a TV series called 'fazhi zhi guang" [light of the rule of law, yifejqizlTfc]
in co-operation with the provincial TV station. The PLC Centre was operated on an
autonomous basis; the PLC did not invest any money or undertake any risk. The link that the
PLC itself had with the Centre was that it gave permission for the use of its name for an
annual fee of 20,000 yuan. In addition, PLC officials debited their entire mobile phone and
banquet bills against the Centre's account, amounting to 180,000 yuan over five years.
In 1999, when the separation of government and business was accelerated, the
Centre stopped using the title PLC in its name and also cut its links with the TV station. The
renamed Centre for Promoting the Legal System became wholly independent from any state
21 For the case of Chen Xitong, former Beijing mayor who was sentenced to 16 years of imprisonment,
see Zui gao renmin fayuan gongbao [the SPC Gazette], no. 3 (2000), part x; for the case of Cheng
Kejie, former Guangxi supreme officials who was sentenced to death, see Zui gao renmin fayuan
gongbao, no. 5 (2000), pp. 161-162.
22 Renmin Wang, 11 October 2001 (http://www.people.com.cn).
23
Boxun, 19 August 2003 (http://peacehall.com/news/gb/pubvp/2003/08/20030819071 l.shtml).
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agency and operated wholly as a private business. Its programmes were very popular and it
became very prosperous. No attempt was made to recover the 180,000 yuan from the PLC.
Nevertheless, in April 2001, the PLC accused Lan Hai of corruption and appropriation of
public money. It instructed the local PSB to arrest Lan Hai and instructed the local
prosecutor and court to accept the sentence it had already determined. Through the PLC's
control over the court and appellant trials, Lan Hai was eventually sentenced to 14 years of
imprisonment. In this case, all Sichuan judicial authorities, including defence lawyers, were
subject to the PLC's authority, resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice and failure in
protecting property rights.
This case, like the one discussed before, is an example of the many conflicts
between the state and individual interests. Here the conflict happens within the legal system
which is supposed to resolve such conflicts. In China, PLC interference with law
enforcement is invisible but influential in that it makes decisions outside the formal legal
procedures through manipulating judicial agencies. By controlling the appointment of
judicial personnel and designating annual campaigns, Party PLC becomes an invisible
supreme judge without actually hearing or trying cases or without its name appearing on any
legal documents. Compared to other interference from administrative and legislative
agencies which are external, visible and subject to check, PLC interference is carried out
behind the scenes, systematic and not subject to challenge.
The existence of Party PLC is typical in a legal system of the Party-state structure.
This practice shows that the Party is in fact above the law, and that the rule ofman overrides
the rule of law. Scholars like Cao Siyuan, Zhang Yinhong and Wang Yi, together with some
senior officials like Li Rui and Qiao Shi, have called for the removal of this institution at all
levels, in order to safeguard governance according to law.24 They state that judicial
independence is a constitutional principle in a state based on the rule of law, having the
utmost significance in curbing state power and in resolving conflicts among citizens and
between citizens and the state. This practice in China also provides ample opportunities for
judicial failures and corruption, since Party supremacy over the legal system makes it
difficult for the law to curb power.
These scholars and officials claim that there is no legal basis for the role of Party
PLC whether from the constitution or from other state laws. It has been built up through the
24 Cao Siyuan, "Zhengfawei weixian" [the PLC is in breach of the constitution], Qianshao (May
2003); Zhang Yinhong, "Zhengfawei fang'ai sifa duli" [The PLC hampers judicial independence],




national Party network as a tool of Party control over the legal system. The PLC leadership
of the judiciary is also in conflict with international conventions and declarations concerning
judicial independence. They consider that Party interference in judicial work has caused
injustice in many cases and encouraged local protectionism. If the Party and its government
refused to respect the authority of the courts, it will be impossible to elevate the dignity and
authority of the judiciary and the law.
(2) Internal influence over the courts and judges
Within each court, there is a Party Organisation [dang zu, PO, and an Adjudicating
pi1 -ih\
Commission [shenpan weiyuanhui, AC. fltilllQ z?]. The PO acts to ensure that court
work complies with Party lines and is directly responsible to the local PLC. The AC has the
power to discuss, instruct and approve major or difficult cases.25 The heads of the courts,
who are normally members of both PO and AC, are not judges but officials assigned by the
local Party and government. Their main job is to develop and maintain a harmonious
relationship between the courts and local authorities, since this relationship determines the
financial and other welfare of the courts as well as the promotion of senior members. Within
the courts, the PO controls the appointment and promotion ofjudges, and at the same time, it
influences the decision-making process of the AC.
The trial process is subject to various internal reviews based on the courts'
hierarchical system. AC membership is not a professional qualification but a political title in
correspondence with administrative rank. So, only officials who have a certain rank in the
army or other state agencies may be selected. Since the PO has the discretionary power to
nominate a person for AC membership, the AC usually abides by PO instructions to make
sure that Party policy and goals are being enforced. There are separate benches for civil,
criminal, administrative, economic, marine, intellectual property rights and enforcement of
court decisions. All final decisions are subject to a superior approval ranging from the
presiding judge [shenpan zhang, in the collegial panel [he yi ting, a
bench chief judge [ting zhang, M "K:], the AC, and the president or vice-president. In some
circumstances, the courts need to ask the PLC for instruction.
This internal review may be helpful in constraining judges' power of decision¬
making in order to assure the quality of their judgement. However, both China's practice of
the AC deciding difficult cases and the appeal system are carried out by reviewing case files
without having a process open to the parties. Moreover, it is often the AC, who are not the
25 Art. 11 of the Organic Law of the Courts.
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presiding judges, that makes a final decision rather than the appellant judges. It may provide
a degree of accountability and constraint, but this practice, trying a case based on files rather
than holding a hearing and the judges who decide a case are not the judges who try the case,
are obviously at odds with the principles required by the rule of law. China's administrative
rule based on democratic centralisation requires that lower courts report a pending case and
request advice from a higher court, and inside a court, the court leaders often give
instructions for a pending case to the presiding bench of the case. Sometimes, judges who are
not on the presiding bench for a case may step in when the case is still in hearing, ignoring
the procedural guarantees for a trial.
Individual judges have no independent power to make a judgement in court, except
in some cases of summary procedure. The titles given to judges represent different
administrative ranks from junior to senior. Under the AC, collegial panels, usually consisting
of at least three judges selected at random before the trial, preside. The final judgements are
made in the name of the courts rather than the collegial panel or an individual judge. Thus
the power of independence, if it exists, is vested in courts, not judges. The president and
bench chiefmay have a legitimate right to review a judgement or suggest changes in drafting
judgements prepared by collegial panels. Where a case is considered complicated or
important, the AC often makes a decision rather than the trial judges or collegial panels. As
Donald Clarke puts it, "those who try the case do not decide it, and those who decide the
case do not try it."26
This internal collective review of cases by senior judges or the AC departs from
Western ideals of judicial independence, which is a practice with Chinese characteristic
derived from the principle of democratic centralism that applies to all state agencies of the
party-state.27 This practice might be justified in some circumstances to guarantee the
accuracy and impartiality of judicial decisions and to support judicial independence in China
from improper outside influence. This is particularly necessary in terms of the general low
level of professionalism among judicial personnel and widespread judicial corruption. As
Zhang Zhiming claims, this practice is a rational Chinese response to current conditions and
is therefore more appropriate than the Western ideal of judicial independence; even if the
judiciary was genuinely independent, the system would still lack judicial fairness and the
rule of law, and judicial corruption would keep growing.28
26 Donald C Clarke, "Dispute Resolution in China", Journal ofChinese Law, no. 5 (1991), p. 260.
27
Lubman, 1999, p. 262.
28
Zhang Zhiming, "Guanyu shenpan weiyuanhui gaige de sikao" [Thought about reforming the AC],
Renmin fayuan bao, in Jiancha ribao website: Zhengyi wang, 28 October 2002
(http://211.100.18.62/fzdt/xwnr.asp?id=8296).
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Sometimes, AC reviews indeed help to maintain the impartiality of a trial. However,
this practice seriously hampers the autonomous adjudication of the courts and judges since it
permits interference with the collegial panel's function. The function of the AC is to deliver
judgements on individual cases according to current Party and state policy rather than to
assure impartiality. Cases in administrative litigation are usually considered to be important
and are therefore referred to the AC, leading to illegal administrative actions being often
affirmed by the court under pressure.
For example, the collegial panel sitting on an administrative case in a county court
reached a decision in favour of repealing the action made by the defendant administrative
agency. The president of the court, under pressure from the local government, then referred
the case to the AC in order to change the panel's decision. However, the AC reaffirmed the
decision reached by the collegial panel by a vote of 9 to 2. Then the president persuaded the
AC members to change their vote immediately after the meeting. A second vote was carried
out with the vote at 7 to 4 in favour of the panel's decision. Again, the president further
persuaded the AC to call for a third vote. This time, the result turned out to be 6 to 5 against
the previous decision, due to the absence of a member who supported the panel's decision
and the participation of a vice president who happened to miss all previous votes. In the end,
the court had to follow this final decision, and let the illegal administrative action be
upheld.29
In another case, Huang, a young woman who went to the job centre of the Wulong
county government, Chongqing, to seek a job in November 1997, was raped by Luo, the
director of the job centre. The local PSB reported the case to the local Party PLC, suggesting
exercising both Party discipline and judicial procedures on Luo. But the PLC convened a
work meeting participated by the first-rank officials \diyi ba shou, from local
Party, government, and monitoring authorities to reach the decision that Luo had made a
mistake by taking advantage of his position to have a sexual relationship with the woman
rather than accuse him of having committed the crime of rape. According to the Party
democratic centralism rule, the judicial agencies must obey this decision.30
29
Yang Zhizhu, "E si mo zhuo zei, qi si mo gaozhuang: Zhongguo dalu jiceng fayuan de guancha yu
sikao" [Do not become a thief even if you starve to death and do not go to the court even if you are
angry to death: Observance and thought of China's basic-level courts], Zhongguo yanjiu, no. 3 (1997),
quoted in Boxun news, 19 August 2002 (www.buxun.com).
30
Song Caifa, "Yi fa xingzheng shi yi fa zhi guo de nandian he guanjian" [Exercising administrative
power according to law is the most difficult point and the key to the administration of the country
according to law], Shehuizhuyiyanjiu, no. 1 (2000), pp. 52-55.
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(3) Administrative influence from local government
In China, since local judges and courts are appointed and funded by local authorities, they
often seek to protect local interests while sacrificing or even infringing interests of outsiders.
Decentralisation of the economy has increased the dependence of local government on local
enterprises for revenue, so local governments employ all means to encourage and control the
development of the local economy. Local protectionism can cause potentially serious
damage to the effort to build a national market economy.
Human resources, budgets and benefits in the courts are all controlled by
governmental agencies at the equivalent level, and the local judiciary is an administrative
agency with no difference from other governmental agencies. This institutional arrangement
further exposes the courts to day-by-day pressure from powerful agencies. The local
administration may persuade a litigant party to withdraw a lawsuit, which involves an
administrative defendant or a local party. They may also ask the trial judges to issue an
unjust or even illegal judgement, or they may transfer a judge who tries to be impartial. By
being subject to local authorities, courts at the local level become the local government's
courts.
The problem in enforcing court judgements [zhixing nan, tklT>®] has become a
regular focus in the SPC annual reports submitted to the NPC and has received prominent
coverage in the press since 1988. This not only reflects the weakness of courts in protecting
rights and resolving conflicts, but also shows the reality of local protectionism. Since there is
a long tradition in China of suspicion towards the courts and litigation, the execution of court
decisions, therefore, is crucial in enhancing confidence in the courts. "Even when parties
overcome traditional reluctance to sue and persevere through litigation to obtain a favourable
judgement, they may fail to vindicate their claim because of difficulties in enforcing court
judgements".31
One major function for the law and courts is to safeguard property rights. Thus,
whether a legal system can provide security for the economic interests of different market
actors will have great influence on the future of the market economy and the rule of law.
Unlike criminal and administrative decisions, which can be enforced through state coercive
means, civil and economic judgements, which are crucial to safeguard property rights, are
mainly enforced by litigants' voluntary actions. However, the institutional powerlessness of
the courts has become one reason for the difficulty of enforcing judicial decisions.
Official texts show the low rate in enforcing court judgements, attributing the major
reason to local and departmental protectionism. For example, Xiao Yang highlighted the
31 Lubman, 1999, p. 266.
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dilemma of judicial enforcement. In a report submitted to the NPC in 2001, he admitted that
this problem remained uncorrected, especially in economic decisions. Even if some
judgements were executed they were usually carried out at the expense of legality or
involved violent resistance. He claimed that local protectionism created a formidable
obstacle to the enforcement of judgements against local individuals or enterprises.32
When disputes arise between a local enterprise and an outside one, under pressure,
local courts may favour the local litigant either by unfairly giving judgement to the litigant or
failing to enforce a judgement against that litigant. On some occasions, local protectionism
even covered up criminal acts. Some local courts, at the request of the local administration
and enterprises, have gone outside their jurisdiction to apprehend a litigant or to take a
person hostage for debt collection; sometimes, they have used courtrooms to detain a
disputant to force him to accept certain conditions about the case.33
Local protectionism has challenged strongly the weakness of the central government
and the legal system. Disobedience to court orders is thus quite common since the courts do
not possess greater authority than other agencies. Some agencies, such as the banking system,
which usually has the duty to assist in enforcing court judgements, is often reluctant to co¬
operate since it is parallel to the courts in the administrative hierarchy.34
In 1999, the Central Committee for Discipline and Investigation (the CCDI) and the
Ministry of Supervision, both being internal surveillance agencies for Party and government
officials, respectively, issued a notice, calling for a strict check on acts involving illegal and
irregular enforcement of judicial judgements. The notice shows how some governmental
departments deliberately create obstacles to the enforcement of court decisions, and how
some cadres ignored or set themselves above the law through arbitrary interference in
judicial work. It highlights six ways in which local governmental agencies hamper the
enforcement of court decisions.35
1) By using an official post or political power to replace the law, either through "writing
a note" [pi tiaozi, to or "having a word" [da zhaohu, fj] with the court
or judges;
2) By making or issuing illegal regulations, documents, and instructions in relation to
specific cases to show favouritism to local or departmental interests;
32 Xiao Yang, SPC working report, in Falii nianjian, 2001, pp. 30-31.
33 Cao Siyuan, "Reform Court System to Deal With Localism", interviewed by the VOA, 30 March
1998.
34 For example, see Donald C Clarke, "Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The
Enforcement ofCivil Judgements", Columbia journal ofAsian Law, 10:1 (1996), pp. 1-92.
35 Renmin ribao, 19 October 1999, p. 3.
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3) By concealing, transferring or secretly distributing public property of SOEs, or by
inducing SOE workers to hold a demonstration to resist court officials;
4) By refusing to assist court enforcement, especially of outside decisions, even when
these agencies have a legal responsibility to assist such enforcement;
5) By restructuring and rearranging enterprise ownership to forge a bankruptcy or a
false mortgage to escape debts;
6) By refusing (in the case of local courts) to enforce a decision made by another court
against a local party, or postponing and even pending such an enforcement.
Thus the authority of PRC courts has been seriously undermined by powerful administrative
interference.
(4) Social connections and networks
In addition, complicated social and personal connections or networks [guanxi or renqing,
A lit ] also undermine judicial independence. The maintenance of established
institutional and individual relationships has always been important in China throughout its
history. Judges may take advantage of their localised position and keep long and stable
relationship with a wide range of people and agencies, such as relatives, neighbours,
classmates or friends, lawyers, governmental officials and managers, as well as
governmental agencies and companies. They both benefit and feel pressure from such a wide
connections during their daily work.
The low salaries of the judges make them easy to face external influence and
financial temptation. For example, a judge may often need to travel to collect evidence that is
difficult to obtain, such as evidence held by a bank or other state agencies. Since the
allowance for such travel is low, it is often supplemented by one or both of the parties
involved in the case. It is widely believed that the party that travels together with the judge is
most likely to win the case. Sometimes, judges meet with one of the parties and their lawyers
outside the courts without the other party's presence. The meeting may be held over dinner
table or on other informal occasions. Judges often seek financial contributions from both
sides, giving rise to a popular saying in contemporary China "(judges) eat the plaintiff and
then the defendant while attributing the reason of this to the imperfection of the legal
system" [chi leyuangao chi beigao, hai shuo fazhi bu jianquan, IK pT >
Being subject to so many internal and external influences, China's judicial system
thus lacks independence and is relatively powerless. This is shown in at least three ways.
First, courts have no power to interpret laws and regulations but may only apply them, and
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their judgements have no formal value as precedents. In Western countries, judges have the
right to interpret laws and set precedents. In China, only legislative agencies have the power
to interpret laws and regulations. Moreover, courts cannot invalidate any regulations even if
they are in conflict with state laws.
Secondly, the jurisdiction of the courts is limited. For example, some Party and
governmental officials in practice are above the law. Corrupt officials or law-breakers are
not dealt with by the courts but by Party discipline. The Party CCDI decides on whether to
punish them according to Party rules or to transfer them to the courts. Party officials in CCDI
have judicial power in investigating corrupt officials, such as confiscating travel documents,
videotaping suspects without their knowledge and freezing bank accounts. In addition, a
huge number of cases involving ideological dissidents and minor crimes are dealt with
directly by administrative measures either by SI or RETL rather than by the courts.
Finally, there is an excessive number of reviewing on court judgements. Cases may
be reopened and reviewed even without any request by the parties, but simply as
administrative supervision. They may be reviewed by the same court that rendered the
original judgement or by a higher-level court. If the SPC or a higher-level court discovers an
error in a lower-level court, they may either review such matters themselves or order a retrial
at the lower level.40 The Procuratorate may also request a case to be reopened. The decision
whether a judgement is wrong or needs to be reviewed is regarded as an internal matter
within the relevant institutions. The selection of cases for review is usually based on the
potential public impact or merely for quality control. Re-adjudication is highly flexible and
the procedure is informal, resulting in frequent favouritism.
The multiplicity of review processes is an example of the different concepts of
judicial systems in the West and in China. As Lubman notes, in the West, one must not
request to reopen his case based on the same facts and issues as long as he/she has had a fair
and full trial. This is to uphold procedural justice and judicial authority even if doing so at
the expense of some substantive justice. However, China's legal system rarely encourages
any procedural justice while sacrificing a substantive outcome. This has "obvious
implications for the attainability of the rule of law in China," and it "introduces instability
and variability that runs counter to the Western ideal of the rule of law, especially if
outcomes are revised for political reasons."36
The following case shows how difficult it is to make a court judgement final. In
1997, two businessmen Ma Deming and He Guicai dissolved their partnership to operate a
40 Arts 177 and 179 in the Criminal Procedural Law.
36 Lubman, 1999, p. 271-272.
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coke plant because of conflicts. According to their agreement, He was to pay back Ma his
investment of 461,653 yuan, but He failed to do this. In 1998, Ma sued He at the Liiliang
Intermediate-Level Court (LILC), Shanxi. The court ruled that the defendant, He, should
return money with interest and litigation costs. The defendant did not appeal and thus the
decision came into effect.
However, although the defendant did not make an appeal, the case was reopened
four times; each time the plaintiff won, but the court decision was still not enforced. When
Ma made inquiries, a senior judge told him: "You do not know the law. Engaging in a
lawsuit [da guansi, jTjlrwJ] is just like a game of ball, where the ball goes from one side to
another for several rounds until one side finally wins two out of three matches..."37 In 2001,
the vice-president of the LILC interviewed Ma after his repeated appeals, and ordered the
enforcement of the initial ruling. By that time, however, the assets of the defendant, which
had been frozen before the trial, were gone, and Ma was left with heavy debts and the family
suffered serious deprivation. In early 2002, Ma was informed that the provincial higher level
court in Shanxi (SHLC) had suspended enforcement again because it had decided to retry the
case. To date, the case is still pending and Ma has not received any redress.
A LILC judge in this case revealed that the reason behind the re-trial was that the
defendant used official connections to have the case reopened many times, in order to reduce
the amount due to Ma. He warned Ma not to seek support from high levels even if the ruling
was not enforced in future, since the defendant would only continue to seek help. This case
shows the difficulty in enforcing rulings even in very straightforward cases.38
2. Judicial fairness and efficiency
The close institutional connection between the judiciary and Party-government, the
internal review of cases within the court system, and dependence of individual judges on
their superiors and social networks, all undermine court authority and function. At the same
time, the low level of education and professionalism among judges also causes mistakes and
abuses. In order to assure judicial justice and efficiency, an independent and accountable
judiciary are needed. In China, there is a lack of institutional guarantee for a real independent
judiciary, and efforts in building judicial ethic and standard begin just recently. In latter case,
there is a long way to go.
37 See Fazhi ribao online, 6 September 2002 (www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2002-
09/06/content_42832htm).
38 In February 2002, Ma knew from the LIPC that the SHLPC ruled to suspend the enforcement of its
final decision because it decided to retrial again. But Ma did not receive such ruling yet. At last, the
SHLPC revoked this ruling of suspending the enforcement and retry the case. ibid.
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(1) Judicial unfairness and corruption
Judicial fairness not only requires structural arrangements but also requires social and
cultural conditions in which broad beliefs and expectations of judicial independence are
cultivated among the public including judges. Many PRC judges are often too poorly trained
to perform their duties. Even if many legal training sessions have been conducted,
incompetence in the judiciary remains a serious problem to this date. Besides, raising
professional standard alone cannot resolve structural deficiencies in which the courts are not
independent but subject to Party leadership and local government. Moreover, the courts have
been deeply involved in serious corruption, which is a part of widespread corruption among
all state agencies. Too many judges use their power to pursue personal interests.
All of these problems cause serious damage to the authority of the courts and the
fostering of a legal culture. Appeals for more effective supervision over the judiciary have
been frequently made by scholars and politicians, whose proposals include legislative
supervision over individual cases by People's Congress at all levels, holding the judges
responsible for their wrong decisions, and referring pending cases to superior judges for
advice. The proposals might compromise judicial independence, however, in China, more
concerns and efforts have been given to control judicial corruption than to judicial
independence. In other words, the latter is clearly not the priority at the moment in public's
concern. Yet liberal scholars, such as Cao Siyuan and He Weifang, have called for a genuine
judicial independence, dealing with localism through establishing a federal court system and
changing judges' working venue from time to time, and a decent salary for judges to foster
their clean and just virtues.39
(2) Efficiency and right protection
Judicial fairness and judicial efficiency are two goals for China's
judicial reform in the SPC Five-Year Programme. In recent years, China's courts have taken
steps to improve efficiency in the face of rising caseloads and stagnant resources. However,
there is always a risk that gains in efficiency may come at the expense of justice. The
proportion of criminal cases tried according to summary procedure ranges from 25% to 60%
39 Cao Siyuan, 18 April 2001, in World Economic Forum: China Business Summit 2001
(http://www.weforum.org/site/knowlcdgenavigator.nsf/Content/_S42297open); He Weifang, "Faguan
zhiyehua shi fazhi xiandaihua de zhongyao biaozhi: faguan zhiyehua zhuanjia luntan" [The
professionalisation of judges is an important mark of modernisation of the rule of law: Experts Forum
on judges' professionalisation], in Beijing University website, 9 July 2002
(http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticlelD=26366).
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of total criminal cases in some courts.40 Although there are gains in efficiency, there has
been little or no discussion of the effects of such procedural reform on justice or defendants'
lawful rights and interests. Some judges may be encouraged to persuade defendants to accept
summary trial, overlooking problems found in evidence, especially in confessions. For
example, in some cases, judges have failed to inform defendants of their rights to a full trial,
or to explain the consequence of agreeing to simplified procedures.
In principle, if defendants raise objections to summary procedure, they have the right
to full procedures, but this right is often denies by judges on the pretext of needing to resolve
old caseload. The real problem lies elsewhere. Firstly, the criminal system in China has an
inherent imbalance of power among three judicial agencies, with the PSB enjoying the most
powerful position. Neither the statute law nor the other two judicial agencies have the
authority to curb police abuses of human rights during criminal investigations. Cases that
involve police use of torture in extracting evidence are often decided according to summary
procedures, while the Procuratorate and courts ignore the fact that evidence has been
obtained by such illegal action, especially during annual "strike hard" campaigns. Secondly,
the three agencies are all part of the Party-state apparatus, which requires them to co-operate
rather than co-curb. Thus any doubts about a case or evidence will not affect their
determination to speed up the rate of resolving criminal cases. Finally, there is no powerful
legal representation to safeguard defendants' rights. Thus, the defendant involved in a
criminal process is excessively vulnerable.
Efficiency must not be maintained at the expense of fairness. A fair trial requires
being open to the public, conducted according to due process and with access to lawyers. In
China, however, procedural justice is frequently ignored, open trial is not guaranteed, legal
representation is often restricted, and legal aid is very limited. As a result, miscarriage of
justice and infringement of rights are common. At the same time, the number of unresolved
cases is increasing every year, and difficulties in the enforcement of court decisions persist.
The importance of evidence is not emphasised in judicial practice, which is
important for a fair trial. Courts are required under the CPL to make judgements by "taking
the facts as the basis and the law as the yardstick" [yi shishi wei yiju, yifalii wei zhunshen, til
This requirement is based on political considerations rather
than legal principles, and is evidence of political interference in judicial work; it follows the
traditional emphasis on substantive justice while ignoring due procedures. PRC law provides
40
Jeffery Prescott, "Efficiency and Justice in Summary Criminal Trials," Fazhi ribao, 24 July 2003, p.
8 (www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/2003-07/24/content_39533.htm); also in The Chinese Law Centre in
Yale Law School (http://Chinalaw.Yale.edu/pdf/JPEfficiency_eng.pdf).
155
that as long as the main facts are clear and the main evidence is sufficient (even if there is an
element of reasonable doubt), the accused will be found guilty as charged. The rule of law,
however, requires that judges rely on evidence rather than facts to try a case; facts must be
subject to proof by lawful evidence before they become meaningful at a trial, and only then
do facts become legal facts or legal truth.
The principle of open trials may also be ignored due to the low level of
professionalism in the courts. For example, judges are reluctant to conduct open trials
because they are used to making decisions on the basis of fdes and interviews and lack
confidence in the procedures of open courts. They are especially reluctant when it comes to
economic disputes, because they lack expertise in economic and financial matters.41
Moreover, current law stipulates that politically and religiously sensitive cases and cases
concerning state secrets or personal privacy may not be open. Open trials have been a goal of
judicial reform. In practice, however, cases that go to open trial are carefully selected to
serve the purpose of legal popularisation and maintaining social stability. Admission for a
selective case to be open to the public is limited to a Chinese citizen with a PRC identity
card.
Thus there are many obstacles to a fair trial, and the judicial process is full of
unfairness and corruption. At the same time, judicial efficiency cannot be ensured, since the
courts and judges are exposed to interference from many sources. The difficulty of enforcing
court judgements is a good example of poor efficiency. While court judgements are difficult
to enforce, there has been an increase in extra-judicial means to resolve disputes. As Lubman
summarises based on statistics in PRC law yearbook throughout 1991 and 1997, 64.6% of
the total settled cases were done so through mediation in 1990, the proportion increased to
over 51% of the total number of settled cases in 1998 from one million to three million. He
notices that the number of cases resolved through adjudication has also increased during the
period 1991 to 1998, which rose from 19.1 % of the total number to 48.6%.42 In 1999,
1,500,264 of 3,519,244 civil cases were resolved through mediation or 42.6% of the total
number of decided cases; 631,829 of 1,529,877 economic cases, or 41.2% of total cases,
were mediated.43 The mediated cases have shown a trend of decreasing in terms of the
proportion among the total cases, but the number remains tremendous, especially if taking
account the general increase of caseload over this period.
There is nothing improper in mediation itself because extra-legal means have been
accepted as efficient and convenient method to resolve disputes in many countries today. In
41
Lubman, 1999, p. 260.
42 Lubman, 1999, p. 273.
43
Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 2000, p. 760.
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China, however, the reasons for judges to favour more mediation in resolving cases than
adjudication may not merely for its convenience but for some other reasons, such as
influences from outside and financial interests, or avoiding embarrassment due to ignorance
of specific knowledge needed in trial. The process ofmediation is often full of compromises
and unlawful practices, and sometimes coercion is used to force one party to accept a
decision. Instead of safeguarding rights, mediation may prevent individuals from exercising
their legal rights. Mediation not only undermines court credibility but also discredits its own
role as an informal mechanism. Unfairness in mediation furthers people's distrust in courts
and the law, encouraging them to use informal means through seeking connections and
bribery the judges in resolving their disputes.
(3) Failure injudicial review of Party-state power
The low status of the courts poses particular difficulties in curbing state power. According to
the ALL, citizens are entitled to sue state agencies (min gao guan, pfl=f, literally in
Chinese an citizen sues an authority or official). However, the courts cannot check a criminal
investigation carried out by the police under the ALL. This is counter to the general principle
that the police may not deprive anyone of his freedom or impose any penalty without court
decision.44
As discussed in Chapter Three, the PSB carries out general management of social
security, which is defined as an administrative act and thus within the jurisdiction of the
ALL. However, two major administrative coercive measures (SI and RETL), which are used
to detain hundreds of thousands of people each year, are not subject to judicial review
despite breaching the constitution and law. In addition, misconduct committed by Party
members and state officials is usually not reviewed by the courts but by Party and
administrative discipline institutions.
In China, the enforcement of the ALL meets with strong resistance from state
agencies and officials. An ordinary citizen or company usually faces great obstacles in
challenging authorities and officials, and the courts have only limited authority to hold
powerful agencies accountable for their abuses. Problems in this area are many. An
administrative agency may deliberately fail to inform citizens of their right to file a charge or
delay this information so that the statute of limitation expires. The affected party may be
poorly aware of his right to litigation or may be prevented from using this right. The courts
may be reluctant to deal with an administrative case, since the local judiciary is subject to
local authorities or simply because there are close institutional interests between the courts
44 A W Branley & K D Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, p. 532.
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and local agencies. Finally, ordinary defendants may be refused permission to attend the trial
or present evidence, while powerful defendants may even threaten the plaintiff or the
presiding judges.
In this situation, although there was an increase in administrative litigation from
13,006 in 1990 to 93,642 in 2001,45 the general rate of increase remains low as compared to
other cases in the same period. There has been an average of less than twenty such cases
each year nationwide, with a maximum of thirty-three in 2001. Some courts did not accept a
single such case in a year. Among the cases that the courts accepted, two-thirds did not come
to trial or to a court ruling, usually because the plaintiff withdrew. The success rate for
plaintiffs was below 20%.46
The nationwide rate of withdrawal during this specific period was over one-third of
all cases at the first instance, and at maximum 57.3%. The withdrawal rate in some courts
amounted to 81.7% 47 Many lower courts had no or very few administrative cases to try, and
the administrative bench in some courts could not operate because of inadequate personnel to
form a collegial panel.48
Reasons behind this high rate include: (1) the defendant administrative agency
corrected its wrong action after the litigation, in which the agency usually made its decision
without following legal procedures or having abused its power while not realising its mistake
until it was sued. In this case, the plaintiff considered that his interests had been safeguarded
and thus dropped the suit which undermined the lawful interests of many others who had
been affected by this governmental action. (2) the plaintiff feared losing the case would bring
more trouble in future from the defendant, for he believed that the court would protect the
defendant agency rather than stand up for a civilian due to mutual protection among state
agencies [guan guan xiang hu, "If TlT (3) the plaintiff dropped the charge due to
45
However, cases of this type became fewer after 1998, declining at the rate of 21% in 2000. One
reason for the decline is the implementation of the new Administrative Redress Law in 1999, which
opened up more areas for administrative reconsideration rather than for judicial review.
46
Ying Songnian, "Wanshan xingzheng susongfa zhuanjia tan: xiugai xingzheng susongfa shi zai bi
xing" [Experts talk about the perfection of the ALL: it is bound to revise the ALL], Fazhi ribao, 3
March 2002, p. 3.
47 He Haibo, "Xingzheng susong chesu kao" [Reflection on withdrawal of cases in administrative
litigation], in Zhongguo xingzheng faxue jingcui [Quintessentials of China's administrative
jurisprudence] (Beijing: Falii chubanshe, 2002), p. 204.
48 Bao Wanchao, "Min gao guan: zhongguo de xianzhuang, kunhuo yu gaige—Guangxi, Ningxia
liang qu xingzheng susong de shishi wu zhounian shikuang diaocha fenxi" [Citizens sue officials:
China's present status, puzzlement and reform—report on investigating the reality of the fifth
anniversary in implementing the ALL in two regions of Gaungxi and Ningxia], Zhengfu fazhi, no. 5
(1996), pp. 4-7.
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pressure and a threat from the defendant. (4) The court persuaded the plaintiff to withdraw
the case, especially when the defendant was most probably going to lose the case.49
Even if the court eventually tries an administrative case, the defendant is likely to
ignore the judgement and the court can do nothing about this. For example, a businessman,
Ma Yijun, obtained permission for land development in 1995 in Mishan, Heilongjiang. In
1996, Ma sued the builder, and during the second trial, some local officials tried several
times to intervene in the case without success. When the court was about to make its decision
in 1997, the local government issued a document to put the relevant land to tender
irrespective of the fact that Ma was the legitimate developer. At the tender meeting, the local
government gave Ma's land development right to his adversary, the builder. Ma sued the
local government under the ALL for infringing his rights.
In 1999, the court rescinded the document issued by the defendant on the grounds
that it breached legal procedures for failing to inform the plaintiff of his right to a hearing
when transferring the land to the other party, and that the local government (the defendant)
could not intervene in a civil dispute since it was not a relevant party. The court ruled that
the defendant should return the land to Ma. However, the defendant refused to obey the court
decision.50
The following case51 is another example of an administrative agency acting counter
to the law, and also shows the difficulties faced by an ordinary citizen suing a state agency.
Wu Chengnong was a farmer in his seventies from Rui'an, Zhejiang. In 1975 he built up a
two-storied factory after approval from the village Party Committee. In September 2000, the
Rui'an authority decided to bring the local environment under control by clearing up the
streets and demolishing unregulated buildings. Wu accepted a notice from the local Planning
Bureau in which his name was misspelled as Song Rong'an, ordering him to demolish the
factory before 26 September on the grounds that the building had breached the city planning
regulation. Wu ignored the notice since it seemed not to be addressed to him. On the
morning of 27th, however, the town head brought some people to the village to demolish the
factory, leaving all the machinery buried in the rubble.
In October, Wu brought about an administrative lawsuit to the local court. The court
tried to protect the buried machinery for evidence, but the local authority in charge of
construction together with the township government used a bulldozer to destroy it. Wu then
49 Li Yun, "Guanyu xingzheng anjian fei zhengchang chesu de sikao" [Reflections on abnormal
withdrawals of administrative cases], Zhongguo fayuan wang, in Zhengyi wang (Jiancha ribao), 5
June 2003 (http://211.100.18.62/fzdt/xwnr.asp?id=9358).
50 Fazhi ribao website (http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2001-04/content_16063.htm).
51 "Che fang che chu xingzheng guansi lai" [An administrative litigation arises from the demolition of
a factory], Fazhi ribao, 5 September 2002, p. 8.
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started another suit for civil compensation for his property rights. The court tried the case in
March 2001. Wu's lawyer proved that the disputed factory was not an illegal building, and
that the local authority acted illegally by demolishing the factory and then destroying the
evidence. The joint defendants (Planning bureau and the township government) refused to
accept responsibility. The court ruled in favour of the defendants on the grounds that the
evidence provided by the plaintiff, including photos, video and witnesses, could not prove
that the defendants had acted unlawfully. Thus the court rejected Wu's lawsuit.
Wu appealed and the appellate court, the Wenzhou Intermediate-Level Court
(WILC), repealed the first court ruling in June 2001 and ordered a retrial. The original court
retried the case and came to the same conclusion. It now ruled that the factory was a lawful
building when it was first built in the 1970s. However, it noted that the factory was
destroyed by a typhoon in 1994, Wu failed to apply for a new approval according to local
planning regulations and also failed to register its ownership with the government. For these
reasons, Wu was held to have acted unlawfully in rebuilding the factory in 1995.
Wu appealed again on three grounds. First, the court ignored the fact that the
defendants neither gave Wu a chance for a redress nor issued a notice for compulsory
enforcement before the demolition was carried out. Second, the court failed to make the
defendants present the legal basis for their action and thus the demolition was illegal. Third,
the factory was rebuilt before the local planning regulation was made, so this regulation
could not be applied to the case. Finally, whether the new factory was registered or not was
neither a factor determining whether the factory was legal or not, nor was it within the
jurisdiction of the defendants.
In the end, the WILC tried the case and ruled that the defendants had breached the
law and should compensate Wu 160,000 yuan. However, this amount was far lower than
Wu's actual loss since the value of the machinery could not be accurately assessed.
Moreover, since Wu has to date not yet receive a formal ruling from the appellant court, the
enforcement has not been carried out.
A citizen who wins his case is often driven into a desperate situation. Wu Boliang
was an innovative farmer in Nanfeng, Jiangxi, who was one of the first to get a government
contract to use a plot for farming. After a dispute about the contract between Wu and the
village government arose, he sued the latter and won the case in January 2001. The court
ordered the village government to compensate Wu 640,000 yuan, but the latter refused to
accept the court decision. Despite this, the court did not take any measures to enforce its
decision. Since he received no compensation from the defendant, Wu fled to a mountain
hideout in order to escape his debt collectors. When Wu appealed to the judge in charge of
160
enforcement, he was told that it could never be carried out because the village government
had no money, and that Wu should not disturb him any more in future. This drove Wu into
such despair that he even tried to commit suicide.52
The difficulties in the administrative litigation show the weakness of the law in
protecting private rights against state infringement and in restricting governmental power.
Thus the function of the ALL in constraining official arbitrariness has failed. Under the ALL,
both litigant parties should have equal rights as with other types of litigation, but in practice
the defendant is in a superior position. For example, if a legal representative of a company
sues an administrative agency, the superior body of the company will strip him of his
qualification for representing the company.53 Even in judicial reviews, administrative
agencies are more powerful than judicial agencies, so that the courts are unable to constrain
them by using the ALL mechanism. The local Party and government interfere in
administrative cases by making inquiries, giving instructions or even reviewing cases.
Thus powerful state agencies strongly resist judicial review and place their power
above the law. Other supervision over this power, whether from the legislature or within the
administrative hierarchy, is also weak. Moreover, China lacks powerful media or a robust
civil society to monitor the officialdom. The weakness injudicial checks over Party and state
power further results in the expansion of administrative arbitrariness and ignorance of
individual rights. Traditional attitude towards the law in China also discourage citizens from
taking legal actions against state agencies and makes them, especially the officials, unwilling
or even ashamed to become involved in legal litigation.
Failing to curb public power and protect private rights, the PRC judiciary itself has
not been immune from systematic corruption in state agencies. Before 1986, cases involving
corruption were relatively rare in law enforcement agencies. Since then, an increasing
number of officials from these agencies have been involved in either graft or profit-seeking
activities.54 Judicial corruption has become a major target of anti-corruption efforts in recent
years. As Lti Xiaobo records, in 1996, corruption cases involving law enforcement personnel
increased by 23% over the previous year. In the first ten months of 1997, there were 7,208
such cases, in which 1,303 involved middle or high-ranking officials in judicial agencies. In
1998, nearly 10,000 law enforcement agencies were investigated for involvement in business
activities. As a result, 1,339 agencies were restructured and 2,270 senior officials were
52 "Min gao guan, shen le you ruhe?" [A citicen sues an authority: what can you do even though you
have won the case?], Zhongguo qingnian bao, 28 March 2001, p. 3
53
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54 Lii Xiaobo, Cadres and Corruption: the Organisational Evolution of the Chinese Communist Party
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removed from their posts.55 The figure of corrupt judicial personnel has been increasing to
this day and the situation is difficult to control .
Corrupt judicial officials may extort money from litigant parties, leak information to
one party or criminal suspect; they may accept bribery, gifts, or dinner invitations from
litigants; they may handle cases without following legal procedures or refuse an open trial
required by law; they may use their power to arrange lawyers who have good connections
with them to represent a case, or meet with one party and his lawyer outside the court; a
judge may place a lawyer who is a personal friend into a case which is already represented
by other lawyers, claiming that the friend's speciality is needed in this case; judges may
appropriate the money collected on behalf of their clients from enforcing court decisions. For
example, three judges in Shenyang, Liaoning, among whom one was a vice-president of the
district court and another was vice bench chief, and two judges in Hubei, lost millions of
funds collected from enforcement in gambling.56 The Anticorruption Bureau, which was
established in the early 1990s to attack official misconduct, is itself not free from corruption.
At its worst, the situation is out of control.
According to an SPC regulation, the president of local high level courts must take
responsibility for lawbreakers in their jurisdiction by reporting their work to local Party
committees and the People's Congresses or go all the way to the SPC if the case is major and
influential. In 2000, 20 presidents from provincial higher level courts went to the SPC to
undergo such examination, followed by self-criticism to the local authorities; at the same
time, 32 senior court officials were dismissed from their posts and sentenced to life
imprisonment. A total of 1,450 court personnel broke the law in this year, of which 1,377
were dealt with under the Party or administrative disciplinary rules and only 73 were
punished by law.57
The current judicial reform has tried to improve personal quality through changing
traditional channels for judge recruitment, enforce judicial decisions and improve
adjudicating procedures. Xiao Yang admitted, after addressing problems such as emphasis of
substantial justice while ignoring due procedures; too many pending cases each year affected
court image and authority; local and departmental protectionism in hampering enforcing
court decisions; many mistakes happened in judicial process due to lack of professional
knowledge and practical ability among judges, that not all judges were conscientious in
55 Lii Xiaobo, pp. 197-198.
56 Jiancha ribao, 6 September 2002, p. 2. In China, the enforcement bench in the court carries out the
enforcement of court judgements. The money obtained from the enforcement is directly transferred to
the court account titled as enforcement account rather than to the other party, and then the court will
transfer the money to the entitled party.
57 SPC report, in Law yearbook, 2001, p. 31.
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serving the people but were rude and arrogant; a minority ofjudges abused their adjudication
power to forge legal documents in order to seek private interests, leading to many
miscarriages of justice.58 These problems remained in his 2002 working report.
The regime has launched a series of campaigns that focused specifically on the
education and regulation of court personnel. The courts, later followed by all sectors, were
required to improve their ethical standard and moral level, according to the Programme of
Citizens' Ethical Construction.59 Furthermore, regulations about judges' withdrawal from
cases where they, their relatives, or friends are involved are also made by the SPC, and the
Judges' Law was revised in 2001 accordingly. However, improvement of virtue alone cannot
assure judicial fairness. Judicial corruption is a part of the institutional corruption arising
from the political system and from the long-standing tradition as an authoritarian country.
Corrupt judges are not different from those in other state agencies. The rule of law requires
first an independent judiciary, free from Party and government interference, and then a
culture of the rule of law among public servants and the citizenry. Only in this may judicial
fairness be guaranteed and judicial corruption, together with the general political corruption,
be restricted within a minimum level.
3. Conclusion
The PRC courts have very limited independence institutionally and individually, and are
subject to a wide range of influences. The Party, through its PLC at all levels, ensures that its
judicial policy and ideological tasks are carried out. At the same time, the judicial system is a
hierarchy based on the democratic centralism of the Party and state, requiring lower courts
and judges to obey their superiors. Thus local courts are subject to local Party Committees
and governments and are often driven into protecting local interests or profit-seeking.
Party and government control over the judiciary has seriously undermined judicial
fairness and efficiency. The fact that the regime frequently requires courts to carry out extra¬
judicial functions has hampered the process of judicial professionalism. There is no legal
guarantee for independent adjudication since court personnel and financial matters are
dependent on local authorities. It is not just poor quality or judicial corruption that
undermines judicial independence. On the contrary, the lack of autonomy in the judiciary is
the fundamental reason for the unfairness and corruption.
58 The SPC report, pp. 31-32.
59 In 2001, the SPC issued an opinion called "Guanyu jia da zhiben lidu, yufang he zhili sifa renyuan
fubai xianxiang de yijian" [Opinions on increasing rectifying force in order to prevent and rectify
judicial personnel from corruption], Fazhi ribao, 18 May 2001, p. 1.
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The courts can only enforce the rule of law when the Party and state adopts, or yields
to, a different philosophy of governance. The rule of law is an ideology requiring
fundamental changes in the political system. As an eminent judge has pointed out, human
rights depend largely on the judiciary and its power, and democracy and social justice call
for vigilant watch by the judiciary, according to UN Basic Principles on the Independence of
the Judiciary (the powers of the court must be independent and the appointment of judges
and their tenure must also be independent).60
The rule of law requires a fair trial and due process for everyone, and when
individual life and liberty are violated by the state and its officials or other political
heavyweights, the courts must have the authority to intervene. Judicial independence and
security of tenure are significant in maintaining social order. The misconduct of judges must
be punished without affecting the fearless performance of judicial functions. At the same
time, contempt of court and defiance of judicial orders should never be allowed. The
administrative power should not have the power to remove judges. For judicial misconduct,
there should be an independent institution to be empowered to investigate rather than
handled by administrative agencies.
To date, China's judicial review of governmental actions is too limited to play a role
in constraining Party and state power. As long as the Party leadership is superior to the law
in practice, the judiciary and law will lack genuine independence whatever the regime claims.
If the Party is truly committed to promoting the rule of law, it should not use the law as an
instrument for fulfilling its changing political tasks; it should instead give the judiciary
independence in solving conflicts and attaining social equilibrium. However, the focus of
judicial reform on enhancing fairness and efficiency rather than independence and autonomy
shows that the regime is reluctant to support judicial independence, for fear of undermining
the Party leadership. Without autonomy, it is not clear how a fair, just, and efficient judiciary
can be established. As one writer suggests, "the law should not serve any specific political
agenda, be it class struggle or the construction of a socialist market economy....just educate
the people about the importance of the rule of law. Do not put any demands on the courts and
the lawyers to toe the prevailing political lines."61
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Govern the State Process" (a paper presented at the Fourth Consultation on Due Process in China,
held from 23 to 29 May 1999 in Bangkok, Thailand, which was organised by the Asian Legal
Resource Centre of the Asian Human Rights Commission)
(http://www.google.com/search?q=Chinese+legal+reform&hl=en&start=80&sa=N).
61
Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China after Deng Xiaoping: The Power Struggle in Beijing since Tiananmen
(Singapore: Chichester Wiley, 1995), p. 265.
164
Chapter Six: An Official-based Legal Culture
It has been widely accepted that the rule of law assumes at least three important dimensions:
a government of laws rather than men, a clearly defined legal procedural system to the
protection of the citizen from abuse of state power, and a well-established and vivid legal
culture to support the legal institutions and process.1 Legal culture, which has evolved in a
society over a long period, unlike that which is imposed from above, reveals the mentality
and culture of this society in its attitude toward the law, and also decides the level of the rule
of law. It is difficult to define a legal culture since it can include any cultural practice or
value that affect people's attitude towards the law and legal institutions; it may refer to the
values and expectations among officials and common people in relation to law.2 Lawrence
Friedman defines a legal culture as "those parts of general culture—customs, opinions, ways
of doing and thinking—that bend social forces toward or away from the law and in particular
ways."3
Generally speaking, legal culture, in a broad way, includes the legal system and legal
consciousness among the officials and the people. In a specific way, legal consciousness
generally relates to people's thoughts about the law and their evaluation of the law, and the
legal institutions, which carry the values and standards relating to law that are common to
the whole society. It is these common values and needs in a society that determine the way
of thinking within which the legislative activity is carried out.4
Cultural elements have always played an important role during China's
transformation to a modern society, and "in the Chinese context, the transformation of
culture, or political culture, is often considered to be the key to the transformation of the
society."5 It is well known that a modern legal culture is very important to the establishment
of the rule of law. To foster this culture, it requires at least three elements. First, there are
well-defined laws for people to follow and there are fair and independent legal institutions
through which laws are strictly enforced. Second, there is a widespread respect for the law
' For example, see Donald Barry (ed.), Towards the "Rule ofLaw" in Russia? Political and Legal
Reform in the Transition Period (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), p. 199.
2
Stanley Lubman, Bird in A Cage, 1999, p. 37.
3 Lawrence M Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective (New York: Russell Sage:
1975), p. 15, quoted in Lubman, 1999, p. 37. For Friedman's further discussion of legal culture, see
his article, "The Concept of Legal Cultures: A Reply", in David Nelken (ed.), Comparing Legal
Cultures (Brookfield, VT.: Dartmouth, 1997), pp. 33-39.
4 Li Rui, "Shi lun zhongguo falti wenhua" [A tentative discussion of Chinese legal culture], Jinan
daxue xuebao, no. 4 (1999), p. 63.
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and the judiciary, and both state agencies and people abide by laws. Third, there is a well-
developed consciousness of rights and freedoms so that state agencies and officials can be
restricted from infringing individual rights and interests. These elements being in place,
individuals and companies can trust in law and the courts to resolve disputes and safeguard
their rights.
China's legal culture carries strong influences from its imperial tradition and the
PRC's early practice, which are both formed in a similar social environment—on a highly
centralised economic and political system. After the PRC was founded in 1949, the highly
centralised economy and one-Party rule provided a consistent social environment in favour
of the traditional culture of the rule of man. The reform, which started in the late 1970s,
focused on economic modernisation, and reforms in cultural and political tradition were not
the priority for the Party-state. The government plan for legal reform that has taken place is
to ensure two Party priorities: economic performance and social stability. This process
involves introducing a great number of Western legal concepts and rules. However, the
influence of Western legal culture is limited and adoption is fragmentary with the rejection
of a totally Western version of the rule of law.
Although the development of a legal system has been going on for over twenty years,
there is still not a legal environment for implementing the rule of law in China. The
resistance to law enforcement is strong and powerful. Party and governmental power are in
fact superior to the law and the judiciary, and even the courts have failed to fulfil their
professional goals in realising social justice. Legal awareness among the whole society,
especially among state officials, including judicial personnel, remains poor. Worship of
political power is embedded in China's traditional culture, and has profound influence on the
mentality, thoughts and assumptions of the officials and its people. This power is always
considered to be the highest authority while the law and the courts are less important, as are
lawyers, who have no official identity.
Thus the elements needed to foster a modern legal culture remain at an early stage in
development. Transforming thought and culture is the hardest task among all obstacles
facing the implementation of China's rule of law and this project will take a long time.
Moreover, the obstacles discussed in previous chapters will increase the difficulty and
complexity in nurturing a culture of legality in contemporary China.
5
Shiping Hua (ed.), Chinese Political Culture: 1989-2000 (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2001),
p. 3.
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1. Legal tradition based on the rule of man
Tradition and culture play a great role in shaping the spirit of a nation, and people always
pay a great respect for their traditional customs and values.6 For the greater part of its two-
millennial history, China has gradually developed its own law-related institutions and culture,
including approaches to legal problems, which are usually referred to as Chinese Legal
Traditions [zhonghua faxi, 1 These traditions have exerted a strong influence on
China's political and social life and have been integrated to Chinese culture and mentality.
Over the long imperial history, Confucianism is the underlying and dominant principle of
China's political and social institutions. At the same time, Legalism has also become a
supplement to Confucian principles. As MacCormack points out, traditional Chinese law is
Confucian in spirit and Legalist in form.8
Confucians believe in the fundamental goodness of men, advocating rule by moral
persuasion in accordance with the concept of li [^L, propriety, a set of generally accepted
social values or norms of behaviour]. Li is enforced by society rather than by courts.
Education is considered to be the key ingredient for maintaining social order, and codes of
law are intended only to supplement li rather than play their independent role. Li is
persuasive and thus the instrument of a virtuous government, while laws are compulsive and
the instrument of a tyrannical government. Laws are not better than the men who create and
execute them, while the moral training of the ruler and his officials count for more than a
well-designed legal system. Therefore, the imperial codes focus on the maintenance of the
inequality on which social status and class have been based, the differentiation of the senior
and junior, and on the strengthening of the clan system.9 Hence, "li does not extend down to
the common people, and xing [jflj, punishment] does not extend up to the officialdom."10
6 Robin Vitaly, "Confucius and Early Confucianism", in Steven Levine (trans.), Individual and
State in Ancient China: Essays on Four Chinese Philosophies (New York: Columbia University Press,
1976), pp. 10-11.
7
Zhang Jingfan, Zhongguo falii shi lun [On the history of Chineese law] (Beijing: Falii chubanshe,
1982), p. 11.
8 Geoffrey MacCormack, The Spirit ofTraditional Chinese Law (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 1996), p. 1.
9
During writing the part of imperial Chinese legal tradition, 1 have mainly consulted the following
books: Geoffery MacCormack, Traditional Chinese Penal Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1990) and his another book, The Spirit ofTraditional Chinese Law (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 1996); Derk Bodde & Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1973); Philip Huang, Civil Justice in China: Representation and
Practice in the Qing (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); and Ch'u T'ung-tsu, Law and Society
in Traditional China (Paris: Mouton, 1961).
10 MacCormack, Traditional Chinese Penal Law, p. 32.
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On the other hand, Confucian scholars and rulers accepted that teaching and moral
guidance alone would not suffice to secure good behaviour among the people. Penal laws,
while necessary, should principally be used to supplement and reinforce the moral values
held by the ruling elite, and to some extent, by the population at large". Law and punishment
were considered the secondary means of maintaining social tranquillity. They further argued
that li is preventive in that it turns the individual away from evil before he has the chance of
committing a crime; whereas law is punitive in that it only comes into action to punish the
wrongdoer. "If the people are guided by fa [7£, law], and order among them is enforced by
means of punishment, they will try to evade punishment, but have no sense of shame, but if
they are guided by virtue, and order among them is enforced by li, they will have a sense of
shame and also be reformed."12
In contrast, the Legalist tradition insists that a society can achieve harmony only
when transgressions are met with firm and swift punishments. It emphasises state power and
control rather than morality as the effective means to rule the state and the people. Only laws
that are clearly written and able to be vigorously enforced may curb social disruption and
crime. In the Legalist view, the object of law is deterrence, preventing offences through
intimidation. They advocate an authoritarian government in which law is an instrument for
the ruler to uphold his supremacy over his subjects by applying this equally to both officials
and commoners.
To sum up, the imperial legal system has the following characteristics:13
(1) Unequal treatment of individuals according to their social status
The law gave formal recognition to the social inequality, which in other ways
separated the vast commoners from the small and highly educated group of officials and
Confucian scholars. The nobles and officials were often immune from the jurisdiction of the
legal system. The judicial authorities do not have much power over these groups when they
committed crimes. The courts and law are mainly intended to deal with commoners.
First, the emperor was supreme over all classes, with the power of law-making and
final judgement of the offender. Second, the penal codes acknowledged entire categories of
" Maccormack, The Spirit of Traditional Chinese Law, p. 7.
12 Liu Binnan (annot.), Lunyu zhengyi [The annotation of the Analects], in Wang Yunwu (edi.),
Guoxue jiben congshu sibaizhong (Taibei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1969), 11, p. 28.
13 Literatures regarding China's imperial legal tradition are many, and the following summary is
mainly based on the works by MacCormack, Bodde and Morris, Ch'u T'ung-tsu (see note 9), and
Philip Chen (Law and justice: The Legal system in China 2400 B.C. to 1960 A.C, New York:
Dunellen, 1973)
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persons, who are qualified under the "eight conditions for consideration"[6a yi, AiX]14, as a
special privileged class to deserve special judicial procedures and treatment as compared to
the great majority of commoners. This particular class included members of the imperial
family, descendants of former imperial families, members of government officials and their
immediate relatives. It is this class especially that was expected to model its behaviour
according to the li.
People in these categories could not be arrested, investigated or tortured without the
permission of the emperor. The courts must first report the case to the emperor to decided
matters of arrest, punishment and execution.15 The emperor often considered reducing their
punishment to fines, reduction in official rank, or dismissal from the post. Punishment
applied to common people was not used to this social group because for such persons the
disgrace and shame entailed by their committing an offence or if they were dismissed from
post has been regarded as severe enough.
(2) The combination of judicial and administrative powers
The administration of law was based on a centralised system and not separated from the
imperial administrative system. The government at all levels plays both administrative and
judicial affairs, and thus the magistrates were also detectives, prosecutors and judges.
Legislative, judicial and administrative powers were highly concentrated on the hands of the
emperor. Officials at all levels could not make laws but only follow imperial laws and
decrees. Local officials often made their judgements on Confucian classics rather than the
penal code, allowing arbitrary interpretation and flexibility.16 In order to avoid injustice at
this lower level, imperial China adopts a well-defined appeal system for almost all cases to
go all the way to higher levels for final review or even to the emperor himself.
14 "Ba yi", which originated in the Zhou li [Rites of the Zhou dynasty], first entered the law of the
Wei dynasty (220-265), and has remained in all subsequent codes. It includes: (1) those who were the
relatives of the sovereign; (2) those who were old friends of the sovereign; (3) those who were of
great virtue; (4) those who were of great ability; (5) those who were meritorious; (6) those who were
high officials; (7) those who were exceptionally zealous of government duties; (8) those who were the
guests of the sovereign: descendants of the preceding imperial families. It was a law in the Han
dynasty that when nobles and officials from certain ranks were guilty, special permission had to be
requested from the emperor before they were arrested or even investigated. Both Ming and Qing
codes legalised this special privilege for those who qualified under the "eight conditions for
consideration".
15
Ming Code, vol, I, 6a; Qing Code, vol, 4, 25a, in Bodde & Morris, p. 35.
16 The magistrate was commonly assisted in his judicial work by a legal secretary who did possess
specialised knowledge of the law, and who, on behalf of the magistrate, could prepare cases for trial,
suggest appropriate sentences, or write the legal reports for the higher governmental authorities. Yet
he was merely a personal employee of the magistrate, who paid his salary out of his own private purse.
Hence the legal secretary was not permitted to try cases himself or even to be present at the trials. See
Bodde & Morris, p. 113.
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The preference for moral education to formal law also discourages any professional
developments in judicial work and legal profession. The distrust and disrespect of the legal
profession is a remarkable feature of the traditional Chinese legal culture. Private legal
specialists were regarded as troublemakers and "litigation tricksters" or "pettifoggers" [so/tg
gun, through fomenting litigation and bringing false accusations. Their activity was
regarded illegal and thus should be punished under the imperial law.
Corruption, irregularity and cruelty were full of the administration of justice in
imperial period.17 There was not an adversarial system for an individual to defend himself
and he had to give his fate at the mercy of authority. Torture for extracting confession was
imperial judicial procedure and a person was often jailed a long term before the trial. The
law is designed to protect the state from the people rather than the people from the state.18 As
a result, this law is primarily a "code of punishments,"19 or it should be regarded as
"administrative regulations"20.
(3) The domination of penal law and the poor development of rights
Since the major function of the imperial legal system was to punish crime and
maintain social order, civil and economic cases were normally settled through informal
means outside the courts. People were reluctant to go to court in fear of losing face,
reputation or good relationship, and they prefer settling disputes out of court through
mediation conducted by a third "prestigious" party comes from the local gentry and usually a
great of pressure on parties involved in the process and Confucian values were taught. The
other reason that people do not like litigation is that the dispute settlement is totally
controlled by the magistrate without considering their own will. In practice, law does not
reach down below the county government in which social groups, such as villages, clans,
families and other units play a significant role in settling disputes.
Therefore, the legal system is relatively insignificant in people's life.21 In civil cases
such as property rights and inheritance, the imperial officials either refer these cases back to
the village for local mediation or persuade the parties to make concessions and resolve the
dispute amicably. As Philip Chen says, the law plays only a secondary role in defending
17
Philip Chen, Law and justice: The Legal System in China: 2400 B.C. to I960 A.D (New York:
Dunellen, 1973), p. 8.
18
Ibid, pp. 9-10.




However, Philip Huang has challenged this argument, claiming that the Da Qing Liili (Qing code)
contains quite a lot of rules on civil law and that it was common for magistrates to deal with civil
cases. See his book, Civil Justice in China: Representation and Practice in the Qing (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1996).
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individual rights, especially his economic rights, and if this right was infringed by the
government or the state, the law had no remedy at all.22
(4) Consolidating family values and collective interests
The family values were regarded as fundamental to a stable imperial social order. The
imperial law fully recognised the parents' authority to control their children, seniors to the
juniors, and husbands to wives. Children had no independent right to have their own
property, to live separately from their parents, or even to choose their spouses. Thus disputes
between family members are always judged according to an individual's status in the family
or clan. Based on basic family values, an individual should be first subject to the interests of
his family or clan and then to the community, eventually to the state. The emphasis was
more on individual responsibility than rights, more on duty than freedom and more on
righteousness than pursuing profits.
From above summary, one may be impressive of the moralisation of imperial politics and
law, and of the instrumental use of law as a supplement to moral values. To date, the
ordinary people in China still find it difficult to distinguish moral problems from legal ones.
Law is still not elevated to a high, if not supreme, degree to regulate and constrain both
public and private activities. Instead, law is still used as a means together with many other
means to govern the state and the public. The emphasis of family and collective values is
also, in some extend, discouraging individual development. The low professional level in the
courts and no separation between the administrative and judiciary are also having a deep
impact on the legal system in contemporary China, so are legal profession and dispute
settlement. This legal tradition, in many Western observers' view, is fundamentally
incompatible with the requirements of the rule of law.23 There is hardly any similarity
between Western legal tradition, on which the rule of law is originated, and China's legal
tradition, because the former mainly emphasises protecting individual rights and curbing
bureaucratic power, an independent and accountable judiciary, and an autonomous legal
profession.24
22
Philip Chen, p. 11.
23 Western academics on modernisation theory and political culture agree "the weight of this
comparative critical analysis might suggest that there are more liabilities than assets in China's legal
tradition." See Ronald C. Keith, China's Struggle for the Rule ofLaw (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1994), P. 53.
24 Lubman made a detail comparison between Western and Chinese legal culture, 1999, pp. 13-32.
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2. Legal Culture in Contemporary China
China's traditional legal culture has a profound impact on the attitude and mentality of
administrators and ordinary people towards law and legal institutions. It has hardly changed
throughout all the revolutions and successive political campaigns that have happened in the
twentieth century. In China today, this legal culture itself is subject to reform. The
incomplete and ineffective conditions in the PRC legal system also contribute to the lack of
legal awareness. Moreover, continuous totalitarian rule hampers the development of a
modern legal culture.
The credibility and accountability of law determine the extent to which the society
will obey the law. This first requires that legislative activity be a democratic and rational
process in which legal notions should be well defined, predictable and enforceable; and
secondly it requires that legal principles fulfil social justice and be applied equally to all
subjects, and that laws must reflect the intention of safeguarding individual rights and
restricting official power.
During the period of reform, the lawless situation that existed during the Cultural
Revolution has been basically changed. However, the approach towards legal reform results
in frequent use of law as an instrument, viewing "objective reality" as the source of law but
only the CCP has the authority to decide what "reality" is according to its own needs and
ends.25 This principle is consistent with the Party mass line and working style, which stresses
seeking the truth from facts and requires adapting policy to actual conditions. As a result, the
law changes frequently, officials find ample space to distort laws and the public find it hard
td trust in law. Although instability in the law may be an acceptable cost during times of
reform, inconsistency and uncertainty in the law will introduce illegal constraints into
economic development. If economic reforms continue without the help of law, the law will
also lose its relevance to society and its legitimacy.26
Since administrative fiats are still more important than statutory laws in practice,
which shows the deep-rooted culture of the rule of man, legal transplanting is also an
instrumental process through selecting fragmentary foreign rules without accepting the rule
of law as a whole. Moreover, it takes a long time for new laws to penetrate into the life and
way of thinking among the public. Without a culturally favourable environment, these laws
25 Yu Xingzhong, Legal Pragmatism in the People's Republic ofChina, Journal ofChinese Law, no. 3
(1989), p. 50.
26 Ronald Keith, China's Struggle Towards the Rule ofLaw, 1994, p. 25.
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cannot take root in the new soil, leaving the rule of law more a slogan than a practice as
China moves into the twenty-first century.27
A modern legal culture needs a favourable environment for the enacted laws to be
strictly enforced and for society to obey voluntarily these laws. Respecting the law and
obeying the law are two basic dimensions for the fostering of a rule of law culture. Respect
for law requires "developing a conscious appreciation of the law", while obeying the law
stresses applying this consciousness to "appropriate social behaviour."28 It requires law's
supremacy over state power and individual officials' obedience to the law.
The actual situation in China is that the Party is above the law, and administrative
power is superior to the law and the judiciary. Thus major obstacles or difficulties in
establishing the rule of law lie in abuses of public power and its arbitrary infringement on
private rights. If governmental power cannot be constrained, laws and regulations will
become useless and rulers will set themselves above the law by trespassing private rights and
market freedoms. Without effective supervision and punishment, the network of political
power, developed over many years, is often a formidable influence in organised crime and
corruption.
Compared to the legal illiteracy [famang, fi g ] among the people, the lack of legal
consciousness among officialdom poses a more severe threat to the fostering of a culture of
the rule of law. An official-based culture [guanbenwei, favours the political power
and rule of men. It is those in power who determine the legal environment. Officials
frequently replace the law with their own words and notes, break laws and even commit
crimes. An investigation into the enforcement of the ALL, which was conducted in the early
1990s, revealed that only 38.5% of officials knew citizens' constitutional rights, 11.5% never
learned the constitution, 25.6% knew less than half of these rights, and only 16.5% knew all
of them. Many officials considered that the ALL "tied their feet and hands and affect work
efficiency".29
One example of poor legal consciousness among Chinese state officials is the so-
called "political performance projects" or "image projects" [zhengji gongcheng or xingxiang
gongcheng, that aim to show their political merit. Many of these
projects were illegal. For example, the Hubei provincial government decided in 1995 to
develop a luxurious residential area named "bund garden" [waitan huayuan, ^hl^-Z-tilzEl] in
27
Qiang Shigong, "Falii yizhi, gonggong lingyu he hefaxin" [Law Transplant, Public Domains and
Legitimacy], Guo fa wang (www.lawcn.com/classic/classic0001 .htm).
28 Ronald Keith, 1994, p. 17.
29
Gong Xiangrui, Fazhi de lixiangyu xianshi [The ideal of the rule of law and the reality] (Beijing:
Zhongguo zhengfa daxue chubanshe, 1993), p. 26-27.
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its capital city, Wuhan, for a cost of nearly 0.2 billion yuan. The Flood Prevention Law was
passed in August 1997 and enforced in January 1998. The law stipulates that any buildings
which would hamper the passage of floodwater within the area of rivers and lakes must be
prohibited. The Hubei provincial administration still mobilised all resources to carry out this
illegal project, and they did not stop it at once even after they were informed of the law. The
newly-built luxurious blocks of flat had eventually to be dynamited because they were right
in the flood-prevention zone.30
Officials in Nanjing planned to build a sightseeing platform on the hill of Zijinshan,
on which a building of historical heritage, the famous Zhijingshan Astronomical Observatory,
stands. The project was still carried out regardless of the state laws for the preservation of
historic heritages, and the platform finally had to be demolished, causing tremendous loss to
the state. It was reported in the Economic Reference News that officials in Jiujiang, Jiangxi,
invested nearly 10 million in building an airport but only received 100 passengers during the
course of a whole year. Another such airport was built in Wuhu, Anhui, with an annual profit
of only 6,000 to 7,000 yuan.3{ Many other officials from poor areas also launched many
image projects irrespective of the tight budget and low living standards of the people in their
jurisdictions. Examples of these projects are too many to list.
In these cases, the officials either have full knowledge of their illegal decisions or
arbitrarily carry out these projects without assessing the consequences of their decisions. It
reveals the habit of rule of man in which officials have been used to making their decisions
according to their own wishes rather than adhering to the law. They used law only to curb
the people, not their behaviour. This ignorance of law among state agencies and
administrators has not only caused great damage to state interests but also to the authority of
law. This is the great cost resulting from a society based on the rule of man.32 The greatest
constraint and threat to the rule of law are the replacement of public power with private
purpose, the infringement of public power on private rights, and the difficulty in controlling
such abuses. If officials do not set examples themselves in exercising administrative powers
on a legal basis, legal awareness in the whole society will be impossible to foster.
The ineffectiveness in controlling governmental power means the malfunction of the
rules, resulting in those in power being superior to the law. These powerful forces step in
market competition and develop complicated powerful networks which cause group
30 Liu Jingyou, "Jian lun chengxu bi shiti geng zhongyao" [A brief discussion: the procedure is more
important than the substance], Legal Daily, 17 February 2002, p. 3; Zhou Fenmian, "Yi fa xingzheng
qi neng zhishi kongtan" [How could the exercising administrative power according to law turn out to
be hollow words], Legal Daily, 3 February 2002, p. 2.
31 Ibid.
32 See Fazhi ribao, 4 February 2002, p. 1.
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corruption and also make it difficult to detect their misconduct. Many projects, including
"fishing projects" [diaoyu gongcheng, ftjUlfM], attract investment and commercial bids
while not returning investment after local governments obtain the money, using vague
regulations to make things difficult for investors.33
The direct reason for causing widespread administrative interference and lack of
judicial independence is firstly worship for rule of man and good officials. Second, moral
weakness is over all kinds of life and workplaces, leading social credit declined. Third, poor
legal consciousness results in widespread use of extra-legal means such as official power,
money and social connections, which has deep influence from legal tradition. When social
disputes can be resolved in a much easier and efficient way through exercising official power
than legal remedy, what is the driving force for establishing a rule-of-law state? In this legal
environment, how can one rein in judicial corruption and intense resistance of law
enforcement? Thus, rule of law requires multiple efforts to transform China's culture, way of
thinking, political culture, and legal tradition. Finally, the deep fondness and high
expectations for virtuous officials often surpass the faith in the law while ignoring the
construction of rule of law.34
Poor legal awareness among Chinese officialdom is also manifested in the worship
of official power and lack of respect for law. The historical concept of official-based idea or
mind has been discussed frequently in China because of its link to political corruption and
culture. This idea or mentality is explained as viewing an official post as the basis of
everything in a person's life. To get an official post is considered to be the highest goal. A
person's value, position and role are all assessed in terms of whether he is an official and
how senior his rank is. In practice, this culture results in the phenomenon of pursuing or
requesting an official post, selling and buying an official post, and other forms of
bureaucratic practices. These are closely related to the long-standing centralised and unitary
administrative system.35
In contemporary China, holding an official post is still regarded as a source of
wealth and privilege. Although the economy has developed greatly, it is still early for an
independent business class to have grown up, which is often considered to be the main
counter force against state bureaucracy. On the contrary, managers depend to a great extent
33
Qian Hongdao, "Fazhi de jiannan" [The difficulties of the rule of law], Cankao wenxuan (Beijing)
[Selected articles for reference], no. 24 (2001), pp. 7-8.
34 For a similar accounts of current legal culture, see Zhan Meibai, "Lun shangfa jingshen" [On spirit
of respect for law], Fazhi yu shehuifazhan, no. 3 (1999), pp. 88-91.
35
Zhang Xiaolin, "'Guanbenwei' yisi jiexi" [The explanation of the 'official-based concept'], Renmin
ribao, 17 Janurary 2002, p. 9; Also see Liu Zhanfeng, "Haishi 'guanbenwei' zai zuosui: gaijing dang
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on the state for investment and other support. At the local level, SOE managers are usually
officials appointed by the government, and local private businesses have to maintain a close
relationship with local authorities in order to survive. Thus, official posts or official
connections are crucial in economic development and people's lives, making pursuit of an
official post greatly attractive.
The importance of seeking an official career has a long tradition. In many areas, the
selling and buying of official posts has become a business by corrupt officials in
contemporary China. For example, in 1997, the Organisation Bureau of Pingyang county, in
Wenzhou, Zhejiang, made over 300,000 yuan through selling official posts within its
jurisdiction. In the same year, a vice-mayor in Anyang, Henan, sold 18 official posts.36 In a
typical case in Shaoguan, Guangdong, an individual businessman [ge ti hu, was
rocketed to the position of an important official. He paid 430,000 yuan to go through the
process from joining the Party, entering into the Party cadres system, as a lower rank official,
to finally becoming the Secretary of a district Political-Legal Commission, in one month.37
In order to deal with this misconduct, the CCDI and the Ministry of Central
Organisation issued a notice to call for preventing and investigating illegal practice in the
selection and promotion of Party and governmental cadres. Wang Huilin, a Party secretary in
Changzhi, Shanxi, restructured and approved 432 official posts, and quickly promoted 278,
during the two months before his retirement. In Ningxia, from 1991 to 1998, three
consecutive Party Secretaries in Tongxin county, Ma Yong, Ding Lin, and Shang Jingyu,
received money for appointing 357 cadres, of which 140 personnel were assigned using
forged identities and official seals, and one was even a student of a secondary school, who
was appointed as a cadre in charge of birth planning, and collected his salary. Those
corruption cases which involved the selling of official posts are only the tip of an iceberg.38
Soon after gaining an official post by the means of bribery, these people start to use
their power in pursuing personal gains. At each level, Party and governmental officials have
usually formed a complicated web in which the whole officialdom is connected, sharing
honour or disgrace [rong ru yu gong, This group often excessively protects its
own interests and benefits within the area of its jurisdiction while distorting state laws and
de zuofeng xilie tan zhiwu" [It is still the 'official-based' idea that makes mischief: part five of series
of articles on improving Party working style], Renmin ribao, 3 April 2001, p. 9.
36 He Qinglian, Xiandaihua de xianjing: dangdai Zhounguo de jingji shehui wenti [The trap of
modernisation: economic and social problems in contemporary China], Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo
chubanshe, 1998, pp. 343-344.
37
Ling Zhijun and Ma Licheng, Huhan: Dangdai Zhongguo de wuzhong shengyin [Holler: Five
voices in contemporary China] (guangzhou: guangzhou chubanshe, 1998), p. 345.
38 Liu Haiqi, "Mai guan yu jue, fa bu rong" [Law does not allow the selling of official posts], Fazhi
ribao, 4 June 2001, p. 1.
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central policies.39 Such powerful official circles can damage any well-established legal
system, not to mention a limited one. In some regions, local authorities operate in this way
and even cover up organised crime.
Seeking an official position is thus attractive and profitable. In China, administrative
power is ever expanding with no effective restriction from either the law or the regime. The
lack of control over this power allows of a wide range of privileges and powers used at the
discretion of state officials. The phenomenon of pursuing private gains through public office
is rampant and is endangering current Party rule. In the process of the marketisation of the
public ownership system, individual officials and their designated entrepreneurs have taken
control of local businesses, leading to the development of an authoritarian economy. In this
trend, the market economy is becoming a governmental market economy in which official
power plays an important role. It is estimated that during 20 years of economic reform, the
expansion of China's political capital that closely related to political and administrative
power has brought the very few people in power a profit ofmore than 30,000 billion yuan.40
Although campaigns against the corruption of officials have been launched regularly
and many officials, including some senior ones, have been punished, the situation has not
been controlled and is deteriorating as more senior officials become involved. Enthusiasm
for attaining an official post is still high, because the cost of breaking the law is low as
compared to the vast profits to be obtained from corruption. Punishment for the misconduct
of officials is insufficient, since they are often dealt with by Party discipline or
administrative rules and hardly punished by law. In serious cases involving circumstances
that would have great social consequences, the courts are instructed to try these cases
according to decisions made by the Party. The purpose of this procedure is to warn other
officials, to conceal the working of the bureaucratic system and to appease the people.
Sometimes, these accused officials are made scapegoats in order to cover up a power
struggle. The weakness of the constitution and judiciary in effectively restricting official
abuses encourages cadres to escape from legal punishment when they break the law, and
increases the interdependence between lower level officials and higher-level ones.
As He Qinglian states, the current efforts in perfecting the legal system do not touch
or probe into the historical and cultural bases of the rule of man [and there is the absence of
institutional separation and restriction of state power], so reform will not necessarily lead
China to the rule of law. A legal culture has the potential to encourage the observance and
enforcement of the law. However, according to her, the wide ignorance of law and abuses of
39
Zhong Guoxin, Zhongguo gaige bao [China's reform news], 19 August 1998, p. 6.
40
Ling Zhijun and Ma Licheng, p. 347.
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power in the whole bureaucracy have seriously undermined the emergence of a modern legal
culture. People's indifference to and distrust of the law has counteracted the hope that the
growth of a legal consciousness would develop. Creating this awareness of law necessarily
involves bringing citizens into the process of making law and building legal institutions that
can be relied upon. These are important components in transforming a society ruled by man
into one ruled by law.41
As with state officials, ordinary people are also influenced by traditional images of
the courts and law. Administrative power rather than the law is regarded as the most
important means of getting things done. Moreover, PRC officials have set bad examples for
society. There is still a widespread belief in China that officials are more powerful than the
law, and that the courts must also obey the Party and the government. The people believe
that there is no difference between the PSB, courts, and prosecutors and that lawyers also
must obey the three agencies or they will be suppressed. People regard the law as a means of
dealing with those who have no official connections, while powerful parties are not
substantially affected by it. In most cases, governmental agencies and officials protect each
other against civilians, leading to the parties who have followed all the legal rules being
wrongly sentenced. In practice, the lack of judicial independence and efficiency in dispute
settlement and rampant judicial corruption have also turned people away from the law.
The popularity of expecting "clear-sky officials" [qingtian, W'X], refers to clean and
upright officials in China's legal culture reflects a deep-rooted favour for the traditional rule
of man. Films and plays adapted from traditional stories about virtuous officials still appeal
to the public at this time. Peasants are still in fear of the government and those who are in
power, and look forward to upright and powerful officials occasionally turning up to
maintain justice and be concerned about the people's welfare. At the same time, citizens
show their suspicion of the good rule of man, regarding a good legal system as a necessary
supplement only.42 This wish for clean officials may undermine the current effort to establish
the rule of law. The role of such "clear sky" officials to help legal reform is limited in that
the personal authority of such officials is superior to that of law since there is no separation
between the judiciary and administrative power. Literature and plays about clear sky officials
concern accounts of the rule of law which show that the law is weak, while the officials are
powerful since they can arbitrarily interfere in a case. It seems to Chinese people, especially
41 See Liu Xin, "Renzhi yu shehuizhuyi fazhi buneng xiang jiehe" [It is impossible for the rule ofman
to be united with socialist rule of law] in Zhang Jin (ed.), Fazhiyu renzhi wenti taolun ji [Collected
papers on the rule of law and the rule of man] (Beijing: Qunzong chubanshe, 1981), p. 88.
42
Zhang Shuming, Zhongguo 'zhengzhi ren': Zhongguo gongmin zhengzhi suzhi diaocha baogao
[China's 'political men': report of investigation on political quality of Chinese citizens] (Beijing:
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1994), pp. 51-52.
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peasants, that law is useless without good officials to enforce it. It is the rule of man and the
worship of power that cause administrative interference in the independence of the judiciary.
With the tradition of combining administrative and judicial power, it is easier or more
effective to use power to resolve social conflicts than to use the legal system. In this situation,
we can say that it is definitely not the case that its goal of the rule of law has been reached.
In rural areas, there has been a wide restoration of clan or kinship tradition, as well
as temples or other types of superstition. Clans are controlling the countryside in some areas.
They encourage farmers to safeguard clan interests against any external infringement
including that from the implementation of state laws and court decisions. Instead, the use of
old clan rules to regulate rural affairs and even the exercise of judicial power to detain and
punish those who breached these rules are very common in recent times. The revival of the
clan organisations is an obstacle to modernisation and the rule of law. If the clan system
returned throughout the rural areas, the rule of law will meet resistance from over 80% of the
population. This will also indicate that, on the one hand, the state has failed to protect
farmers' interests from various infringements against them, and on the other hand, state
policy and law have failed to get through in vast rural areas. At the same time, clans are
utilised as a tool of extortion against farmers and in committing organised crimes in
contemporary China, in which many local officials are involved.
Certainly the Party-state has realised the severity of this situation. In 2002, Wen
Jiabao, who was then vice Prime Minister in charge of rural work, said that in 2001, with the
exception of the countryside around Shanghai, Beijing, and in Jiangsu and Tibet, all the rest
of the rural areas had witnessed over 7,000 conflicts between peasants and local
administrations. He said that Party policy had failed to be implemented in rural areas, and
widespread uprising has brewed there. He attributed the main responsibility to Party and
government officials for their ignorance of the suffering of peasants due to excessive taxes
and fees imposed by local authorities, and for their tolerance of local black and evil forces
manipulating and oppressing peasants. Many rural governments had not been functioning for
a long time and some of them had even participated in anti-government activities.43 In 2001,
nearly eight million peasants took part in these anti-local government actions, resulting in the
death or injury of around fifteen thousand people.44
In China's legal culture, the judicial process is not designed to encourage the litigant
parties to be active and aggressive in the trial, but to ensure the judges' control in the trial.
43 Wen Jiabao, "Quanguo nongchun shehui fazhan qingkuang" [The national situation of social
developments in rural areas], given at the Conference of the Central Committee on Rural Work held
on 7 January 2002. Zhengmin [Debate and contention] (Hong Kong: Baijia chubanshe), no. 252
(January 2002), pp. 9-11.
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This state-dominated justice accounts for many irregular judicial practices, such as the small
number of witnesses, the use of torture in extracting confessions and the misunderstanding of
the role of lawyers.
Witness evidence is not very important in practice, and it is the fact of substantial
justice, not formal or procedural justice, that is valued. For example, the right to silence in
the criminal process is a totally new concept, confusing many people because they do not
understand why it is necessary to inform a suspect of his right to silence since he has
possibly committed a crime. They think that whether there has been a crime or not is a
matter of fact; it is not decided by the court failing to follow certain procedures. People could
find it difficult to understand a suspect being set free as a result of police failing to inform
him of the right to silence. Moreover, the method for proving a crime also reveals a
traditional emphasis on substance. The law generally requires clear facts and sufficient
evidence in deciding a crime irrespective of any reasonable doubts that still exist in the case.
The use of torture for extracting confessions has been criticised both at home and
abroad, but it is difficult to stop this practice. In spite of the legal prohibition against torture,
law enforcement officials are reluctant, in certain cases, to give up using torture to make
suspects confess. Ordinary people ignore this as long as it does not have anything to do with
them. Many people think that the legal procedures eventually serve substantive justice. Once
the suspects are proven guilty, the use of torture for extracting confessions will be ignored.
Western legal cultures take individual freedom and rights very seriously, and the
major purpose of their criminal justice systems is to protect the right and freedom of the
individual rather than those of society as a whole. The emphasis is more on setting an
innocent person free, through safeguarding procedural justice, than on preventing a suspect
escaping from punishment through focusing on substantive justice. In contrast, Chinese
culture particularly emphasises collective, social and public interests more than individual
interests. A major purpose of its criminal system is to maintain social order rather than to
safeguard individual freedom. It focuses more on attacking the crime than on protecting
individuals. Rather than emphasise preventing a person from being wrongly sentenced, the
Chinese system emphasises preventing a potential criminal from escaping punishment.
The outcome of the Simpson case in the United States will never be accepted in
China.45 When Professor Alan Dershowitz (from Harvard University), one of Simpson's
defence team, gave a talk at the "high level symposium of the Sino-American criminal
adjudication practice" held in Beijing in 2001, he pointed out that the success of the defence
44 Ibid.
45 This is a case involving a famous black football player, Simpson, who was prosecuted for
murdering his wife and her boyfriend.
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in this case rested on a blood-stained glove presented by the police. It was illegally put in the
house by the police by breaking a window. Although there was almost certainly sufficient
evidence to prove Simpson's guilt, the defence team took advantage of this small deficiency
in legal procedures to build their defence. They said to the grand jury that perhaps Simpson
had killed people, but the police had presented a piece of false evidence. If the police could
present one piece of fake evidence, they could have presented a second and a third and so on.
He illustrated this by saying it was just like a person who found an insect in his noodles, who
then dumped the whole bowl of noodles rather than wait for a second insect. A famous
principle with respect to legal evidence was "do not pick up any fruit from a contaminated
tree".
This case reveals that sometimes, in order to enforce the rule of law, a society may
pay a price: let a real criminal go free. It highlights the importance of procedural justice in
protecting a suspect's legal rights and keeping a balance between judicial power and the
citizens. This case gives a positive signal to the police by warning them to act within the law.
If a tiny mistake was ignored, more illegal practices would happen in the future, leading to
no guarantees for human rights. However, this principle revealed by the Simpson case is
difficult to understand in China. Both officials and the people cannot accept the idea that, in
order to follow certain legal procedures, the court must set a real criminal free into the
community. Community safety is more important to the public than that of individuals.
Therefore, the first thing in building a society based on the rule of law is to transform
people's minds. Judicial fairness includes both procedural and substantial fairness, and
sometime a fair procedure is more important than substantial justice in protecting human
rights.
Most witnesses are reluctant to go to the court. They prefer to be interviewed by
judges outside the court rather than confront litigant parties. In practice, witness statements
are usually read out in the court: there is no cross-examination of witnesses. The lack of
witness examination in court may be attributed to the lack of effective protection and
financial reimbursement for witnesses. Moreover, the judicial system itself and the influence
of culture also contribute important reasons to this failure. People have learned not to
interfere in other people's business, including witnessing in the court against one side for fear
of damaging a harmonious neighbourhood. Although the new CPL states that it is a legal
responsibility for a person to be a witness in the court, a witness might obey the court order
by turning up at the court in order to prevent breaking the law, but he would answer "I don't
know" to all inquiries. In this situation, the judges can do nothing. Thus the problem in the
witness system remains unresolved.
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The legal culture is also an important factor behind judicial corruption. Even if the
judges are knowledgeable scholars and there is no external influence, the judiciary still
cannot be relied on to be fair and clean because of the wide and complicated personal and
social networks and connections that exist. Many judges have worked in their jurisdiction for
a long time and have formed a stable network. In this situation, it is difficult for a fair
judiciary to be realised. The use of connections in a lawsuit seriously breaches the
fundamental principles of the rule of law, which further reminds people of the image of the
law and courts in traditional times.
In recent years, some reforms have been carried out to prevent judges from handling
cases they have connections with. However, favouritism in judicial practice remains
widespread. For example, the revised judges' law and other regulations made by the Ministry
of Justice ask judges to withdraw from cases with which they have connections, and to be
responsible for the enforcement of prosecution of cases they have handled. Some scholars
suggest that judges should change work location regularly in order to separate them from
local connections. However, in terms of the huge number of Chinese judges (there are about
180,000 judges and other judicial personnel, 300,000 cadres in the judicial administration,
procuratorate and police) and other practical difficulties, such a plan is not feasible in
46
practice.
The importance of social connections or relationships is a feature also in China's
business culture, which has become an individual case study in the academic and business
world in the West.47 Taking contractual negotiations of joint ventures as an example, a
Western scholar asked whether a rational-legal institutional framework is emerging in
business negotiations in China or whether the relationship [guanxi\ between negotiators is
still very important in getting things done.48 The contract reflects mutual agreements in terms
of the reliance of contractual parties on a rational-legal system, thus this writer notes, the
joint venture relationship involves negotiations between organisations from different cultural
and institutional backgrounds; this unfamiliar situation between the partners might push
toward a more formal rational-legal approach in an economic agreement. The significance
4(1
Jing Hanchao (Vice president of the Hebei provincial supreme court), "Zhongguo wenhua yu sifa
gaige" [The Chinese culture and the judicial reform], speech at the Xinan zhengfa daxue yantaohui
[The symposium held in Southwest China University of Political Science and Law], Guo fa wang
http://www.law.com.cn (27 March 2002).
47 For example, see Pitman Potter, The Chinese Legal System: Globalisation and Local Legal Culture
(London and New York: Routledge, 2001); Guthrie Doug, Dragon in a Three-piece Suit: The
Emergence ofCapitalism in China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Richard P
Appelbaum, et al (eds), Rules and Networks: The Legal Culture ofGlobal Business Transactions
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001).
48 Guthrie Doug, Dragon in a Three-Piece Suit: the Emergence ofCapitalism in China (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 155-177.
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for such comparison, the writer states, is that if the overwhelming practice in China is to rely
on connections and trust to conclude agreements, this will have a significant impact on the
direction of economic reforms, and the type of legal system that eventually emerges.
The result of such comparison turns out to be that foreign investors, who have been
used to a rational-legal system and predictable outcomes, favour the use of arbitration
clauses in joint-venture contracts, instead of lawsuits, reveals a deep distrust of China's legal
system. They regard the institution of arbitration as more reliable than that of the judiciary in
achieving a democratic resolution to an agreement. In contrast, a Chinese organisation,
which has a close relationship with the administration, will favour settling dispute through
the Chinese legal system since they can seek social connections to affect the courts, rather
than use the international method of arbitration.49
This result of comparing Western and Chinese business culture reveals different
legal culture. It reflects the distrust ofWestern businessmen in China's courts and laws, and
at the same time shows that Chinese counterparts are well familiar with the process of the
courts in which they can seek wide connections to get things down rather than have good
faith in the legal system itself. Over twenty years of legal reform has made some
improvements in the traditional attitude towards the law and court, in areas such as favouring
the rule of man, ignorance of rights, worship of officialdom, and the instrumentalism of
law.50 However, the rule of law is far from being fully understood and accepted as a part of
the culture among the people, the officials and even the legal profession,51 as revealed below
in surveys conducted in the mid-1990s.
The legal consciousness of professionals, especially judges, should be a yardstick by
which to measure whether the rule of law is in existence. These people are highly
professional and not subject to the control of political power and other kinds of interference,
but adhere to social justice. However, the survey among judges about the meaning of law
shows that 73.8% regarded law as the will of the ruling class, 8.7% as the implementation of
justice, 17.1% as a just system and a set of rules, and 0.4% had no idea about how law could
be assessed. Compared to judges (29%), 30% of lawyers in the survey knew the contents of
49 Ibid.
50
Generally see Zhang Shinning, Zhongguo 'zhengzhi ren': Zhongguo gongmin zhengzhi suzhi
diaocha baogao [China's 'political men': report of investigation on political quality of Chinese citizens]
(Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1994); Xia Yong, Zhouxiang quanli de shidai:
Zhongguo gongmin quanli fazhan yanjiu [Toward a time of rights: study on the development of
citizen rights in China], Beijing: Zhongguo zhengfa daxue chubanshe, 1995; Gong Xiangrui, Fazhi de
lixiang yu xianshi [The ideal of the rule of law and the reality] (Beijing: Zhongguo zhengfa daxue
chubanshe, 1993).
51 Li Lin, "Fazhi de linian, zhidu he yunzuo" [The concept, system, and operation of the rule of law],
Falii kexue, no. 4 (1996), p. 7.
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the ALL and other laws.52 This indicates that judges are still strongly influenced by the
ideology of class struggle which treated law as a tool of the ruling class.
As for the awareness of rights, such as democratic rights, the role of law, and rights
concerning litigation, knowledge among citizens was patchy and generally poor.53 For
example, when citizens' rights were infringed by the government, 20.7% of the interviewed
people chose not to protest, 19.7% filed administrative litigation, 10.6% sought help through
personal contacts, and 9.8% reported the matter to the relevant authority. The rest 39.2% of
the people did not answer the survey or answered, "do not know."54 This result reflects the
traditional attitude that people fear authority and the law.
In a society based on the rule of law with well-defined rights and responsibilities for
its people, everyone knows when an individual's rights and interests are infringed; he/she
will use legal means for retribution and protection. Apart from basic human rights such as
personal freedom, dignity and property rights, citizens also enjoy litigant rights and various
economic, cultural and political rights. Laws are designed to safeguard individual rights and
freedoms rather than prevent state interests from being breached by citizens and companies.
Being aware of and safeguarding these rights, people will force state agencies and officials to
act within the law and to reduce the abuse of the law. If citizens can actively participate in
state management and supervise the structure of power, they can claim their rights and
protect their rights.55 If people are convinced that the law applies equally to everyone and
protects every individual, they will build their confidence in the new legal order. Building
the concept of rights will help foster a good legal consciousness.
However, the importance and scope of citizen rights has not been fully understood or
adequately defined in the law. Take the right to litigation for example. In spite of rapid
increase in cases taken to court, most people remain in favour of extra-legal means to resolve
their conflicts. This attitude is not only a continuation of the legal tradition but also a
response to the current judicial practice. Even some very serious cases such as rape are often
resolved between both parties. A considerable number of civil and commercial cases are
settled outside the courts each year, especially cases against a state agency, for the reasons
discussed in chapter five.
52
Gong Xiangrui, p. 73.
53
Gong Xiangrui, p. 25.
54
Gong Xiangrui, p. 94.
55 Ma Changshan, "Gongmin yishi: Zhongguo fazhi jincheng de neiquli" [The consciousness of
citizenship: the internal driving force for China's legal system process], Faxueyanjiu, no. 6 (1996).
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With the development of a new market economy, concepts such as social justice,
efficiency, social control, and the protection of rights, all need to be properly defined.56 The
economic development creates a situation in which the leadership may recognise the need to
make laws relating to the protection of rights and interests. Therefore, the old concept of the
relationship between the state and the individual with respect to rights and obligations should
be re-evaluated.57 China's new concepts of rights and responsibilities emphasis the balance
between the two with no one prior to another. This combination of rights and responsibilities
is in compliance with Party requirements of Chinese characteristics. Since the reform and
opening up, the relationship between the state and society has been gradually changing
because the centralised economic system no longer exists as before, and social interests are
becoming increasingly plural and they need to be treated equally before the law by changing
civil and public laws.
As Keith and Lin observe, the new slogan "small government and big society",
which has been advocated to rectify the irrationality of an old economy, would not work
effectively in protecting rights if the state failed to actively enforce the rule of law in order to
assure social justice. However, they state, the regime has shown an ambivalent attitude
towards the rule of law by both emphasising the supremacy of the law and restricting
political power by the law, and the importance of relying on a strong state to reinforce the
rule of law and supports social justice.58 The collapse of the Guangdong International Trust
and Investment Corporation (GITIC) is an example in which the state would depart from the
rule of law when that suited its needs.59
:,fl Ronald C. Keith and Lin Zhiqiu, Law and Justice in China's New Marketplace (New York:
Palgrave, 2001), p. 11.
57 Keith and Lin, P. 9.
58 Ibid, p. 43.
59 The GITIC was established in 1980 by Guangdong provincial government. By 1988 it had
expanded its business to 1,000 areas with an asset of more than 30 billion yuan. As a state-owned
company, the legal risk of the company was ignored since investors assumed that the provincial
government or even the central government would ultimately guarantee any debt the company
incurred. Before the collapse, GITIC bonds were yielding 250 basis points above the rate of US
treasuries, and thus many foreign investors put their money on the company bonds, despite that fact
that the relationship between the company and its sovereign was unknown. In order to keep track of
external debts the central government regulations required that loans by foreign lenders to domestic
Chinese enterprises be registered with the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE).
Unregistered debt is mostly unenforceable under Chinese bankruptcy law. By 1995 the company
further expanded its business scope, and later it illegally absorbed deposits from 25,000 local
depositors at an interest rate much higher than that set by the People's Bank of China (PBC). In
October 1998, the PBC closed GITIC and its several branches in Guangdong because it had incurred
debt of approximately USD 4.5 billion, of which the foreign debt was approximately USD 1.93 billion,
half of which was not registered with the SAFE. In 1999, GITIC applied for bankruptcy, and the
central and local governments refused to undertake any responsibility for the GITIC's debt, since the
legal framework in this area was unclear. Thus the application of bankrupt law rather than central
financial policies resulted in the company avoiding heavy foreign debt, left many foreign creditors
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The implementation of economic reform imposed from above has hampered the
emergence of a civil society in China that will foster a legal culture of a modern rule of law.
A new development is the close co-operation between officials and new business group, both
of whom share a dependence on the state. Most township and village enterprises and new
economic players rely on local governments for resources. Non-governmental organisations
and economic units are not independent interest groups, but instead act as a bridge between
the government and the society. Socialist corporatism today is obstructing the wider
recognition of individual and organisational autonomy. If the law does not restrict the Party
and the government from interfering in the economy, it will be difficult for people to conduct
market activity in accordance with fair and accountable principles. This will hamper the
success of a market economy and the emergence of a civil society in China,
It is clear, therefore, that the present legal culture is far from supporting the
establishment of the rule of law. Whether in economic, political or in social life, China's
tradition, culture and some current practices are hampering this process. The traditional
mentality of state administrators and people towards law permeates their every day life. The
fostering of a modern legal culture is crucial for the reform of the legal system.
The Party has called for combining the rule of virtue with the rule of law in order to
improve the general moral standard of the public, especially that of state officials and
members of the legal profession. In official texts, socialist culture should comprise all fine
cultures, fully reflecting the spirit of the times and of creativity. It should include developing
the fine cultural traditions inherited from Chinese history and from the revolutionary
traditions. The Party's ethical foundations for society include patriotism, collectivism, and
socialism, a text on socialist spiritual civilisation, based on traditional morality and
communist ideology. Like traditional Confucian officials, the CCP, many scholars, and the
new rich entrepreneurs regard the rule of law alone as insufficient to deal with ever-
increasing corruption and crime in the economic sphere. The addition of an ethical and
cultural program is required.
The combination of the rule of law and the rule of virtue is a mix up of the
traditional rule of man, the role of the Party and the requirements for establishing a socialist
market economy. It shows that the CCP is using multi means to administer the state rather
than relying on the rule of law. The need to maintain Confucian traditions and values is
with limited or no remedies. For a close study of the case, see William Gamble, "Economic Effects of
Legal Infrastructure - Collapse of the Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation",
the University of Virginia Darden Graduate School of Business Administration Alumni Forum, 25
March 1999 (http://www.Darden.Virginia.edu/). It can be accessed through the website of the
Emerging Market Strategies Company
found by the writer, (http://www.xensei.com/users/gamblet/Guang.htm).
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obviously useful to the Party-state, as it stresses respect for authority and the existing order,
although the potential risks to China's modernisation.60
In contemporary China, legal culture is composed of three parts: traditional legal
culture, the PRC elite legal culture, and legal culture among the ordinary people.61 Tradition
and PRC elite culture in legal system are continuously affecting and determining the
direction of the legal reform. Since all round reforms in China is a top down process, the
ordinary people usually are not important in affecting the formation of a modern legal
culture. However, tradition has become a part of public culture, and the plural interests
arising from the market economy will also bring some, limited perhaps, changes to the
attitude of the public towards rights and law. This change may also be taken account by the
ruling elite when they make policies relating to legal development. To date, the sign for this
change and its impact on the elite legal idea has not come into being, due to the overall level
of legal consciousness remains weak.
3. A case study: the attitude towards lawyers
People's attitude towards the legal profession often sheds light on the level of legal
development in a society. While the people have deep distrust and fear of judges, the police,
prosecutors, and governmental officials, they have an even deeper disrespect for lawyers.
Lawyers' position in contemporary China has provided a particular insight into the
difficulties facing the development of the rule of law.
The existence of lawyers in the legal system is not a Chinese tradition, but a
completely Western transplantation, which was started in the early twentieth century, but
never fully developed in practice until the 1990s. With the intensification of economic
reforms, lawyers are playing an increasingly important role in protecting the legitimate rights
and interests of citizens in contemporary China.
Obstacles facing defence lawyers in cases of criminal justice highlight institutional
disrespect for and suppression of lawyers. Any sign of lawyers showing their independent
opinions will result in suppression by the police, judges, and prosecutors and by local Party
and government authorities.62 For example, they are under pressure not to remain unbiased in
cases involving local parties or government agencies. They are also under pressure not to
60 Tian Chengyou, "Rujia dezhi sixiang de de yu si" [The gains and losses of Confucian thought of the
rule of virtue], Beijing University website, 26 March 2002
(www.chinalawinfo.com/research/lgyd/details.asp?lid=3387).
61 Pitman Potter has an agreement to this view in his new book, The Chinese Legal System:
Globalisation and Local Legal Culture (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 8.
62
Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, March 1998
(www.lchr.org/pubs/descriptions/chinalaw.htm).
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take politically sensitive cases and will suffer reprisals if they do so. In practice, the biggest
obstacle bringing about change in lawyers' situation comes from the attitude of judicial
personnel towards lawyers. During the judicial process, lawyers are usually not well
respected, and their opinions are ignored. Lawyers have no recognised position and are
subject to the superiority of judicial officials, especially since the latter stand for the state
interest and can make the final decision. As a popular saying among lawyers puts it, "anyone
is a father [in litigation], only lawyers are grandsons." AAA#1I*l^iA>
teA1A] Even in front of the clerk of the court, lawyers have to be cautious, in case they
incur some displeasure that would result in unfavourable consequences for themselves and
their clients.
As a separate entity, it is difficult for the legal profession to become a part of an
authoritarian culture. Judicial personnel have the strong-minded attitude of officials and look
down on lawyers, who have no official background, although they are usually better-
educated compared with judicial officials and better equipped with legal skills. An Official is
always more powerful than an ordinary subject in China's traditional culture. In addition, the
different professional background between judicial personnel and lawyers results in
alienation between them. Judges and members of the procuratorate are not professionals, but
enjoy state power, which enables them to use power at their own discretion in a case, in
order to compensate for their disadvantage compared to lawyers.
Despite holding professional qualifications and legal skills, lawyers can do nothing
without the support of judicial power. They have to cultivate a special relationship with
judicial personnel in order to succeed in their careers. This abnormal relationship between
judicial personnel and lawyers, based on the inferior position of lawyers compared to judges,
creates tremendous opportunities for corruption and the miscarriage of justice. It is a reality
at the local level in China that judicial officials and lawyers have formed mutually beneficial
interest groups within and outside their workplaces.
This clearly reveals lawyers' subordinate position to judges. Outside the courts they
address each other as brothers [chen xiong dao di, $j\AiSS]. Sometimes lawyers rely on
the judge to introduce the case. Under the current judicial practice, some lawyers will build a
good relationship with judges, even if this is against their conscience. This situation
influences many people in deciding whether they want to go to the court, and if they choose
to do so, whether it is necessary to retain a lawyer. They consider that retaining a lawyer is a
waste ofmoney, and they prefer to seek the help of a judge.
Discrimination against lawyers also comes from other state agencies, such as the
1CAB, Tax and Price Bureau, and the Post Office, from whom lawyers often have to seek
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help. These agencies may not directly interfere with lawyers' work, but they are reluctant to
co-operate when lawyers require them to provide evidence, since lawyers have no state
power and cannot mandate them to do so. They consider that lawyers represent private
interests, and they can arbitrarily impose high charges for lawyers' request for information
and evidence. It was reported that a private businessman was prevented by the local ICAB
from retaining a lawyer for his company. Since the Bureau was in charge of local enterprises,
it tried to maintain its control over local businesses, considering the participation of lawyers
to be unfavourable and inconvenient.63
The personal safety of lawyers in their work is sometimes not assured. According to
the All-China Lawyers' Association (ACLA), the number of various criminal charges against
lawyers since 1996 amounts to over 100 cases since 1996. The actual incidents are more than
the published figure. More than 300 lawyers have been maltreated by various measures
ranging from criminal detention, arrest, being putting on the most-wanted criminal list,
labour camp, put on bail while waiting for trial, tried in the criminal court and sentenced.
Between 10 and several dozen incidents involving lawyers being illegally detained, arrested,
attacked and expelled from courtrooms have happened each year.64 The year 1995 witnessed
a sharp increase in lawyers being accused and humiliated, and was called by lawyers and
legal scholars "the year of lawyers' suffering" [liishi shounan nian, At the time
of writing this thesis, there are still some lawyers being detained and the effort to rescue
them is being made by the ACLA and some NPC members.
The following cases involve the court suppression of lawyers who tried to express their
different opinion.65
He Xin, a lawyer in Jiangxi, offended the court president by pointing out illegalities
in a trial. The latter used his power to prohibit his court from accepting any cases represented
by He Xin. He did this by refusing to accept any legal documents drafted by He. He Xin
appealed to the provincial Discipline and Investigation Commission (the Party supervisory
organ) in 1995. At the same time, the Commission received some letters criticising the court
president's misconduct. He Xin was assumed to be the writer of these letters. The court
president accused He Xin of libel and taking advantage of his connection with the local
prosecutor, but the latter refused to bring a charge against He as he had no proof. The
president then fded a lawsuit against He in his own court. During the trial, the president
distributed material stating that He Xin did not have a lawyer's qualification and that the





procuratorate was investigating him. The trial lasted for two years and finally sentenced He
to one year in prison for defamation of the court president.
In 1995, a lawyer, Zhang Songmin, was beaten by court police, because he disagreed
with the judges in the trial. He was detained for ten days for interfering with the execution of
official duties. In the same year, a Heilongjiang lawyer, Zhou Changxi, took part in a lawsuit
held in Hebei. He had a disagreement with the judges during the trial that resulted in him
being handcuffed to a chair by three court police and being beaten for 75 minutes. This
caused cerebral concussion, a clot of blood to form in his the head and other injuries. Also
during this year, three lawyers in Liaoning were expelled from the court because their
opinion differed from the judges. This gained nationwide attention.
The Zhang Jun case (a senior lawyer in Taiyuan, Shanxi) has attracted wide attention
in China with respect to the maltreatment of lawyers.66 Zhang Jun had a high reputation in
Shanxi. He was a member of both the officially approved China Democratic League and the
Shanxi provincial People's Political Consultative Conference (SPPCC). He was also a
scholar-lawyer (medical consultant and Dean of the Shanxi Provincial Political and Legal
Office). In 1990, he was arrested by the police in Xiyang County in Shanxi in the name of
resisting the enforcement of court decisions. Zhang protested that it should be the client who
should be held responsible for resisting the enforcement of the court decision rather than the
lawyer. The arrest was carried out without the knowledge of the Taiyuan judicial authorities.
The county police interrogated and maltreated Zhang, in turn, day and night, without
allowing him to eat or sleep. Zhang was in his 60s and this treatment caused gastric bleeding
and loss of consciousness. The police, fearing his death, called the ambulance to send him to
the hospital but were stopped by the political secretary of the local PSB, who pulled out the
tube connecting Zhang to the infusion, in spite of the objection of the doctor who was
treating Zhang.
The reason behind the arrest was tracked to an occasion one year ago in 1989, when
Zhang represented a case in which his clients, the villagers of Pangjiayu, complained at the
Xiyang county government's action of giving 500 mu of their village land to the next village.
Zhang stated in the court that the acquisition of land had infringed the collective-owned
property rights enjoyed by his client. The Xiyang court, which was instructed by the local
government, rejected Pangjiayu villagers' request for the return of the requisitioned land.
Zhang appealed on behalf of the villagers, but the second trial sustained the previous
decision. Zhang then appealed to the provincial Peoples' Congress and Political Consultant
66
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190
Committee. At the same time, he convened an academic debate in which the legal experts
who were participating all considered the court decision to be wrong.
In March 1990, the provincial government held a meeting attended by government
court officials to discuss this case. Zhang reported the experts' opinion on the case to the
meeting and then criticised the Xiyang county government saying its decision had seriously
infringed his clients' property rights to land, and that it had breached the constitution and the
law by the illegal detention, beating, and harassment by using a police dog, of the villagers
during the forceful land requisition. This had been done in order to pursue private interests.
Zhang's speech offended the corrupt officials so much that the whole Xiyang authority
endeavoured to take an open revenge against Zhang Jun, aiming to bringing him down. They
wanted to prove which one was more powerful, Zhang's influence in Shanxi legal circles or
the governmental power (even if a county level).
In spite of these threats, Zhang Jun insisted in sticking to his opinion in order to
protect his client's interests. At the same time, as a member of the SPPCC, he had the legal
right to expose and supervise judicial and administrative corruption at the same level as the
committee. In the end, his persistence resulted in his secret arrest. During the interrogation,
the county prosecutors said to Zhang, "Don't be too proud. As long as your case is in our
hands, we can easily change the nature of the case as we wish, although we will meet more
difficulties and need to make greater efforts in your case compared to other cases."
In January 1991 the Xiyang court tried this case, and Zhang's defence team, led by
Li Fei, who was jointly retained by the Shanxi provincial Justice Bureau and the provincial
Bar Association, were prevented from meeting Zhang. When the trial started, the defence
lawyers were not permitted to give their speech, and Li Fei had to grab the microphone to
quickly read out several pieces of evidence that proved Zhang's innocence. The court
president, Chen Laixi, ordered the lawyers to be dragged away from the courtroom into a rest
room. Chen told Li Fei that the speech he had made in the court was not acceptable and must
be withdrawn in order for the trial to continue. Li refused to change his statement. Over
twenty policemen then rushed into the room and hit the lawyers with police baton. The
beating and the noise made by the suffering lawyers upset the people outside in the
courtroom. When later the lawyers were pushed out of the rest room and into the court, they
grabbed the microphone again to speak to the public, "we came here to perform our legal
duty but our personal safety could not be guaranteed, so we have to leave." With the help of
some of the people listening (most of whom were Zhang's clients from the village), the
lawyers escaped from the court. Without a fair trial, the Xiyang court eventually sentenced
Zhang Jun to 15 years' imprisonment.
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This was a very typical case involving the use of political and judicial power to
prevent a lawyer from performing his legal duty. This case was clearly a miscarriage of
justice. The Xiyang officials got what they wanted, while all the superior authorities could
do nothing to prevent this from happening. This reveals the great problem of the supremacy
of the authority. The Shanxi Bar Association reported this case to the provincial Peoples'
Congress, requiring that it investigate it, in order to safeguard the legal rights of lawyers.
Zhang's unfair treatment aroused a wide sympathy and support from all walks of life. Fellow
lawyers encouraged Zhang not to give up, regarding his fate as a sacrifice in the effort to
safeguard the law and human rights during the process of building the rule of law. The
ACLA and the Shanxi Bar Association made several attemps to rescue Zhang Jun, and the
latter even established a special association for the protection of rights named after Zhang
Jun. When Zhang was arrested, his wife, a lawyer too, was also arrested and was not set free
until 1993, on the condition that she did not appeal for her husband's release.
In 1995, the SPC intervened in this case, and the Shanxi provincial government
instructed the provincial higher level court to retry the case. Zhang Jun was declared not
guilty and was released in 1997, but the formal judgement was not made until June 2001 in
which Zhang Jun was cleared of two crimes out of the three charges (taking bribery,
extortion and inciting villagers to resist the enforcement of the court decision) made against
him by the Xiyang court. However, the third charge remained. Moreover, none of the
government and judicial officials involved in persecuting him was punished, and Zhang did
not obtain any compensation. This last decision remained unacceptable to Zhang Jun. After
his release he continuously appealed to the relevant authorities, demanding that these abusive
and corrupt officials be dealt with by the law; and also that he be cleared completely. His
appeal was consistently given wide support.
Fifty-one members of the SPPCC signed a joint appeal to the NPC, questioning why
the unjust treatment of Zhang Jun, which had had such a great and adverse impact on
lawyers and the attitude of the public towards the authority of law, could not be rectified for
so long, who was resisting the rectification, and why some officials frequently abused their
power and considered they were superior to the law, and which should be greater between
the law and the power. However, up until 2002, Zhang Jun was still fighting for his rights by
submitting his 647th appeal to the supreme authorities and this case is still one of the motions
made by the NPC members to the annual conference of the NPC and the CPPCC (PRC
Political Consultant Congress).67
67 Falii fuwu shibao [Legal service times], 12 April 2002, p. 7.
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The official attitude towards lawyers inevitably has a great impact on the general
public. The historic weakness of law versus the power and negative image of the "imperial
litigant masters" has preoccupied people's minds. Most people get their image of lawyers
from films about Western courts. They regard lawyers as ideal protectors of the rights of the
weak and justice without fear of any pressure. In reality, lawyers can only provide a legal
service based on evidence and by only representing the interests of one side in each case.
They may promote social justice through their work, but are not powerful gods of justice.
The fulfilment of social justice is mainly dependent upon the judiciary and other state
authorities.
In practice, lawyers are always expected to win a case; if they do not win they will
be blamed or despised for not performing their duty. A client, who needs the help of a lawyer,
may show his respect for the lawyer and co-operation with him at first. But once his case has
been lost, he will often harbour a grudge against his lawyer. In any legal system, lawyers are
expected to protect rights and interests only according to the law and procedures, by using
their professional skills. In China, many clients do not realise that the final result of a case is
determined by many factors beyond the control of their lawyer.
People also assume that lawyers have great knowledge and are capable of
representing any type of case. A lawyer is expected to take any types of case. Some lawyers
indeed take on a wide range of cases in order to make money. But in a rational legal system,
a lawyer can only be a specialist in one or a few fields. Many people regard lawyers as bad
people who like to stir up disputes and involve people in litigation, and also defend
criminals.68
Lawyers often suffer from the maltreatment of the litigant parties, especially the
opposing party in a case. In the same year in 1995, for example, Ren Shangfei, a Hebei
lawyer, was held as a hostage and was maltreated for 120 days by the opposing party, a
manager of a fireworks factory in Hunan. Ma Haiwang, dean of a Shanxi law firm,
represented the wife in a divorce case. When he was in the firm's office one day, the
husband in the case came with several people and raided the firm, beating Ma for five hours,
causing massive injuries. One eye had been gouged out and around the other eye was split
and required over twenty stitches. There were also serious injuries to his body.69
Two lawyers in Sichuan went to a court in Dali, Yunnan, to take part in a lawsuit for
their client. The parties of the opposite side used an axe to burst into the hotel room where
the two lawyers were and beat them up, and even poured the boiling water over the lawyers'
68
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heads, causing serious damage to the face of and arms of one of the lawyers. Pei Shan, a
female lawyer in Urumqi, was beaten and humiliated in the courtroom by the opposite
parties without the court officials protecting her or even preventing the attack. She suffered
broken ribs.70
In many clients' eyes, lawyers just pursue their own interests and are unreliable; in
judges' minds, they only represent one of the parties in a case and only know one side of the
picture, so judges ignore their statement in the court; in ordinary people's minds, they help
the rich and not the poor, like the litigant masters in the past. Thus, Chinese lawyers are
struggling in a complicated network of social relationships and discrimination resulting from
the current legal system. The social network of lawyers is more important than their legal
knowledge in becoming successful and rich. The requirement for the free development of the
legal profession is incompatible with the present official control of civil organisations. In a
modern society, lawyers have various roles to play, such as participating in lawmaking and
the decision making process. It is obvious that the best environment does not exist for
lawyers to fully play their role in contemporary China.
In some circumstances, they cannot even protect their own rights, not to mention
protecting their clients' rights and interests, and maintaining a balance between state power
and interests of the individual. In a state based on the rule of law, an independent legal
profession is a guarantee for fulfilling human rights and the rule of law. Whether a society
respects its lawyers or not is an indication of the level of the rule of law.
On the other hand, however, powerful forces continue to hold back progress and
change in legal reforms.71 China's history and culture does not favour an autonomous legal
profession. In an authoritarian society, the independence of any social organisation in society
will be restricted. The current situation in the development of the position and work of
lawyers reflects how far China is from the goal of building a country based on the rule of
law.72 Over twenty years have passed since the lawyer reform started in 1980, but legislation
in this area remains insufficient and many obstacles restrict the development of the position
of lawyers. They are the lowest level in the legal system, and their social functions are still
not acknowledged and respected by officialdom and populace.
70 Ibid.
71 Randall Peerenboom, Lawyers in China: Obstacles to Independence and the Defence of Rights,
New York: Lawyers' Committee for HRs Publication, 1997.
72 Li Xuan, "Zhidu quexian yu guannian diwu: dangdai liishi ye de liangda kunjing" [Shortcomings in
the system and resistance in the mind: two major difficulties of lawyers profession in contemporary
times], Zhongguo liishi xiehui website, 30 March 2002 (http://www.chineselawyer.com.cn).
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4. Conclusion
This chapter discusses cultural obstacles for implementing the rule of law, which is reflected
by both official and ordinary people's opinions and attitudes towards law, the court, business
behaviour and lawyers. The traditional mentality and culture, which emphasises the
superiority of power over the law and the use of wide social connections, continues to
influence the mind of the Chinese people to this day. The poor legal consciousness among
Party members and administrative officials as well as ordinary people restricts the
functioning of even a best legal system.
While the legal tradition is continuing to affect both elite and common people in
contemporary China, it is the ruling elite culture that dominates and determines the direction
and content of the development of a legal culture in current China. The vast majority of
people have little influence on legal development, but continuously following traditional
informal means and customs to resolve social disputes in these times of legal reform. Both
economic and social development to this day has not given rise to an autonomous civil
society or to a middle class as opposed to the state power. The new emerging business class
has become closely dependent on official support based on transaction of money and
administrative power. The regime has all the time suppressed any free opinions in the media,
and nowadays also on the internet articles, restricting any independent development of social
organisations, such as religious groups, political associations, labour unions and the legal
profession. This further hampers the emergence of a civil society, which is supportive for a
legal culture. Thus conditions for nurturing a modem legal culture, including political
democracy, legal independence, economic autonomy and self-aware social force, are
underdeveloped or do not exist.
Yi fa zhi guo is not the same as the rule of law, because the latter originates in the
West from below rather than from above through the ruling elite and its scholars. The change
in people's attitude is a long-term and gradual process, so in China a legal culture that
supports the rule of law may take several generations to foster until such ideas as the
supremacy of law and an independent judiciary so essential to the rule of law is fully realised
in the whole society. The particular context of Chinese legal culture, which combines an
authoritarian tradition, instrumental and formalist PRC ideology, and the strong resistance to
formal legal channel among the public, poses great difficulties in the implementation of the
rule of law. An independent judiciary and legal profession is not existed in the current
political structure. The transformation of a rule-of-man legal culture will inevitably be a long
process, which restricts the progress of the rule of law.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion
Legal reform, which is primarily motivated by facilitating economic reform, is also a
political self-legitimating process for the PRC regime. The law in China, for a long time, has
been a flexible tool for the ruling elite in maintaining social order and an instrument of
punishment rather than a means of rights protection and power constraint. Since 1978 and
especially after 1992, the CCP leadership has begun to take legal reform as an initiative to
facilitate the development of a market economy, from calling for "strengthening [the] socialist
legal system" to "administering the state according to law and establishing a socialist rule-of-
law country". The regime has realised the importance of the law in regulating the economy, the
state administration, and society. It still uses the legal system mainly as an instrument in
maintaining social stability, but the role of law has greatly expanded in contemporary China in
administrative, economic, and social activities.
Since the PRC's political legitimacy is mainly based on economic performance and
social stability, the legal reform must be restricted in the current political structure and the pace
of the economic reform. This constraint is manifested ideologically by the official emphasis on
the four cardinal principles and the programme of socialist spiritual civilisation. In practice, the
legal reform is comprised of two stages. One is to recover the legal institutions and make laws
to fill in a lawless vacuum in correspondence with professional development in state agencies.
The other is to establish a set of legal rules for facilitating the development of a market
economy, taking account of protecting citizens' rights and restricting governmental behaviour.
The second stage is very slow and difficult in current China because the rule of law project
lacks systematic and consistent support from the Party-state.
Both official and academic debate support a thick model of the rule of law in China by
combining traditional legal culture and socialist values, insisting on both substantial and
procedural justice. As a top-down action, the legal reform is dominated by the Party-state and
thus relies on Party intention and commitment. It is also a gradual process in that transformation
of people's mind and legal culture will be a long period and that the major concern of the regime
is the stability of the current political system. The official expression of China's rule of law is a
socialist rule-of law country with Chinese characteristics through combination of rule of law
and rule of virtue. The regime has rejected a Western liberal democratic version of the rule of
law all the time, and has always emphasises the difference between a socialist legal system and
a Western one in spite of their many similarities. The public is unaware of the distinction
between the rule of law and rule by law. The ruling elite decide the model and content of
China's legal development. The PRC legal scholars, with political and ideological restriction,
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have participated in enthusiastic debate on a socialist rule of law, and some of them have gone
beyond the Party's constraints by appealing for a Western version of the rule of law based on
safeguarding individual rights and freedom, judicial independence, and the supremacy of the
constitution and law.
However, the supremacy of the Party to all-round state affairs including legal matters
causes problems for elevating the authority of the law. The Party does not want any institutions,
such as the judiciary, lawyers, and other social groups, to become too strong to control. The
prefix "socialist" in front of the market economy and the rule of law retains for the Party the
major role in deciding the direction and content of the economic and legal reforms. Its actual
supremacy implies that it can overthrow any judicial decisions or interfere in the judicial
process whenever it finds a need. It is clear that when the CCP leadership uses the phrase rule of
law they do not mean a system that gives primacy to law above political considerations and
Party policy. Instead, it is a way to manage state power, regulate the economy and discipline
society in light of rapidly changing circumstances.
The rule of law, whether it is a Western version or a socialist one, primarily requires
that public power be legalised and restricted by law. Whether the rulers, especially the senior
ones, are constrained by law or not is a fundamental difference between a rule of law and a rule
by law. A major legal mechanism in holding state power accountable is the development of an
administrative law system, especially judicial review or the administrative litigation in China's
context. However, there are still many areas in which government acts without legality, and
those existing laws and regulations are not well defined and even in mutual conflict, and the
most important law for legal administration, the administrative procedure law, is still not made
to date. Powerful administrative agencies at local levels frequently ignore state laws and abuse
private rights and interests. All supervision including administrative redress and judicial review
are not effective in curbing administrative power.
In an authoritarian regime, the police enjoy many powers. Moreover, the top concern of
the Party in maintaining social stability has furthered police power. The unconstrained police
power has become one of major concern because infringing human rights in contemporary
China during their exercise of the power of investigating crime and maintaining social order,
especially during annual strike-hard campaigns and the so-called comprehensive management of
social security. The suppression of alien ideology and dissidents, such as free political opinions,
activists for labour rights, and religious groups, are also carried out by the PSB and the State
Security Agency. The wide use of administrative detentions to deprive people of their freedom
without judicial involvement has greatly challenged the establishment of the rule of law. The
concept of PRC human rights values collective and public interests above individual and private
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interests, and emphasises the harmony between the rights and responsibility. This has resulted in
many infringements on personal freedom and property rights, and this culture of violence
towards the individual must change for China to be considered a rights-oriented, democratic
state.
The market reform, on the one hand, requires free operation and equal participation of
both public and private actors. This calls for a small and restricted government. On the other
hand, the top-down model of economic reform needs an authoritarian government to make and
enforce laws. In China, the separation between the government and economy is hard to carry
out. Many industries and enterprises are still under state control and local governments are
deeply involved in the operation of regional economies. As a result, the newly emerged market
force has a clientelism and corporatism relationship with the state rather than a force on which a
civil society is fostered. Socialist ownership and an official-based market economy only further
the alienation in various social groups and encourage rent seeking. The deliberate mixing up of
public and private property rights has caused widespread ignorance and infringement of
property rights in the new marketplace. Conflicts between enterprises and governmental
agencies and between individuals and enterprises are tremendous. Thus the market development
fails to meet a Weberian requirement for a rational and legal process, and it also discourages the
function of formal laws and undermines the success of a market economy.
The weak PRC judiciary has resulted in frequent failures in resolving conflicts,
safeguarding rights and interests, and constraining Party and state power. An independent and
competent judiciary is crucial to curb state arbitrariness and abuse. However, the institutional
arrangement for the judiciary to be controlled by the Party and local administrative power
trumps the principles of the rule of law. The current PRC judiciary is not independent, not very
respectful and seriously corrupt. The Party wants a more competent and efficient judiciary to
resolve ever-increasing disputes arising from the rapid economic development while not a too
independent one to lose control. The dilemma is how to strengthen the judiciary without
allowing it to become a threat to the one single Party rule. Although the submissive position of
courts to political interests corresponds with the leading role of the Party, this is incompatible
with the requirements of the rule of law. Institutional guarantees such as separation of judicial
and administrative power is necessary because it can assure the judiciary is independent
institutionally from external interference. Political democracy is also the basis for establishing
the rule of law rather than something to do with Western or socialist concern.
At the same time, China's legal tradition, which has been considered a great challenge
to the rule of law, continues to exert great impact on the attitudes of officials and ordinary
people towards the law since both systems are based on a totalitarian government. In this
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system, it is the ruling elite and its scholars that make decisions for legal development and
manipulate the content of a legal culture. The public power is often more powerful than the law
in getting disputes settled, officials often follow their superiors' instructions rather than abiding
by law, and ordinary people distrust law and prefer non-legal means to resolve disputes by
seeking personal connections or using bribery. In addition to state officials, ordinary people also
lack a legal consciousness required by the rule of law. The difficulties in transforming an
official-based legal culture are huge in an authoritarian country. If the legal tradition is an
obstacle for China's legal modernisation, then the current political system provides favourable
soil for its continuation and hampers its transformation into a culture of legality.
Like the legal reform, the PRC regime is able to involuntarily start political reform
forced by the pace of the market development and foreign co-operation. The search for political
legitimacy will never stop on the part of the CCP leadership because the conflict between the
progress in a market-oriented economy and the political constraints for profound reform will
exist throughout the whole process of the reform. However, when the Party has to give up some
of its control to the law for developing the economy and curbing widespread official corruption,
its supreme position will be undermined. This explains the Party-state's ambivalent attitude
towards independent growth of any state institutions and social organisations, including the
judiciary and legal profession, not to mention any civil rights groups.
Thus, the basic problem for the regime is how to promote economic reform and
governmental efficiency while not sacrificing its ruling position. Since the key to the realisation
of the rule of law is to control Party and state power, it is particularly difficult in a China ruled
by a single political party in controlling and allocating state power. In this case, the authority of
law will never be elevated to constrain the Party that has been above the law. If the Party and
state power cannot be restricted, legal construction would only strengthen such power rather
than limit it, and law would become a more advanced and effective weapon for the officials to
gain personal interests and to suppress the people, which is more powerful rule by law rather
than the rule of law.
The rule of law is not only a legal matter but also a political and social one. Restricting
reform to the legal area is not sufficient for the success of the rule of law, which also needs
political, economic, and cultural support. Without political democracy, the legal reform itself is
impossible to change the underlying reasons of many problems such as a weak judiciary,
officials' being above law, and corruption. It is a culture of rule of law that assures officials
honest and clean rather than moral campaigns in improving official credibility, and it is a well-
established legal mechanism that defines incentive structures of appointment of officials and
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constrains their behaviour. The legal reform without political democracy may indeed improve
the role of law while at the same time also strengthening the power of the Party-state.
Many other factors, in addition to restrictions from political, ideological and cultural
areas, also affect the direction and future of the rule of law, such as the globalisation of world
economy and legal systems, incentives for more foreign investments to sustain its economic
growth, international pressure such as from the WTO principles for an effective judicial review
and rational legal rules, and requirements for standardising its human rights, and other
complicated factors from economic transition and imbalance among different regions and social
members. However, in the end, the primary obstacle remains the current state structure and
ideology, which have tied the hands of legal reform. The rule of law will not succeed without
breaking socialist ideology and one Party rule, because a socialist rule-of-law country actually
means a country based on the rule of the CCP. It is its socialist character that China's legal
system should abandon rather than its Chinese character because a legal system bears inevitably
some degree of its legal tradition in any society. Only political reform begins may the prospect
of rule of law be predicted, or the future of the rule of law can at least be imagined with the
support from political democracy. Any other difficulties facing the rule of law will be gradually
improved as time moves on. Only with greater public participation in legal developments may
an independent judiciary and media as well as an autonomous society come gradually into
being. Without reforming the PRC's political system, the rule of law even becomes impossible
for any assumptions in the near future. Under current conditions, the law is most likely to
become a more effective instrument than before for carrying Party goals and policies, or in fact
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